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An economic analysis is presented of the Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA), the contract governing the relationship between the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation and the private insurance companies that deliver crop insurance products to farmers. The paper outlines provisions of the SRA and describes the modeling methodology behind the SRA simulator, a computer program developed to assist crop insurers and policy makers in assessing the economic impact of the Agreement. The simulator is then used to analyze how the SRA affects returns from underwriting crop insurance. The results are presented in aggregate and also at the regional and individual company levels.

Federal crop insurance programs are the primary risk management programs of the US farm programs. Currently, these programs have been criticized for being disproportionally in favor of the riskier areas. Despite previous researchers having widely speculated its existence, a formal study of the scale, spatial pattern and fiscal impacts of such misrating phenomenon is still missing in the literature.

This paper first purposes an empirically testable definition of misrating, and then detects the scale of the misrating phenomenon by using over two million actuarial records collected by United States Department of Agriculture (USDA's) risk management agency since 1989. Furthermore, multiple spatial statistics methods have been adopted to study the spatial patterns of the misrating statuses. Finally, the paper builds a simple theoretical model to study the potential fiscal impacts of any policy attempts to mitigate the misrating issue.

The result reveals that roughly 40% of the counties display some degree of misrating. Furthermore, the distribution of misrating displays a significant pattern of positive global spatial autocorrelation, which reflects the existence of regional clusters of premium rate mispricing. Last but not least, the paper concludes that whether an attempt toward fair rating decreases the total program outlay or not relies on the demand elasticity of crop insurance in both overrated and underrated regions.

This paper offers the first attempt to quantify the scale, identify the spatial pattern and evaluate the fiscal impact of the premium misrating in federal crop insurance programs.

Three great scholars, one each from the United States, France and Israel, came to the same conclusion at the same time—the world would soon come to an end by flood. A great conference was scheduled where it was concluded that the world would indeed be inundated abruptly in 30 days. After the meeting the three great scholars met for drinks and dinner. While sipping brandy after dinner, the American asked the Israeli what he was going to do during the last 30 days. The Israeli said he planned to make his peace with God. The French scientist, asked the same question, said he was going to take all of his money out of the bank and throw a 30‐day party, enjoying wine, women and song. Then they asked the American what he was going to do. He replied that he was going to spend his time learning to live under water. This story illustrates two points about planning:

Rent seeking is endemic to the process through which any policy or regulatory initiative is developed in the USA. The purpose of this paper is to show how farm and other interest groups have formed coalitions to benefit themselves at the expense of the federal government by examining the legislative history of the federal crop insurance program.

The federal crop insurance legislation and the way in which the USDA Risk Management Agency manages federal crop insurance program are replete with complex and subtle policy initiatives. Using a new theoretical framework, the study examines how, since 1980, three major legislative initiatives – the 1980 Federal Crop Insurance Act, the 1994 Crop Insurance Reform Act and the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protection Act – were designed to jointly benefit farm interest groups and the agricultural insurance industry, largely through increases in government subsidies.

Each of the three legislative initiatives examined here included provisions that, when considered individually, benefitted farmers and adversely affected the insurance industry, and vice versa. However, the joint effects of the multiple adjustments included in each of those legislative initiatives generated net benefits for both sets of interest groups. The evidence, therefore, indicates that coalitions formed between the farm and insurance lobbies to obtain policy changes that, when aggregated, benefited both groups, as well as banks with agricultural lending portfolios. However, those benefits came at an increasingly substantial cost to taxpayers through federal government subsidies.

This is the first analysis of the US federal crop insurance program to examine the issue of coalition formation.

In the USA, private insurance companies serve as an integral part of the delivery and risk sharing of the federal crop insurance program. Governed by the Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA), private crop insurance companies must designate an eligible crop insurance contract to the assigned risk, developmental, or commercial funds. While the SRA restricts the private sector delivery system in a number of ways, the assignment of contracts to crop insurance funds, however, is left solely to the discretion of individual crop insurance companies. Thus, as to the companies' profitability viewpoint, the optimal selection of the crop insurance funds is the most important task. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to provide a decision framework for crop insurance companies to make optimal decisions regarding the purchases of crop reinsurance. This information and framework may also be useful for crop insurance firms in China when considering crop reinsurance decisions.

The paper studied three commonly used parametric loss distributions and presented a general guideline to choose the most profitable fund within the company's risk bearing level.

The paper finds many important features in the commonly used loss distributions, which are useful to maximize the company's underwriting returns.

The paper provides a general decision framework for optimally ceding risks to reinsurance. While this paper focused on agricultural insurance decisions by firms, the concept could be applied to general reinsurance decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the growth and rising costs association with the Federal Crop Insurance program in the USA, justifications for public support, and recent reforms that have been implemented or proposed to reduce program costs. It also analyzes a specific policy to reduce premium assistance spending.

Data from the Risk Management Agency are used to illustrate historical trends in crop insurance program costs and to analyze the impacts of imposing a per acre cap on premium assistance.

Imposing a per acre cap on premium assistance could achieve significant savings. A $20 per acre cap is estimated to reduce premium subsidy expenditures by more than 40 percent. However, the impact of such a policy would be most severe on crops currently receiving the largest subsidies per acre, which happen to be some of the largest program crops in the USA.

This paper adds to the literature analyzing potential reform in crop insurance industry. The subsidy cap considered has been proposed and considered by policy makers, and this paper provides estimates for its potential savings.

This study is designed to investigate how the use of reinsurance affects the primary insurers' profitability and pricing on their insurance products.

This study examines the impact of reinsurance on the insurers’ profitability using a two stage least square to control the endogeneity problem with a reinsurance variable. The study analyzes 11,894 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2009.

The study finds that the use of reinsurance in general has a negative impact on property/casualty insurers' performance. However, reinsurance obtained from affiliated firms has a positive impact on profitability, which supports the existence of internal capital markets in the insurance industry.

The finding of study implies that reinsurance transactions are used among affiliated insurers for not only managing underwriting risk and increasing underwriting capacity but also subsidizing capital through internal capital markets. In term of limitation, due to the availability of price data, this study uses only one insurance cycle of 9 years, albeit not weakening the findings.

Especially for non-affiliated insurers, the finding suggests that they need to find an alternative way to transfer underwriting risk without having to use costly reinsurance.

This paper directly investigates the impact of reinsurance utilization on insurers' profitability and pricing.

The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical information about the past loss experience in major US crop insurance programs, and documents the impacts of ratings changes through time on the premiums and exposure to participants. The losses are also examined within the structure of the current SRA to identify impacts on insurance companies and the government by fund designation.

- The study uses RMA Summary of Business data and methods consistent with the use of loss-cost ratemaking to analyze loss performance across years with different starting prices and volatilities. Additionally, the RMA premium quoting system was replicated across years with the ability to adjust only one feature at a time to isolate the impacts of changes in individual rating elements from changes in market conditions. Tabulations are provided in map and table form to present the loss ratios through time, in aggregate across time, and within each of the possible funds in which exposures are held. Additionally, the tools developed allow a direct tabulation of the farmer-level premium impacts of individual changes in the policy premium system, and of changing conditions over time.

Corn and soybeans represent dominant shares of aggregate policy premiums and liability, and also are the crops that underwent the greatest degree of revision in rates over the recent past both due to rate study implications, and to loss rate experience. Despite commonly made arguments that payments associated with the drought of 2012 “more than wiped out all historic gains,” it appears that insurance worked very much as intended and that the loss ratios through time are within reasonable ranges of targets. Fund designation, and the separation under the most recent SRA of Group 1 and Group 2 states substantially dampened the loss sharing and ability to capture gains by private companies, and leads to fairly low rates of return on a pure fund-loss sharing basis for insurance companies. Finally, despite the extreme losses of 2012, the aggregate performance of corn relative to the remainder of the program exhibits lower than average loss rates both in aggregate and on a scale-adjusted basis.

The study provides an important means to isolate and assess implications of rate changes, and to associate causes of losses with rate charges. Additionally, the structure of the SRA, and possible future versions of the SRA are informed by both the aggregate, and the normalized performance results provided. And, the relative performance of major row, crops even with recent extreme losses, appears appropriate or positive to insurance companies after considering the impacts of the SRA on company exposure. In total, the evidence points toward appropriate movement toward target overall loss ratios in the US crop insurance program.

This paper provides an extensive empirical evaluation of ratings for major crop insurance policies and provides a unique means to decompose sources of changes in premiums and rates across locations and through time. It also provides an evaluation of the performance of crop insurance post-SRA in a manner that allows both totals and scale-adjusted performance to be assessed.

The purpose of this paper is to scrutinize the structure of the federal crop insurance program and test whether participating private insurers screen insurance buyers better than the federal agency.

This paper regresses the claim payout on the risk share of private insurers in insurance pools and other relevant variables. The claim payout should be negatively related with the private insurers’ risk share if private insurers screen insurance buyers better than the federal agency.

The payout rates are significantly lower for reinsurance funds with higher risk shares of AIPs, and the relationship between the two variables is not affected much by the aggregate yield (similar relationship in good crop years and bad crop years).

The federal government could improve the effectiveness and the efficiency of the crop insurance program by restructuring its delivery system.

The novel contributions of this paper include estimating the economic significance of private insurers’ screening advantage and showing that the economic significance is similar in good crop years and bad crop years.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of leverage on the financial performance of general insurance companies in Malaysia, and investigate whether the leverage‐performance relationship is a function of or contingent on the extent of product diversification.

The sample consisted of the entire population of authorized general insurance companies operating during the period from 2006 to 2009 in Malaysia. A total of 94 observations were analysed. All the data used were sourced from the Malaysian Central Bank's (BNM) database.

It is found that leverage is negatively associated with firm performance. However, there is a significant interaction effect between leverage and product diversity on firm performance. The finding indicates that leverage could be beneficial or detrimental to the financial performance of general insurance firms, contingent on the extent of product diversity of the firm.

As the scope of study is limited to the general insurance industry and the sample size is small, the findings of the study must be interpreted with caution and the results may not be generalizable to the life insurance sector or other industry.

Findings of prior empirical studies on leverage‐performance relationship and effect of insurance product diversification are rather mixed and inconclusive. Based on analysis of a single insurance (general) sector that is highly regulated, the paper provides empirical evidence that the benefits of product diversification strategy are contingent on level of the firm's leverage. The paper hence, enhances understanding and contributes to the existing literature on impact of leverage, product diversification on performance of the highly regulated general insurance firms in a developing country.