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This paper aims to investigate how user expectations affect value-added service (VAS) investment and pricing decisions of two-sided platforms. It draws on the information asymmetry theory and offers suggestions on how platform operators can manage user expectations.

According to the game theory, this study considers three user expectations (responsive, passive and wary). By framing the Hotelling duopoly model and comparing the VAS investment, price and platform profits, the optimal platform decision is analyzed and discussed.

The conclusions demonstrate that the monopolistic two-sided platform obtains more profits from the informed users with responsive expectations than uninformed users with passive or wary expectations. The marginal investment cost and cross-network externalities are two key factors that determine the platform's VAS investment and pricing strategies of passive or wary users. Furthermore, considering the expectation preferences, i.e. the uniformed users hold wary expectations with more information and hold passive expectations with less or no information, the results suggest that the proportion of wary users to all uninformed users increases the platform's VAS investment, profits and the price of informed users, and increase (decrease) the price of uninformed users when the cross-network externalities of informed users are relatively small (larger).

These results can provide insightful enlightenment into how platform operators utilize bilateral users' expectations and information level to guide their VAS investment and pricing decisions.

This paper is one of the first to explore the impact of three user expectations and the heterogeneity of preferences in informing users' passive or wary expectations, based on different levels of information on the decision-making of two-sided platforms regarding VAS.

Considering the resource constraint, this paper aims to study how to make value-added service (VAS) investment strategy considering the negative intra-group network externality on the seller side from the perspective of a two-sided platform.

The authors use the dynamic game theory, optimization, sensitive analysis and numerical study in this research. The authors model their research question from the perspective of the dynamic game theory, and through optimizing the platform’s profit function, the equilibrium results in terms of VAS investing and pricing strategies are derived. To explore the characteristics of the optimal strategies, sensitive analysis is used, and numerical studies are conducted to further illustrate the analytical results.

It is found that the intra-group network externality is not necessarily the determinant for VAS investment strategy, and its overall negative impact can be overtaken by the investment in certain conditions. The optimal VAS investment level decreases in the negative intra-group network externality. Though the VAS investment is on the seller side, it has either positive or negative impact on the pricing for buyers. Moreover, for a stronger intra-group network externality among sellers, the two-sided prices could either increase or decrease.

The authors implicate how the intra-group network externality reduces the investment benefit and impacts the other side users. The limitation of considering the intra-group network externalities on only one side needs further extension.

The authors provide insights for platform operators in how to use recourse to improve users’ utility and how to price the two sides when competition exists on the seller side.

This study specifies the role of negative intra-group network externality in determining the investment and pricing strategy of a two-sided platform in addition to the positive inter-group network externality.

Considering the cross-market network externality, this paper aims to explore the platform’s pricing decisions and its optimal profit under the given government investment, and then investigate the investment decision to improve social responsibility, which is measured by the social welfare.

When exploring the optimal pricing decisions under the given government investment, extreme value theory and sensitive analysis are used. When investigating the investment level, game theory and optimization method are used. Numerical examples are conducted to further illustrate the results.

First, after considering the government investment, whether the buyers and the sellers are charged depends on the investment level and the difference of the cross-market network externality (CNC) of the sellers and the buyers. Second, the optimal price on the sellers is decreasing (increasing) in the CNC of the buyers (sellers). The optimal price on the buyers is significantly affected by the investment level. Finally, the government investment is win-win for both the platform and the government, and Chinese Government should invest on the sellers heavily.

This study specifies the role of the government investment on the sellers in determining the platform’s pricing decisions and the improvement of the social responsibility, which is measured by social welfare.

This paper aims to investigate German bank-affiliated venture capitalists’ investment practices and the emergence of their investment logics. Most studies focus on the investment behaviour of independent venture capitalists and little is known about dependent venture capitalists’ investment behaviour. The present study contributes to filling this gap in entrepreneurial finance literature.

The paper uses an exploratory qualitative research approach based on 27 semi-structured interviews with the top management of German bank-affiliated venture capitalists and industry experts to develop a conceptual model that explains the investment logics of bank-affiliated venture capitalists. A large amount of archival data has also been collected and used for the analysis.

The results indicate that bank-affiliated venture capitalists either follow an autonomous, contingent or hybrid investment logic. A bank-affiliated venture capitalist’s isomorphic focus – whether they feel isomorphic to the external venture capital environment or the internal parent bank’s environment – explains the emergence of multiple investment logics.

The paper encourages banks to get a better understanding of how the venture capital industry works and what they need to do to compete again independent venture capitalists. Banks and their affiliated venture capital units can improve their deal flows by recognising that they need to get accepted as an on-par investor in the venture capital environment.

The current study is the first of its kind investigating multiple investment logics by focussing on the link between different isomorphic habits and the specific context of bank-affiliated venture capitalists.

This paper aims to study the pricing problems on the two-sided market for cases of monopoly and duopoly competition, specifically investigating the impact of platform service quality on the market. Theoretical analysis and computational studies are conducted to investigate the impact of different parameters on the system outcomes.

Mathematical formulations are proposed for cases of monopoly and duopoly competition. For monopolistic market, the optimal pricing and service quality strategies are obtained using mathematical programming method. For duopolistic market, the equilibrium outcomes are derived by game theory. Sensitivity analysis and numerical studies are also adopted to investigate the impact of different parameters.

For monopolistic market, the platform will provide a low service quality when the service cost parameter is large. However, when the cost parameter is small, the platform provides a higher service quality and higher registration prices. Furthermore, the sum of the optimal prices is proportional to the service quality and inversely proportional to the user price sensitivity. For duopolistic market, the competitive equilibrium prices exist under a certain condition. The determinants of equilibrium prices are the gap between the service qualities of two platforms and the cross-group externalities.

For monopolistic market, this paper specifies the role of platform service quality in determining the platform’s pricing strategy. For duopolistic market, this paper presents a market sharing mechanism between two platforms and explores the equilibrium pricing strategies for platforms with different service quality level.

This study aims to explore the role of equity investment in knowledge-driven business model innovation (BMI) in context of open modes according to the evidence from China’s primary market.

Based on the database of China’s private market and data set of news clouds, the statistic approach is applied to explore and explain whether equity investment promotes knowledge-driven BMI. Machine learning method is also used to prove and predict the performance of such open innovation.

The results of logistic regression show that explanatory variables are significant, providing evidence that knowledge management (KM) promotes BMI through equity investment. By further using back propagation neural network, the classification learning algorithm estimates the possibility of BMI, which can be regarded as a score to quantify the performance of knowledge-driven BMI

The quality of secondhand big data is not very ideal, and future empirical studies should use first-hand survey data.

This study provides new insights into the link between KM and BMI by highlighting the important roles of external investments in open modes.

From the perspective of investment, the findings of this study suggest the importance for stakeholders to share knowledge and strategies for entrepreneurs to manage innovation.

The concepts and indicators related to business models are difficult to quantify currently, while this study provides feasible and practical methods to estimate knowledge-driven BMI with secondhand data from the primary market. The mechanism of knowledge and innovation bridged by the experience from investors is introduced and analyzed.

This paper aims to investigate the investment strategy of a two-sided platform on reducing transaction costs of two user sides and to study the pricing problem of the platform.

Mathematical derivation is used to compute the optimal decisions of a two-sided platform on pricing and investment. Numerical analysis is used to illustrate the findings.

It is found that the demand of one user side decreases in the maximal transaction costs reduction to this side but increases in the maximal transaction costs reduction to the other side. It is also found that a platform should never choose the investment in such a way that the maximal transaction costs reductions of two user sides are the same.

Several limitations exist in this paper, most of which exist due to the assumptions. These limitations could be good research directions in the future. For example, only one platform’s decision is considered, and platforms’ competition is not taken into account. Considering other platforms’ competition, the decisions of the users and the platform would be different.

From the transaction costs perspective, this paper finds that a platform should never choose the investment in such a way that the maximal transaction costs reductions of two user sides are the same. This conclusion has not been found in previous literature.

The purpose of the paper is to construct a model that considers video purchase and then identifies the logical relationships implied by the parameters to explore video platform operation mechanisms.

The authors analyzed the video platform system using a mathematical modeling approach and numerical optimization techniques. Through pricing decisions, the authors obtained equilibrium results for the profitability of the video platforms and analyzed the favorable market factors. The authors then extended the model by analyzing the competitive strategies of the two video platforms in the market.

The authors find that advertiser profitability, ad nuisance, video sensitivity and video creator network effects are important factors influencing the pricing strategy of video platforms. During positive market conditions, video platforms tend to lower their prices until they absorb enough users. As market conditions change, the price adjustment strategies of video platforms are affected by parameter changes and inter-parameter relationships.

The study considers the network effects of video creators, which provides a realistic reference for scholars and managers. In addition, the authors consider the bargaining power of platforms when purchasing content. The authors provide a fresh perspective for scholars while filling a gap in the field as video platforms can acquire a portion of the content on the market by setting a purchase price.

This article is based on a systematic and comprehensive review of the literature on two-sided platforms, the business structure based on the concept of matchmaking groups of customers (e.g. Uber or Airbnb). The research aims to identify gaps in the existing literature while providing a structured summary of the existing knowledge in the field. Finally, we propose a conceptual framework enabling platform thinking, the ability to see hybrid multi-sided platforms as a useful resource-orchestration structure to unveil innovation opportunities.

This study adopts a bibliometric approach, combing co-citation and text mining analyses of 196 papers, also implementing a longitudinal analysis that highlights the evolution of the field since its inception till today.

The novel aspect of the paper consists in taking a purely managerial stance of a very peculiar kind of platform, merging existing knowledge in comprehensive frameworks while providing potential avenues for research.

From an academic perspective, this research highlights the double nature of two-sided platforms: as an operational choice or as a way to exploit (digital) assets and reach the economic sustainability. A research agenda is proposed, based on three pillars: a side-based standpoint, a business model perspective and an evolutionary stance to see how these businesses may evolve.

The research identifies different literature streams that may help practitioners in identifying how two-sided platforms may help them in fostering innovation.

The identification of two-sided platforms as a different way to create value (transaction platforms) or to capture value (non-transaction platform), enhancing the debate on this innovative business model. A research agenda to bring the field forward is proposed.

Information technology-enabled gig platforms connect freelancers with consumers to provide short-term services or asset sharing. The growth of gig economy, however, has been accompanied by controversy, and, recently, food delivery platforms have been criticized for using data-driven techniques to set strict delivery time limits, resulting in negative externality. This study aims to provide managerial implications on the decisions of delivery time and subsidy for food delivery platforms.

The authors develop an analytical framework to investigate the optimal delivery time and subsidy provided to delivery drivers to maximize the gig platform's profit and compare the results with those of a socially optimal outcome.

The study reveals that it is optimal for the platform to shorten the delivery time and raise the subsidy when the food price becomes higher; nevertheless, the platform should shorten the delivery time and lower the subsidy in response to a higher delivery fee. Increases in the food price or delivery fee have non-monotonic effects on the number of fulfilled orders and the platform's profit. In addition, the authors solve the socially optimal outcome and find that a socially optimal delivery time is longer than the platform's preferred length when the delivery fee is high and the negative externality is strong.

The food delivery platform's optimal decision on delivery time is derived after taking negative externality into account, which is rarely considered in the prior literature but is a practically important problem.