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The four‐part framework described by the authors can help boards of directors to better focus their time and energy to provide substantial value to the M&A process. High standards for value creation; grounded, quantified strategic benefits; an integration focus on high‐value opportunities with clear accountability for delivering them; and a common management model are the key determinants of a successful deal. This framework can help boards add value to the M&A process. Moreover, it can help top executives to be more effective in evaluating and managing deals and more efficient in interacting with their boards.

This study aims to examine whether particular corporate governance mechanisms influence the performance of mergers and acquisitions.

Regression analyses investigating 1,596 recent acquisitions in the US market completed over the five-year period from 2009 to 2013 are performed.

The results show that board independency, CEO duality and level of CEO fixed compensation have an impact on the return of acquisitions. Moreover, the findings indicate that acquisitions significantly create value for bidders delivering a positive cumulative abnormal return upon announcement. Finally, also focusing on the 690 relative larger deals, there is a clear evidence of a positive influence of good corporate governance mechanisms over the quality of acquisitions completed.

To our knowledge, this is the first paper trying to identify corporate governance mechanisms related to the best acquisition decisions, by using specifically the three corporate governance variables (CEO duality, CEO fixed compensation and board independency).

The purpose of this paper is to present an interview with Professor Michael Porter of Harvard, the noted academic and consultant whose concepts are central to the practice of strategic management, and the answers to questions he is often asked by practitioners who solicit his advice.

For her new book, Understanding Michael Porter: The Essential Guide to Competition and Strategy (2011), award‐winning author Joan Magretta edited this dialog with him which has been adapted for Strategy & Leadership.

Professor Porter delivers warnings on the most common strategy mistakes. When it comes to dealing with disruptive technology, he cautions managers to be sure they have rigorously identified the underlying source of the disruption. On the relentless pressure to find growth, he offers ways to approach it without damaging strategy and profitability. Futhermore he offers advice on managing the planning process itself.

Porter's advice on successful strategic planning: leaders need to bring together the whole team responsible for a particular business, and they need to do the plan together to think about the industry, the competitors, the opportunities, the value chain, and then ultimately make some choices about positioning and direction, and finally, develop the implications for action.

Porter revisits many of his core strategic ideas and gives managers advice on how to apply them to manage effectively in the current dynamic environment.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the relationships between acquirer size and performance outcomes of the different process of acquisition in the Chinese context and the moderating effect of political connections on the size-performance relationship.

Building upon agency theory, the paper examines the relationship between acquirer size and acquisition announcement returns to find whether the acquirer size effect exists in China. Moreover, the paper investigates whether large firms can perform better in the long run arising from scale economy. Finally, the paper examines the moderating effect of political connections on the size-performance relationship. Accounting for the complexity of political connections in China, the paper uses two methods to capture political connections.

The paper finds that acquirer size plays a significant negative role on announcement returns, suggesting that the acquirer size effect also exists in China. However, acquirer size has a significant positive impact on long-term performance, indicating that large acquirers perform better in the integration process. Although no evidence shows that political connections can bring some off-setting benefits to acquirer size effect argued by Humphery-Jenner and Powell (2014), political connections, indeed, have a positive effect on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) announcement returns.

The paper contributes to the corporate characteristic, political connections and M&A performance literature. Due to agency problem and scale economy, the effect of firm size on acquisition performance varies with the stage of M&A. Political connections can bring some benefits to M&A deals.

We consider conditions under which firms hire an intermediary advisor in acquisition deals. Although acquirers pay large advisory fees to investment banks for their assistance in acquisitions, we know little about the conditions under which acquirers form a relationship with an investment bank for an acquisition deal. Specifically, we examine the role of overall acquisition experience, acquisition experience specific to the target’s industry, prior relationship-specific experience, and deal size in relationship formation and continuation. We test their hypotheses using a dataset of US-based acquirers and targets between 1991 and 2015. Our findings provide nuanced insights into the role of acquisition experience for acquirer–investment bank pairing up on acquisition deals.

This paper aims to study characteristics of specified purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) and examine the performance of their securities over time.

Previous findings in literature on SPACs' performance around the announcement of merger date are scarce, not uniform, and mostly address the performance of SPACs' common shares. The authors believe that more insights on merger announcements can be obtained if the perf]ormance of all three types of securities that SPACs issue during the IPO, namely units, common stocks, and warrants are analyzed simultaneously. In order to examine the behavior of these securities we form three samples with daily returns for three distinguished SPAC securities. Results are obtained for abnormal returns based on the market model from Brown and Warner.

It is found that SPACs represent a fairly unique way to raise capital. The incentives of their founders, underwriters, and investors are interdependent and successful business combinations generally result in significant returns to founders. The analysis shows that SPACs have a complex corporate structure in which the incentives of the founders, underwriters, and investors are interdependent and where successful mergers result in significant returns to the founders. It also shows that different SPAC securities do not exhibit similar reactions in response to announcements regarding their corporate status. While holders of all three securities realize positive abnormal returns on the merger announcement day, the strongest reaction is observed among the investors holding warrants, while common stock holders react very mildly.

SPACs are recent phenomena in capital markets and very few papers in finance literature describe them. None of the existing papers evaluated performance of all three types of SPAC securities: units, common shares and warrants before this paper.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether ex ante board connections and director retention result in agency costs to target company shareholders in the form of reduced payment in mergers and acquisitions transaction.

The authors employ detailed data of ex ante board connection and director retention in the mergers and acquisition in the UK from 1999 to 2015. Ex ante board connections are measured as proportion of target and acquirer companies’ directors worked on the same board at any time prior to the takeover, while director retention is measured as proportion of target companies’ directors remains on board after the takeover is completed. For mergers and acquisition payment characteristics, the authors examine takeover premium, cash payment percentage and offer price adjustment.

The authors find that ex ante board connections and director retention lead to reduced offer prices and lower proportions of cash payment. Notably, when there is no connection and target directors are not retained, the authors find that the bidding companies increase their final offer by £14m more than in other scenarios. The authors also document strong evidence that ex ante board connections lead to a higher probability of director retention.

The paper highlights that ex ante board connections and director retention will lead to a significant cost on target company shareholders. The authors recommend that a more detailed set of information on ex ante board connections and intended target board retention should be disclosed.

In May 1999, the CEO of this company (the largest brewer in Brazil) is contemplating a bid for Antarctica, the second-largest brewer in Brazil. The primary motives are to exploit economies of scale and other synergies and to prevent other competitors (mainly foreign multinationals) from acquiring the firm. The tasks for the student are to value the target and buyer, propose an exchange ratio of shares, and generally design the terms of the transaction.

The paper aims to argue that the social responsibility of international business (IB) scholars is to seek truth, disseminate learning, and make a difference on issues crucial to the global economy.

Instead of making philosophical and abstract arguments on the importance of the social responsibility of IB scholars, this article focuses on a leading debate of the times: how to view the rise of China's outward foreign direct investment (OFDI)? The article argues that the so‐called “China threat” brought by such OFDI, as it is often portrayed by the (Western) media, is a myth that cannot be substantiated by evidence‐based scholarly analysis.

At present, China's OFDI stock represents a mere 1.21 percent of global OFDI stock. It would be absurd to believe that such a tiny sum can “buy up the world”. Based on findings, three hypotheses on what is behind the myth about China's OFDI are offered.

Although some IB (and management) scholarships have been criticized for their alleged lack of relevance to practitioners and policymakers, this paper disagrees. IB scholars need to engage with issues of grave importance not only to the IB field but also to the wider world, such as China's OFDI.

The article ends with a series of suggestions on how IB scholars, driven by social responsibility, can shed light on, clear the air, and steer the course of public perception, by drawing on time‐honored, evidence‐based scholarly tradition.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first article in the literature on IB scholars' social responsibility.