Two types of opportunism, managerial and competitive, are described. Contractual covenants that control these types of opportunism are used when they are likely to occur…
Two types of opportunism, managerial and competitive, are described. Contractual covenants that control these types of opportunism are used when they are likely to occur, i.e., when there are obstacles to monitoring management behavior and when returns to starting new firms are large. These ideas are subjected to empirical test. The relationship between managers in new firms and venture capitalists is receiving increased attention in the literature (Norton and Tenenbaum 1990; Sahlman, 1988). The determinants and implications of several attributes of these relationships have been examined, including the percentage of a new firm's equity held by venture capitalists, the number of seats on the board controlled by venture capitalists, and the post‐funding activities of venture capitalists (e.g., helping the new firm raise additional capital, contacting customers, replacing management) (Barney, Busenitz, Fiet, and Moesel, 1989). While our understanding of the relationship between managers in new firms and venture capitalists is growing, one particularly important component of that relationship has yet to receive significant attention in the literature: the details of the formal contractual arrangement between managers in a new firm and venture capitalists. Often called the “terms and conditions” of the relationship between managers and venture capitalists, these contractual details specify the rights and obligations of both managers and venture capitalists throughout their entire relationship in a series of covenants (Fiet, 1991). Among other items, contractual covenants can specify limits on capital expenditures, limits on managerial salaries, limitations on raising additional outside capital, technology non‐disclosure agreements, and conditions for forcing a change in managing and liquidating the deal. The purpose of this paper is to understand the determinants of the formal contractual arrangements between managers in new firms and venture capitalists.
Entrepreneurs can sometimes come to feel that they are not so much working for themselves as they are for a banker who is taking a smaller risk and enjoying a higher…
Entrepreneurs can sometimes come to feel that they are not so much working for themselves as they are for a banker who is taking a smaller risk and enjoying a higher return. However, many such companies may not realise that their problem is not lack of money in the sense of debt, but a shortage of equity (Smitham, 1990). Depending on the nature of the small business this problem can be overcome‐a venture capital company could subscribe for part of the equity of their organisation. Venture capital is defined as an investment in an instrument that is not traded on a recognised stock exchange. Venture capital is not a modern phenomenon, although over the last 150 years, it has become more institutionalised within the international financial framework (Tulloch and Walsh, 1991).
The paper aims to increase the understanding of the venture capital industry in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) by examining the venture capital industry in Hungary…
The paper aims to increase the understanding of the venture capital industry in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) by examining the venture capital industry in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia between 1998 and 2003. Even though the number of academic studies focusing on the venture capital activities in the CEE region has been increasing in recent years, the coverage of this industry is relatively weak and not well understood by individuals, businesses, and academics.
The study focuses on the analysis of secondary data available from the European Venture Capital Association on venture capital activities in the CEE region. The paper examines three key statistics that best describe the venture capital process, namely fundraising, investing, and exiting activities.
The study has three conclusions. First, venture capital financing continues to be a major source of capital to the developing firms in the region. Second, Poland is the market leader in the region in the venture capital activities as described by key statistics. Third, the countries of CEE cannot be treated as a homogeneous block.
The study is important for two reasons. First, the study focuses on longitudinal data between 1998 and 2003, the most important period in the development of the industry. Shifts in trends in these key statistics can only be observed by analyzing longer‐term data series. Second, the evolution of the venture capital industry in the analyzed countries could be used as a blueprint for venture capital development in other countries in the region.
Modern portfolio theory demonstrates that a well‐diversified portfolio will minimize unsystematic risk. It may be impractical to achieve a well‐diversified portfolio of…
Modern portfolio theory demonstrates that a well‐diversified portfolio will minimize unsystematic risk. It may be impractical to achieve a well‐diversified portfolio of venture capital (VC) investments due to market imperfections, leading to the decision to specialize. The purpose of this paper is to determine the implications of choosing a strategy of specialization versus diversification in venture investing.
Using a dataset of US VC funds across a 20‐year time period, this paper verifies that there has been a tendency for venture capitalists to pursue a specialization strategy in both industry and stage of development of portfolio firms. A multivariate two‐limit tobit model is constructed to determine the effects of these decisions on venture success rates.
It is found that venture capitalists that diversify across portfolio company stage of development have greater success in bringing companies public and exiting their investments via acquisition. Industry specialization has no significant impact on venture fund success rates.
Success rates may be less important than returns to investors in VC. Future research should examine the effects of specialization on investor returns.
It may be beneficial to increase the level of diversification of VC investments across portfolio company stage of development. The lack of diversification across industry has not significantly affected success rates across funds, thus the tendency to specialize in particular industries over the sample period is not necessarily a poor decision.
Prior research demonstrates a tendency for specialization in VC investing. This paper examines the implications of adopting this strategy.
Joint ventures were originated as commercial or maritime enterprises used for trading purposes by merchants of ancient Egypt, Babylon, and Syria. In the United States, joint ventures date back to the 1880's when the rairoads used them for large‐scale projects. In the early 1900's joint ventures were implemented to decrease the risk, financial and otherwise, involved in shipping and gold explorations. More recently, joint ventures have become predominant as a result of technological and economic changes that led from deregulation, globalisation, and increased need for product innovation [p.7].
Reports the results of an interview and field survey study onmanagement issues in 25 Sino‐foreign joint‐venture companies. Jointventures are shown to have three special…
Reports the results of an interview and field survey study on management issues in 25 Sino‐foreign joint‐venture companies. Joint ventures are shown to have three special characteristics: transformation, system and management. Compatibility issues, in terms of values, motives, leadership styles, are cultural, social and structural. Proposes three managerial psychology strategies to improve management of joint ventures further. Suggests some useful predictors and criteria for the assessment and evaluation of joint‐venture effectiveness.
In response to Ford and Sullivan's chapter, this commentary poses a number of questions intended to help future research efforts ascertain whether levels of analysis and…
In response to Ford and Sullivan's chapter, this commentary poses a number of questions intended to help future research efforts ascertain whether levels of analysis and phases of new-venture emergence happen concurrently. Strongly in agreement with Ford and Sullivan's call for a process approach toward the study of entrepreneurial ventures, the commentary focuses on the potential processes associated with different levels of analysis that might possibly underlie the enactment and effectuation processes depicted in their model. Through the examination of these underlying processes, questions for future research are raised to help address the question, “Do levels and phases of new-venture emergence always happen together?”
Presents a detailed overview of the challenges of creating new ventures within established corporations, and offers success strategies for overcoming these challenges. The author outlines her experience from more than 25 years of consulting to new ventures, independent of and within corporate structures, including many within Fortune 500 companies. Several case studies of successful and unsuccessful ventures are described, including successful ventures that were later closed down by the corporation. Tamer offers explanations for the outcome of each venture. Findings include strategies to ensure the success of a new venture within a corporation: defining capital strategies (including start‐up and exit strategies that create profitable new divisions, and/or create spin‐off companies that bring a return on investment to the corporation); aligning the new venture with corporate goals; maintaining corporate commitment to the new venture; engaging outside experts; and creating strategic alliances inside and outside of the corporation. The strategies presented will help corporations build successful in‐house ventures which can extend the corporation’s market reach, leverage existing assets for increased profitability, or create new companies with a high return on investment. Top management, corporate strategic planners, and heads of newly‐formed divisions will find a blueprint for avoiding classic errors, anticipating obstacles to success, and applying strategies that create profitable new corporate ventures.
Joint ventures to produce a product have been in business for decades. Nowadays they're called “strategic alliances,” and they are likely to have information gathering as a major goal. We ask venture authority Kathryn Rudie Harrigan how a firm can boost its learning potential and yet protect its core secrets.