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The full text of a new draft guideline on value for money audits is provided. Guidance to auditors on the special factors to be taken into account in the application of auditing standards to value for money audits is offered.

This paper explores the value of financial statement auditing in the public sector. The study applies theory about auditing from the private sector as well as the public sector to explore ways in which public sector auditing can be expected to be valuable. It shows that there are a number of complementary explanations that can be applied to examine the value of public audit, including agency, signaling, insurance, management control, governance and confirmation explanations. The evidence from research and history is generally consistent with the agency and management control explanations. There is some support for the signaling and insurance explanations, while research evidence suggests that governance has differing impact in the public sector compared to the private. The confirmation hypothesis is also potentially relevant. Reviewing the history of the development of public sector auditing functions shows that at least some developments were consistent with explanations such as agency theory and management control. Auditing in the public sector is an area where more research is valuable. The paper concludes with a discussion of issues for further investigation.

Most small businesses today could probably benefit from a management audit of the firm's long‐term financial affairs. In large corporations, internal auditors generally have free rein to audit all operations—including the activities of the corporate treasurer and the controller's department. Such audits involve not only the financial aspects of operations, but the day‐to‐day operating aspects as well. Internal audits of operations are typically called operational audits in the United States and value‐for‐money audits in the countries of the British empire. “Value‐for‐money audits” is probably the best name because the objective of the auditors is to point out ways that a department can save money or enhance revenues. Now it would be nice if small businesses had internal auditors to conduct value‐for‐money audits, but such is not the case. Most small companies do not have internal auditors. However, there is another alternative. The owner or manager of a small business can conduct the audit on sort of a do‐it‐yourself basis. Although every department could possibly benefit from such an audit, it is the long‐term financial management of the organization that might profit the most from a value‐for‐money audit.

Evidence of audit committee activity in the formative years of the Baltimore & Ohio (B&O) Railroad indicates that control and reporting activity developed long before the existence of regulatory mandate or the external auditing function. This is the earliest example of such an organized and continuing activity in American business history. With no previous business experience to model this enterprise, the organizers of the corporation put in place an audit committee of directors as a control device to safeguard assets and ensure proper handling of cash receipts and disbursements. Research into primary materials establishes that the committee not only performed regular routine audits of the “treasurer’s report,” but also identified and addressed critical problems of control and payment weaknesses. The discovery of the function of value‐for‐money (VFM) auditing by a committee of directors establishes historical context for today’s audit process and audit committee. Because the B&O was such an important entity, it influenced other railroads; and the railroad industry, in turn, greatly influenced the development of modern American businesses during the Industrial Revolution.

Public finance watchdogs and guardians of the public purse. These are just two of the labels branded on Auditors General over the years. Since their initiation into value for money audit only three decades ago, they have continually been exposing cases of public financing laxity. Each time the auditors approach a government organization, their reputation invariably precedes them. But what happens when the controllers decide to turn over a new leaf and become catalysts for change and improvement who have come to help managers improve their public organizations? Auditees, totally unaccustomed to seeking help from auditors, are understandably befuddled. On the other side of the coin, auditors are equally inexperienced at providing assistance to auditees. There is many a slip twixt cup and lip before the role confusion dissipates.

This paper aims to develop a classification scheme of different types of value for money (VFM) audits with different degrees of compliance audit, and to classify the performance audits carried out by the Swedish National Audit Office (SNAO) during its first six years as an independent state audit organization reporting to parliament.

The empirical data were gathered from all of the 150 audit reports published by the SNAO from its establishment in 2003 to the end of 2008. Seminars were arranged to discuss the classifications for validation.

The focus on traditional VFM audits (the “Three Es”) is unusual. Most audits carried out by the SNAO combine different types of extended VFM audits with compliance audit. On the one hand, they audit how the government and/or central agencies fulfil their mandates (from good to bad). On the other, they audit how the government and/or central agencies adhere to legislation, rules and policies (right or wrong). In some cases, the SNAO equates compliance audit with performance audit.

The authors have verbalised and visualised performance audit activities of interest not only to state auditors, but also to external stakeholders. One practical implication is that the Swedish national audit committee has conducted an evaluation of the SNAO that is partly based on the national report of this study, and has proposed a stronger focus on the Three Es.

The study addresses a new approach in terms of a classification scheme for performance audits, consisting of eight types of VFM audits and three degrees of compliance audit, and creating 24 possible combinations.

English local government audit has gone through fundamental change in the last decade and this period of instability looks certain to continue. Since 2014, councils have been audited by private sector auditors appointed theoretically by the councils themselves (though an overwhelming majority of councils have delegated this responsibility). The scope of audit after 2014 reduced to focus mainly on top-down financial management, rather than value for money or inspection. After growing concerns about the scope and quality of audit however, in 2020, the government commissioned Sir Tony Redmond to review local audit arrangements in England. The Redmond review identified several problems with the reformed structure and made recommendations for change. Currently, the sector is uncertain about what changes will be adopted to solve the issues discovered by Redmond.

As practised by Auditors General in governmental organizations, the value for money (VFM) audit is ultimately destined to improve the management of public affairs. This study aims to examine to what extent Auditor General of Quebec has been achieving this objective through the VFM audits conducted in the Canadian province of Quebec from 1995 to 2002. For the purposes of this research, a model was designed that measured the impact these VFM audits may have had on the management of the organizations audited and that exposed the determinants of this impact.

A survey was sent out exclusively to auditees who are the representatives of the organizations audited: top and middle managers and department professionals (specialists in their area: health, education, etc.) having interacted with the auditors during VFM audits. A five‐category Likert‐type scale was selected for the survey. A total of 188 questionnaires were sent out and, of the questionnaires filled out by auditees, a total of 99 were considered valid, that is 53 percent response rate. Quantitative analysis was performed using SPSS software. For each of the elements measuring the impact of VFM audits on the management of organizations audited, principal components factor analysis (with VARIMAX rotation when there was more than one factor) was performed. These analyses sought to understand the correlation structure of the variables for each of the elements.

The changes made after the auditors' visits have not been radical and there have been no revolutions in the organizations audited, but the influence of auditors is perceptible for all ten of the elements measured. The will of those at the base of the organization and the intervention of parliamentarians turn out to have a decisive influence on the impact that auditors will or will not have on the management of organizations audited.

The point of view reported is exclusively that of auditees. There can be no claim for total objectivity on their part. Moreover, it was practically impossible to corroborate their statements with other sources. Some respondents might have tended to minimize the influence that auditors might have had on them. Others could have shaped facts to their advantage.

Measurement of the impact of VFM audits on the management of government organizations, from auditees' point of view, has not been much examined by scholars. This research constitutes a major contribution to advance knowledge about the impact of VFM audits in a Canadian context.

This study provides insights into the meanings given to audit quality (AQ) by audit partners responsible for delivering audit services. It explores the influence of contextual factors in the auditing setting on constructing such meanings and its representations.

Drawing on a symbolic-interactionist framework, this study takes an interpretive approach, employing semi-structured interviews with audit partners from the United Kingdom (UK).

Three primary meanings of AQ are identified. First, in contradiction to that offered by “mainstream” AQ research, audit partners in this study predominantly regarded the meaning of AQ as an economic concept in the context of the “business” of auditing, delivering the service quality (e.g. value-added auditing and value-for-money) that is expected by their audit clients. Second, the audit partners also espouse the meaning of AQ to be “fit for purpose” audit documentation and adherence to quality control that meets the standards of compliance demanded by independent audit inspections. Third, and similar to the classic convention of AQ, audit partners consider “inputs” to AQ, attributes related to individual auditors (e.g. qualifications, experience and training) as one of the key AQ meanings. A range of stimuli underlies AQ meaning construction, including the audit firm's commercial interests, legitimacy, image management and social identity resulting from audit partners' interactions with audit clients, regulators, and their own self-reflexivity. Interestingly, this study identifies a considerable potential conflict between the meanings assigned to AQ, which suggests that auditors are struggling to strike a balance between the competing demands of those meanings.

This exploratory study addresses only the audit partners' perceptions concerning the meaning of AQ. Findings of this study are relevant to auditors and other parties, such as regulators, in addressing competing dimensions of AQ and potential choices involving conduct and content in any individual audit engagement.

The study complements existing research into AQ by exposing the rationales and potential behaviours that underlie commitments to quality by those involved in commissioning audit engagements. It also adds detailed evidence of how contextual factors in the auditing environment interact with auditors' notions of AQ.

Three decades ago, the National Audit Office (NAO) in the UK acquired the powers to evaluate the extent that the British Administration was managed with economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The NAO has since adopted a dual mission: to help Parliament hold government to account and to improve public service. This study aims to investigate value-for-money (VFM) auditors’ internalisation of a dual organisational identity: “obstructive” actions as representatives of a Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) and “enabling good practice”, induced by a will stated in the mission that the NAO authorities have adopted.

The organisational identity held and promoted by VFM auditors working at the NAO was explored in this research project. The authors specifically examined the understanding of those who claim to be serving both Parliament and organisations audited in their quest for performance improvement. The authors prompted the auditors to explain how they manage to reconcile these seemingly incompatible roles, namely, that of guardians and watchdogs who must publicly report gaps noted and that of assistants in government’s learning process. To this end, the authors conducted a field study at the NAO in September 2012 during which 21 auditors were interviewed individually and as part of two discussion groups.

The findings indicate that the auditors interviewed do not perceive a dichotomy in NAO’s double mission, which they believe to be congruent with their audience’s expectations. They draw meaning and usefulness from their role of monitoring the Administration if they believe they have contributed to improve public affairs management. In their view, the singular role of guardian no longer suffices. The authors conclude that VFM auditors’ recently acquired identity of “moderniser” reflects a self-efficacy expectation that prevents them from recognising the apparent paradox within their dual identity and that lets them fantasise about their real influence on the Administration.

Admittedly, the limited number of auditors interviewed and who took part in discussion groups is not conducive to generalisation of the conclusions to all auditors in the NAO or to other SAIs. However, although modest in number, the auditor respondents have accumulated many years of VFM audit practice and have contributed to the production of many reports. The respondents could therefore rightfully speak of their work as VFM auditors and as representatives of an institution such as the NAO.

This study contributes to the debates about the place and role of SAIs in the control environment of Administrations. By soliciting testimonials from the actors working within the NAO, the authors could thus question certain a priori assumptions held by stakeholders in the political and administrative world for whom auditors are mere “watchdogs” of Administrations, and nothing more.

The dual mission that the NAO has adopted (similar to many other SAIs) has been formally and publicly stated. It was therefore worth investigating how experienced auditors such as those interviewed had internalised this mission. The authors argue that this dual mission, perhaps inspired by the managerialist culture that has shaped changes to the British Administration (and many other occidental Administrations) since the early 1980s and that is seemingly encouraged by Government, twists the legislator’s intentions, which are to consider SAIs’ auditors as guardians and watchdogs of Administrations, not as agents of change and improvement.