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Over one and half years have passed since the demonetization of Indian economy had occurred on November 8, 2016. The drastic step was initiated by the Prime Minister Narendra Modi with an intention to curb the “huge” circulation of illicit or “black” money of Indian economy by means of withdrawal of high value denominations of Rupees 500 and Rupees 1,000 from the supply of broad money (M3). This step helped to demonetize around 86 per cent value of total money supply leading to an unprecedented chaos in the economy and public life. The long delays in issuing fresh currency notes at the banks and ATMs further deteriorated the sudden economic crisis.

This research paper is aimed at exploring the proclaimed “efficacy” of demonetization policy as proposed by Reserve Bank of India by means of a mathematical approach and critically examines the effects of demonetization on the illicit money supply of Indian economy on the basis of macroeconomic theory.

From the mathematical model and related estimates, it may be easily deduced that the Indian policymakers deliberately hurled the masses in one of the gravest economic crises with a clear-cut intention of creating a political gimmick, when in reality, the proportion of illegitimate money supply was not even 1 per cent of total legitimate supply of money.

The analyses and findings related to this paper are based on mathematical modeling and logical interpretations. This paper is free of plagiarism as all the necessary sources and references are properly cited.

The role of money and monetary policy of the central bank in pursuing macroeconomic stability has significantly changed over the period since the end of World War II. Globalization, liberalization, integration, and transition processes generally shaped the crucial milestones of the macroeconomic development and substantial features of economic policy and its framework in Europe. Policy-driven changes together with variety of exogenous shocks significantly affected the key features of macroeconomic environment on the European continent that fashioned the framework and design of monetary policies.

This chapter examines the key basis of the central bank’s monetary policy on its way to pursue and preserve the internal and external stability of the purchasing power of money. Substantial elements of the monetary policy like objectives and strategies are not only generally introduced but also critically discussed according to their accuracy, suitability, and reliability in the changing macroeconomic conditions. Brief overview of the Eurozone common monetary policy milestones and the past Eastern bloc countries’ experience with a variety of exchange rate regimes provides interesting empirical evidence on origins and implications of vital changes in the monetary policy conduction in Europe and the Eurozone.

Whenever capitalism in the West appears to be dragging with unresolved problems, then quite a few people, including professional economists, begin to think that perhaps socialism is a better alternative. Conversely, in the East even a larger number of people, including economists (who are not activists), seriously believe that in view of their shortages and meagre incomes capitalism would be a better alternative.

Marshall, Pigou, and Keynes on one side of the Atlantic, and Fisher on the other, had different approaches to the quantity theory of money. But they shared its basic framework, with the result that theoretical discussions did not prevent some degree of mutual support on policy proposals. If a divergence there was, at this stage, this pertained the feasibility of Fisher’s proposals, because Fisher’s enthusiasm for reform could find no match at Cambridge. This notwithstanding, and although in varying degrees, Marshall, Pigou, and Keynes were sympathetic with Fisher’s battle for “stable money.” Indeed, a fragment from the Keynes Papers shows that, at a very early stage of his career, Keynes paid great attention to Fisher’s empirical research on the relationship between “Appreciation and interest,” taking the relation between nominal and real rates of interest as a possible explanation of the trade cycle. For some time at least, this widened the common ground upon which Fisher’s proposals for “stable money” could find some support at Cambridge.

The purpose of this paper is to expand understanding of the current global financial crisis in light of other large‐scale financial crises.

The phenomenon of large‐scale financial crisis has not been modeled well by neo‐classical general equilibrium approaches; the paper explores whether evolutionary and complex systems approaches might be more useful. Previous empirical work and current data are coalesced to identify fundamental drivers of the boom and bust phases of the current crisis.

Many features of financial crisis occur naturally in evolutionary and complex systems. The boom phase leading to this current crisis (early 1980s through 2006) and bust phase (2007‐) are associated with structural changes in institutions, technologies, monetary processes, i.e. changing “meso structures”. Increasingly, purely financial constructs and processes are dominant infrastructures within the global economy.

Rigorous analytical predictions of financial crisis variables are at present not possible using evolutionary and complex systems approaches; however, such systems can be fruitfully studied through simulation methods and certain types of econometric modeling.

Common patterns in large‐scale financial crises might be better anticipated and guarded against. Better money‐liquidity supply decisions on the part of official institutions might help prevent economy‐wide money‐liquidity crises from turning into systemic solvency crises.

Scholars, policymakers, and practitioners might appreciate the more comprehensive evolutionary and complex systems framework and see that it suggests a new political economy of financial crisis. Despite a huge scholarly literature (organized recently as first‐ second‐ and third‐generation models of financial crises) and a flurry of topical essays in recent months, systemic understanding has been lacking.

During the first decades of the 20th century, German Reformer Silvio Gesell (1862‐1930) championed with a certain success the reforming wave of the epoch by complementing ingenious solutions to some of the most important economic issues of his time with theoretical insights that were as radical as they were penetrating. The purpose of this paper is to offer an introduction to such intuitions, whose validity had been recognized even by a few distinguished academics of the 1930s, but which, owing to the extreme complications that eventually mired German intellectual production in its quasi‐entirety before WWII, failed to preserve the deserved consideration, however slight, they had earned when first formulated. A reappraisal of Gesell's contributions, considering the importance of his main themes, may be worthwhile, all the more so as these deal with questions unsolved to this day.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

The theme of micro‐foundation of economic theory has not been adequately addressed. This is true even of those who pioneered the area of micro‐foundation of macro‐economics. The great missing link in economic theory, both of micro‐economics and macro‐economics, is the inability to methodologically integrate ethical and moral values through preference mapping. This missing methodology disables the study of institutions, policy formulation and normative statements of structural transformation. On the other hand, such issues are once again haunting the human race in the murky and troubled global relations today – from capitalism to war to governance. This paper addresses the preference mapping and embedding of ethical and moral issues as endogenous dynamics in economic theory. The approach is rigorous and methodological.

The scientific correspondence between Harrod and Robertson was initiated by Harrod’s criticism of Robertson’s Banking Policy and the Price Level (1926).⁷ Harrod first wrote on 18 May 1926 (letter 2) raising at once the following “salient point”: Much of your argument depends on the view that justifiable expansions and contractions as defined by you are desirable. Why are they desirable? You give reasons on p. 22 why you think some instability in output desirable. But the reasons mentioned there (and I can’t find any others) don’t seem particularly directed to show that the special form of instability constituted by the so-called “justifiable” expansions and contractions is desirable. They seem to me to show that perhaps some instability, that, presumably, of less degree than we have been accustomed to in the past, is good, but by no means precisely how much is good. Thus, suppose the “hypothetical group member” or “the actual workman” of p. 19 were able to govern output according to their own self interest, there would still, according to the arguments of ch. 2, be some instability. Would not that be enough? Or if you want more, why stop at the “justifiable”? Why not have some of that due to “secondary” causes? It seems to me that you have been led away by purely aesthetic interests to identify that more moderate amount of instability which we really need (as shown on p. 22.) with that which we would get: (i) if secondary causes were removed; and (ii) if control of output stayed where it is now – in the hands of the entrepreneur. I don’t see how you can say to the banks more than “damp down fluctuation a bit, but leave some fluctuation, as that is healthful for the body economic”.He added two notes to his letter, in the first of which he commented upon the four proposed courses of policy outlined by Robertson on pp. 25–26 of his book. In the second note Harrod suggested that Robertson’s calculations in Appendix I to Ch. 5 of Banking Policy assumed the following behaviour of the public: (i) People do not allow for the effect of their withholding on the price level (this is reasonable). (ii) They are ignorant as the future course of inflation (or do nothing to meet it). (iii) On this basis they decide what withholding is necessary to restore H, decide that it would be too much effort to restore it at once, and…spread the restoration over K – 1 days. It so happens that by choosing K – 1 their 2 errors (or failures to take everything into account) cancel each other out, and they do effect the restoration in that time. If K or K – 2 had been chosen, this would not have been so.Harrod further argued that Robertson’s “so-called reasonable assumption of a restoration in K – 1 days is purely arbitrary,” and that “all this reasoning is rendered of doubtful value by the fact that we must suppose an alteration in view as to ‘the appropriate proportion between Real Hoarding and Real Income’ during the process of inflation. Not only will people not replenish H at once, but they may well voluntarily reduce it.”