Search results

Max Weber's verstehen involves a reconstructive perception of the world‐view of the other. Rationality is exercised in order to understand the deeper elements of social interaction. However, does enforcing rationality amount to one being imposing? The theoretical integrity of verstehen may be valid; however, its practicality is questionable on these grounds.

This chapter investigates the, often neglected or confused, role that History plays within Austrian Economics, and suggests ways that the former can inform the latter. Relying mostly on the work of Ludwig von Mises, the chapter explores the apparent contradictions between an a posteriori discipline like History and an a priori field like economics, and argues that they are nevertheless necessary intellectual complements of each other.

What can the applied economist do? In order to explore issues playing out in the “real world” of the past or present, the applied social scientist has to make a series of decisions about what they will accept as the facts of the situation. Particularly for research questions in which the beliefs, plans, and motivations of individuals matter – such as institutional analysis – this task requires the development of some degree of intersubjective understanding, or verstehen. For over 50 years, the Bloomington School of Institutional Analysis has been using fieldwork and deep archival history to conduct meaningful institutional analysis that takes interpretation and the quest for understanding seriously. As such, those who wish to take up the call for economists to take an “interpretive turn” can gain a great deal of insight and practical advice from the study of the Bloomington School’s methods and approach.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze what the concept of agility means for communication evaluation and measurement and to challenge assumptions of goal-oriented and organization-centric approaches to evaluation and measurement.

This paper is a development debate based on a literature review, regarding agility, evaluation theory, communication evaluation approaches and what agility means for communication measurement.

Agility teaches that what works is more important than what was agreed upon in advance, so it is with more emphasis on needs rather than objectives. Regarding evaluation, the findings show that in today’s communication evaluation theory, evaluation is equated with summative evaluation of smart designed and fixed objectives. In agility, evaluation is always formative, to foster development and improvement within an ongoing activity. Consequently smart objectives are no longer valid as fixed benchmarks and ex ante and ex post evaluations do not exist; instead evaluation is an on-going and forward looking activity during action. Regarding measurement, the basic focus in agility on user needs implies that qualitative methods are more obvious than quantitative. The classic Weberian idea of “Verstehen” is helpful to understand how to focus on needs rather than objectives. This paper finally explores the merits of action research and sense-making methodology as applicable measurements in which “Verstehen” is the basis.

Agility is a very radical concept. The practical and theoretical implications of agile evaluation and measurement mean a total change for practice as well as for communication measurement and evaluation theory building.

The value of this paper is that it is the first to include agility into communication evaluation and measurement and that it, consequently, moves beyond organization-centric concepts of evaluation and measurement by bringing the often overlooked user needs into the game.

An extract from a book manuscript highlighting the specific challenge which Greenfield posed to established thinking. Discusses how the study of education administration has been characterized by attempts to develop a theory which describes, explains and predicts administrative behaviour within the school context. Assesses the contribution of the “theory movement” and Kuhnian concepts; the movement of research towards finding a phenomological alternative to explain administrative behaviour; and the development of interpretive approaches which look towards subjects such as the humanities for a possible solution. In the light of this background discusses in depth the contribution made by T.B. Greenfield to the debate and considers the viability of an interpretive alternative.

The methodological individualism and subjectivism of the Austrian tradition in economics is often associated with a methodological dualism, i.e. the claim that the nature of its subject matter, namely purposeful and intentional human action, requires economics to adopt a methodology that is fundamentally different from the causal explanatory approach of the natural sciences. This paper critically examines this claim and advocates an alternative, explicitly naturalistic and empiricist outlook at human action, exemplified, in particular, by the research program of evolutionary psychology. It is argued that, within the Austrian tradition, a decidedly naturalistic approach to subjectivism can be found in F. A. Hayek’s work.

Nobody concerned with political economy can neglect the history of economic doctrines. Structural changes in the economy and society influence economic thinking and, conversely, innovative thought structures and attitudes have almost always forced economic institutions and modes of behaviour to adjust. We learn from the history of economic doctrines how a particular theory emerged and whether, and in which environment, it could take root. We can see how a school evolves out of a common methodological perception and similar techniques of analysis, and how it has to establish itself. The interaction between unresolved problems on the one hand, and the search for better solutions or explanations on the other, leads to a change in paradigma and to the formation of new lines of reasoning. As long as the real world is subject to progress and change scientific search for explanation must out of necessity continue.

The youth justice system in England and Wales has been subjected to numerous transformations since 1997 under New Labour governments. Most approaches to the field during the period under review address the fine details of what is a politically and organisationally modernised domain. Even though this paper steps inside the system to observe some of its transformative developments, it aims to begin at the other end which enables a more rounded sociological approach to youth justice under New Labour to emerge which facilitates the production of a more detailed evaluation and understanding of the field.

This other‐end approach draws upon two main bodies of sociological theory, namely, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, which are put to work to enrich the analysis. It should be made clear that the main concern is not to produce a blueprint for a new youth justice system, but rather to draw attention to some exploratory and explanatory tools to evaluate the period under New Labour from 1997 to 2010.

Since 1997, the focus of the youth justice system has been placed upon individual and family responsibility, tougher on crime than its causes, and the creation of more efficient systems management. Furthermore, youth and criminal justice has been preoccupied with risk assessment and prediction. This has resulted in a system that is ambiguous in terms of what it is trying to achieve.

The main concern is not to sketch a blueprint for the future, but rather to analyse features of youth justice to which these theoretical and sociological traditions of Weber and Durkheim are explored in order to explain the complex dynamics of youth justice make a substantive contribution by enlarging our critical understanding.

Hayek favored both classical hermeneutics and science. His scientific reasoning shows the logical necessity of methodological dualism. Bruce Caldwell and Viktor Vanberg oppose hermeneutics and methodological dualism in favor of science. Their arguments depend on inappropriate interpretations of the doctrine of methodological dualism and an impoverished understanding of hermeneutics that fails to distinguish classical hermeneutics from universal hermeneutics. Hayek showed that “scientific” and “humanistic” approaches to social science can and should be compatible and complementary. Opposing (classical) hermeneutics in favor of science may cause a loss of knowledge by tending to deprive “scientific” social science of insights arising from more “humanistic” traditions.