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In order to mark the beginning of the fifteenth century, a group of prominent Muslim theologians and jurists assembled to draft a document that systematically laid out the rights and duties of all human beings according to the dictates of Islam. The year of Christ was 1981, and the occasion was formally the International Islamic Conference, held that year in Paris. The document that these jurist produced seems at first an odd one, titled The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Islamic Declaration, 1988). Odd as the document so pointedly invokes the famed 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration, 1999). But perhaps such an invocation is not odd at all, for the document is first of all a symptom of and a response to two massive contemporary facts. The first is the ubiquity of human rights talk. It is certainly proof of the success of this discourse as a normative and normalizing force that no-one can speak of universality or ethics or even the most drab topic in international relations without paying homage, only sometimes qualified, to the idea that all humans have rights. The second fact to which the Islamic declaration responds is the suspicion if not outright insistence that the religion of Islam in unsuited to this new order of civilization. Amongst the jurists themselves there is a sense that clarification is needed of the relation of Islam to the global (to say nothing of globalizing) discourse of human rights. This much is readily conceded by the drafters, who felt impelled by the forces of the contemporary world scene to formulate the Islamic position in relation to human rights (Weeramantry, 1988, p. 122).Not surprisingly, such a position involves dethroning the sovereign subject (entirely different from its deconstruction) and proclaiming victory once again for God and his absolute sovereignty, even as it involves extending a governmental interest in the life of the individual, from the conditions of his cultural life (article 14) to the legislation of his leisure time (article17). However, in contrast to the Universal Declaration that never once mentions God or Creator, the Islamic Declaration insists that only God to be “the creator the sustainer, the sovereign the sole guide of mankind and the Source of all Law” (Universal Islamic Declaration, 1988, p. 176). A hasty reading would take this as a response not just to the Universal Declaration, which here is named and renamed, but the entire western tradition of rights and secular power after the death of God. This, however, would be a mistake, for it would overlook both the distinctly modern project of power that the Islamic Declaration articulates, and the peculiar construction of the U.N Declaration itself, the way it refers to and refracts the idiom of the famous eighteenth century revolutionary documents – the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. Thus in the Universal Declaration the repetition of the American phrase, “endowed by their creator,” becomes simply “endowed with reason and conscience,” with no one doing the endowing. In short, the omission of God from the Universal Declaration is an over determined decision and not one of a casual or inevitable secularism.

The object of this research is the reconstruction of the existing legal response by European Union states to the phenomenon of immigration. It seeks to analyse the process of conferral of protection.

One main dimension is selected and discussed: the case law of the national courts. The study focuses on the legal status of immigrants resulting from the intervention of these national courts.

The research shows that although the courts have conferred an increasing protection on immigrants, this has not challenged the fundamental principle of the sovereignty of the states to decide, according to their discretionary prerogatives, which immigrants are allowed to enter and stay in their territories. Notwithstanding the differences in the general constitutional and legal structures, the research also shows that the courts of the three countries considered – France, Germany and Spain – have progressively moved towards converging solutions in protecting immigrants.

The research contributes to a better understanding of the different legal orders analysed.

This chapter examines the conundrum of juvenile immigration law and policy and argues that it is a present-day manifestation of “child-saving” in rhetoric, disposition, and human capital harm. In support of this thesis, the chapter reviews the pertinent human rights, law, and social science evidence, and it concludes that the maintenance of the nation’s existing immigration policy only makes sense within the context of the intentions of the 19th century child-saving movement. To substantiate this view, the political-economic drivers of contemporary US immigration policy (i.e., its child-saving dynamics) are explored. The chapter concludes by speculatively addressing the character (i.e., the form and quality) of modern-day juvenile immigration policy as child-saving informed by the philosophy and criticism of Psychological Jurisprudence (PJ).

What is the relationship between human rights and corruption? This question can take different forms, including moral, legal, socio-political and economic variants. This paper focuses on two key moral questions, asking whether corruption can violate or impact on people’s natural rights (on the one hand) or human rights (on the other). In answer, I aim to establish a strong conceptual link between (a) corruption’s ‘abuse of entrusted power’; (b) the ‘arbitrary power’ targeted by natural rights theorists like John Locke and the broader republican tradition and (c) the ‘arbitrary interference’ with protected freedoms prohibited by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. I argue that the deep thematic links between systemic corruption and violations of human rights are stronger than have hitherto been recognized. In the twenty-first century, corruption should be recognized as a ‘standard threat’ (in Shue’s sense) to human flourishing and protected freedoms, vindicating the human right to freedom from systemic corruption.

The global Clinical Legal Education (CLE) movement transcends borders as law teachers worldwide try to inculcate law students and future legal practitioners with social justice values. One method of achieving this is through developing reflective practitioners. Kolb, finding common ground in the work of Lewin, Dewey, and Piaget, formulated the four stages in the experiential development of concrete experience, reflective observation, abstract conceptualization, and active experiment. Although Kolb’s model is used in legal education literature, students may not be provided with the relevant conceptual tools required to engage in reflective practice. This often results in students providing subjective analysis of their work, which fails to fully contribute to their educational experience. One of the reasons for omitting analytical tools is that reflective practice suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity. According to Kinsella, the “concept remains elusive, is open to multiple interpretations, and is applied in a myriad of ways in educational and practice environments”. A further issue hindering reflective practice relates to Donald Schön’s critique of the positivist approach adopted by law schools.

This chapter will apply a human rights framework to CLE to develop reflective practitioners. The two main reasons for this are, first, human rights as formulated by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights are universal, interrelated, and indivisible and, second, reflection based on these universal human rights values will benefit cross-jurisdictional societies in assisting vulnerable clients affected by emerging implied and direct human rights challenges.

The purpose of this paper is to engender new thinking regarding the intersection between universal human rights and development, and associated programmes. This leads to three subsidiary objectives: demonstrating the mutually reinforcing relationship between human rights and development; considering the practical divide between having and exercising a right; understanding the impact of non-state actors; and emphasising the ways in which state capacity and social capabilities need to be enhanced to both transform the consideration of human rights into a meaningful development catalyst and treat development as a significant contributor to human rights endeavours.

The paper begins by exploring the historical and contemporary understanding of the relationship between development and human rights – arguing for the increasing recognition of their mutually reinforcing relationship. The second section analyses the controversy regarding the existence of genuine “universal” human rights; followed by considering whether human rights are mere aspirations or genuine rights – exposing the difficulty of monitoring, evaluating, and enforcing adherence to human rights mandates, particularly given the growth of non-state actors, such as multinational corporations (MNCs)/transnational corporations (TNCs). The paper closes with a call to strengthen social capabilities and state capacities to consolidate the union between development and human rights.

Credence is broadly given to the moral argument for including human rights within a development framework. However, the economic argument remains largely neglected and certainly under-emphasized. Human rights and development should not be viewed or pursued as separate ends in themselves – competing objectives for separate organisations or programmes – but as mutually reinforcing. Both drive the same goal: the inclusive, equitable and qualitative development of human well-being. Further, to transform human rights into meaningful development catalysts one needs to be able to “exercise” the given rights – which in turn calls for strengthening social capabilities and state capacities.

Unlike some previous works, this paper does not prescribe a particular remedy. Rather, accepting the intangibility of human rights and the associated large degree of subjectivity, it provokes the reader to move beyond the strictures of conventional theories and frameworks. For example, the difference between “having” and “exercising” a right – a stark feature of actual practice has frequently been omitted from theoretical discussion. Likewise, the role of non-state actors, such as MNCs and TNCs, and the way in which their power can impede or support development goals and human rights is a relatively new point of discussion demanding further exploration.

A greater stress on individual responsibility is essential for a more effective protection of human dignity and, ultimately, for securing the future of the idea of human rights. However, this responsibility is an ethical concept and must be distinguished from its moral and legal counterparts. With responsibility comes authority, meaning that individuals have an area of discretion, which must be respected by others and the State, but with regard to which there exists also certain expectations towards the bearer. This idea of an ‘ethical space’ is already familiar to (European) human rights law, where the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ and the related concept of the ‘margin of appreciation’ define the relationship between the European Court of Human Rights and the States party to the European Convention on Human Rights. This relationship resembles, mutatis mutandis, the relationship between the State and the individual. The resulting inter-personal ethical diversity, which inevitably entails a certain level of ethical conflict, is thus both a logical consequence of individual responsibility, as well as an essential feature of a democratic society, which is based on the principle of human dignity.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

This chapter highlights how effective school and public libraries not only provide resources and information about human rights but also actually ensure people’s human rights are being met through their resources and programming.

In this chapter, both human rights documents and library policies are studied to see how effective libraries help children and adults reach their full potential as human beings. Findings by other researchers in this area are also discussed. Concrete examples of human rights projects through school and public libraries in Winnipeg, Canada are identified. The benefits of collaboration are also explored.

Knowledgeable and passionate librarians in schools and public libraries are essential in providing quality education and information rights to children and adults. Through effective collaboration with teachers, other libraries and relevant organizations, children and adults have more opportunities to reach their full potential. Canada’s newest school library document called Leading Learning is explored.

This chapter provides a current snapshot of how school and public libraries are collaborating together and with various organizations in Winnipeg, Canada, to promote and ensure human rights for children and adults. Libraries are consciously blending the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the Conventions on the Rights of the Child along with national and international library policy documents to ensure effective access to quality education and information rights for everyone. Dynamic and evolving libraries are also supporting human rights by incorporating innovative concepts, programs and resources such as Universal Design for Learning, Learning Commons, Makerspaces and prison libraries.