Search results

This paper aims to determine whether tax evasion savings qualify as unlawful proceeds for money laundering purposes. Litigators, regulators and academics have debated the question for decades. A common argument is that tax evasion allows a bad actor to save money that the perpetrator already has on hand. It does not produce a new inflow of wealth that could properly be classified as proceeds. This paper addresses the validity of this argument by using a substance-based approach.

This paper applies the substance-over-form principle and two specialized judicial doctrines to the matter: the economic-substance and step-transaction doctrines.

This paper finds that in substance, tax evasion savings qualify as unlawful proceeds. The opposing argument may be valid on the surface, but it does not withstand the scrutiny of the substance-based principle and insights from the doctrines.

The finding of this paper implies that any courts which value substance can embrace tax evasion savings as unlawful proceeds. Government prosecutors can adopt the position with confidence that substance backs them up. National regulators can push the point. The United Nations’ Financial Action Task Force can consider the option to more explicitly recommend treating tax evasion savings as unlawful proceeds for money laundering.

Using a unique substance-based approach, this paper demonstrates that a dollar of tax evasion savings is substantively equivalent to a dollar of unlawful tax refund proceeds for money laundering purposes. Focusing on an unlawful tax refund overcomes many of the common concerns raised against the treatment of tax evasion savings as unlawful proceeds.

This chapter offers a practitioners’ perspective on how Islamic banks in Malaysia deal with unlawful sources of funds. Specifically, it investigates the practice of Islamic banks in Malaysia in dealing with funds that originate from unlawful sources such as accepting deposits for safe-keeping and investment and providing financial facilities to customers whose incomes come from unlawful sources. This is regardless of whether the sources of fund are wholly unlawful or there is a mix of lawful and unlawful sources. A quantitative methodology is adopted to collect data from selected industry practitioners who are directly involved with Islamic banks, mainly officers of Sharīʿah departments, members of Sharīʿah committees and other stakeholders of Islamic banks. Based on a simple descriptive analysis, it is found that majority of the respondents opine that when the sources of funds are deemed unlawful, the bank cannot accept such deposits, investments or give financing to a customer if he or she is known to possess unlawful sources of funds. With respect to the mixed sources of funds or activities, that is, lawful and unlawful, the bank should not be prevented from receiving the funds either for safe-keeping, investment or payment of financing. The study also finds that banks have the right to investigate the sources of funds of the customers whether they are derived from Sharīʿah compliant, non-Sharīʿah compliant or mixed sources as part of the general due diligence implemented by such banks.

Civil wrongdoings with consequent financial and other loss or damage to employers, employees and third parties may result in the course of various trade union activities. These day to day trade union activities take a variety of forms. The most common ones are inducement of breach of contract, conspiracy, trespass, nuisance, and intimidation. Each of these activities constitutes a tort which, unless the statutory immunities apply, would normally give rise at common law to an action for damages or, as is more frequent, enable the aggrieved party to obtain an injunction.

This substantial article begins with an examination of two important grounds of discrimination: sex discrimination governed by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (and the related Equal Pay Act 1970) and racial discrimination under the Race Relations Act 1976. Discussion is confined to the right not to be discriminated against and covers the detailed provisions of these acts in this respect, judicial precedents and important cases heard not only in the British courts but in the European Court of Justice. The third section of the article is about discrimination in connection with trade union membership and activities governed by the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.

In recent years an emerging global trend of introducing legislation to use civil procedures against criminal assets can be detected. However, these civil forfeiture models, which exist vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This paper seeks to identify issues which need to be considered when such a scheme is being designed and examines the options which have been adopted.

The paper examines the legislative provisions in a number of jurisdictions setting out the common issues which have arisen and the range of options which have attempted as potential solutions.

The paper concludes that jurisdictions which seek to introduce civil forfeiture legislations now have various examples from which to learn but that these models will likely evolve in the face of litigation and experience as legislatures and policymakers attempt to produce fair but effective procedures for the civil recovery of criminal proceeds.

As further jurisdictions respond to this emerging trend and draft their own legislation, there is much to be leant from the issues which others have considered necessary to address and the way in which these issues have been dealt with.

The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the related Equal Pay Act 1970, and the Race Relations Act 1976 have not been consolidated by the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978. Each of the Acts treats sex and race discrimination in a general and broad sense. Both make similar provisions in connection with various aspects of discrimination in employment. Since one act is inspired by the other, the judicial precedent in sex discrimination cases will normally be followed in racial discrimination cases and vice versa. Both Acts are outlined and the grounds that constitute discrimination discussed as well as permissible discrimination. Enforcement of the Acts and liability is detailed. Discrimination in connection with trade union membership and activities is also examined. The right not to have action short of dismissal taken against the employee and remedies for action short of dismissal are discussed.

This paper aims to define the fundamental nexus between income tax evasion and money laundering. The G7 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) designates tax evasion as a predicate offense for money laundering. We determine whether this designation is complete from a conceptual standpoint, or whether there is a stronger connection between tax evasion and money laundering.

This paper applies the FATF definition for money laundering – as well as generally accepted definitions for tax evasion and for a standard predicate offense – to identify the necessary conditions for each crime. This paper then uses these conditions to test opposing hypotheses regarding the nexus between tax evasion and money laundering.

This paper demonstrates that tax evasion does not meet the conditions for a standard predicate offense, and treating it as if it were a standard predicate could be problematic in practice. Instead, it is concluded that the FATF’s predicate label for tax evasion, together with tax evasion methods and objectives, imply that all tax evasion constitutes money laundering. In a single process, tax evasion generates both criminal tax savings and launders those criminal proceeds by concealing or disguising their unlawful origin.

The FATF could strengthen its framework by explicitly defining all tax evasion as money laundering. This would enable regulatory agencies to draw upon the full combined resources dedicated to either offense.

The analysis demonstrates that tax evasion completely incorporates money laundering as currently defined by the FATF.

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) creates rights for covered employees, defines conduct that violates those rights, and deems that conduct an unfair labor practice. But while given broad remedial powers under the Act, the Board's options were curtailed by the Supreme Court's limit on the use of deterrence as an express remedial justification. The Board was left with a strongly make-whole, i.e., ex-post, focus to undo the consequences of a violation.

Put differently, the current NLRA remedies reflect a pay-or-play philosophy. The goal is restoration after the fact, using ex-post remedies to give parties the benefit or status quo that they expected. An actor willing to pay may use a cost–benefit analysis and strategically choose to violate the Act, accepting the make-whole remedies later. But the Act created ex-ante statutory rights, not agreed-upon contractual terms. By statutory enactment, employees are given something of value deemed worthy of protection. Assigning value to compliance with the law in the first instance not only prevents sometimes irreparable harm but also reaffirms the inherent value of the right itself.

The impact of the Board's limited remedies is therefore a broad value-driven one. Without ex-ante deterrence, the available ex-post make-whole remedial options make a normative statement about individuals' rights under the Act: those rights may not be inherently worth enough to incentivize legal compliance. The make-whole focus can imply that financial compensation for the portion of harm that can be calculated and “undoing” some nonfinancial effects is sufficient. There is little drive to deter infringement before the fact. By examining the remedial philosophy behind contrasting approaches in the common law of torts and contract, this Article asserts that the current remedial strictures and framework undermine both the Act and the worth of its rights in the eyes of the public and the employees who hold them.

The Howard Shuttering Contractors case throws considerable light on the importance which the tribunals attach to warnings before dismissing an employee. In this case the tribunal took great pains to interpret the intention of the parties to the different site agreements, and it came to the conclusion that the agreed procedure was not followed. One other matter, which must be particularly noted by employers, is that where a final warning is required, this final warning must be “a warning”, and not the actual dismissal. So that where, for example, three warnings are to be given, the third must be a “warning”. It is after the employee has misconducted himself thereafter that the employer may dismiss.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides: