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Chen and Ritter (2000) documented that underwriter spreads for recent US initial public offerings (IPOs) in $20 million range as well as much larger IPOs in the $80 million range are clustered at 7%. This observation has led to a Department of Justice (DOJ) enquiry into potential price fixing by underwriters. We demonstrate through a times series analysis that IPOs have tripled in size and become much riskier over time. A pooled data analysis can therefore mask evidence of competition in the market. We find that spread clustering is not a recent phenomenon. Over time, clustering at 7% has increased as clustering above 7% has declined. IPO spreads have declined significantly over time as the firms going public more recently are riskier, underwriting efforts have increased and recent IPOs are much larger than IPOs in the past. Controlling for time trends, larger IPOs have lower average spreads. The market for underwriting IPOs seems to be competitive with entry of new firms during the hot markets.

We investigate whether external investment banks or internal key IPO insiders such as company directors and officers, venture capitalists and institutions that hold an IPO's stock serve as effective monitors of IPO investments over the post-IPO period. We measure median changes in each group's holdings for the sample, finding large changes in these values during a long-run holding period. We find that long-run buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) are positively related to the lead investment bank underwriter reputation and the gross spread demonstrating that the external monitoring by investment banking firms increases the post-IPO firm's value. Holding the underwriter reputation constant, we find that the BHARs are positively related to the gross spread, also indicative of the value of monitoring by external investment banks.

Economic theory posits a universal sociocultural orientation toward pricing complicated only by systematic cognitive biases. While institutional and organizational theorists have challenged the purported homogeneity of market logics, they have not linked market heterogeneity to price outcomes. If market logics are internally complex with multiple orientations toward pricing, skilled actors should be able to influence prices through market logics. This study utilizes qualitative analysis of interview data with a stratified random sample (75 percent response rate) of key participants to examine how investment banks (underwriters) instantiate a hybrid market logic in the Initial Public Offering (IPO) market. Underwriters exploit their status position to promulgate IPO pricing methods contradicting neoclassical rationality, behavioral models of pricing, and the underwriters’ own calculative mode of behavior. They successfully create this hybrid logic for issuers while hiding the nature of their market power through deceptive use of vocabulary from the market logic itself. Hence, the internal complexity of market logics directly impacts financial prices, with skilled actors achieving superior outcomes. This study concludes with an assessment of the implications for price theory, developing propositions to guide future research on market logics and pricing.

In this chapter we investigate whether the pricing of IPOs on Europe’s new stock market differs from that of IPOs on main market segments. We report a 22.3 percentage point difference in the average first-day return of new market IPOs (34.3%) and the average first-day return of main market IPOs (12%). We show that reduced incentives to control wealth losses and different firm and offer characteristics partially explain the higher average first-day return on new market segments. We also find that the bundling of IPO deals has been more important to control underpricing costs on new market than on main market segments.

Economic theory posits a universal sociocultural orientation toward pricing complicated only by systematic cognitive biases. While institutional and organizational theorists have challenged the purported homogeneity of market logics, they have not linked market heterogeneity to price outcomes. If market logics are internally complex with multiple orientations toward pricing, skilled actors should be able to influence prices through market logics. This study utilizes qualitative analysis of interview data with a stratified random sample (75 percent response rate) of key participants to examine how investment banks (underwriters) instantiate a hybrid market logic in the Initial Public Offering (IPO) market. Underwriters exploit their status position to promulgate IPO pricing methods contradicting neoclassical rationality, behavioral models of pricing, and the underwriters’ own calculative mode of behavior. They successfully create this hybrid logic for issuers while hiding the nature of their market power through deceptive use of vocabulary from the market logic itself. Hence, the internal complexity of market logics directly impacts financial prices, with skilled actors achieving superior outcomes. This study concludes with an assessment of the implications for price theory, developing propositions to guide future research on market logics and pricing.

This chapter investigates whether non venture-backed, venture-backed and bridge financed companies going public on Germany’s Neuer Markt differ with regard to issuer characteristics, balance sheet data or offering characteristics. Moreover, this chapter contributes to the underpricing literature by focusing on the role of venture capitalists and underwriters in certifying the quality of a company. Companies backed by a prestigious venture capitalist and/or underwritten by a top bank are expected to show less underpricing at the Initial Public Offering (IPO) due to reduced ex-ante uncertainty. This analysis provides evidence to the contrary: VC-backed IPOs appear to be more underpriced than non VC-backed IPOs.

This chapter will describe and analyze the evolution of the structure, content, and other key parameters of business plans in international business plan competitions from the beginnings of such competitions in 1991 through the current time. In particular, the chapter will describe how these competitions have evolved through the current time, the standardization of the structure and content of the plans submitted to these competitions, and the changes that have occurred in their structure and content over time. Then it will explain why these changes have occurred. Specifically, that most of the changes that have occurred in these various areas is a direct or indirect result of pressures on the competitions from the major judges used in them – namely U.S. venture capitalists. Appendices A and B will describe the evaluation criteria used in two of the major competitions – Moot Corp/Venture Labs^® and the Georgia Bowl^® – in more detail, while Appendices C and D will provide information on the Term Sheets and decision-making processes used by such venture capitalists. Appendix E contains four Exhibits that provide additional insights into U.S. venture capitalists’ thought processes. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the additional changes that are likely to happen in the future.

That Melchior Palyi taught a course at the University of Chicago on the European banking system is unsurprising, given his background provided in the biographical sketch presented above.

This research investigated the market conditions caused by IPO advertising by examining the impact of IPO advertising, based on the US stock market from 1986 to 2009. The relationship between advertising intensity in the IPO year and the degree of IPO underpricing was examined. It was found that an increase in advertising intensity around an IPO event increases the initial returns. Simultaneously, however, advertising intensity around an IPO event also increases the degree of overvaluation, which raises the question as to whether advertising serves primarily as a mechanism to convey a firm’s true value to investors. The theoretical valuation of IPO and the relation between IPO advertising and the degree of stock overvaluation are discussed. Based on the Peasnell’s (1982) residual-income valuation framework (henceforth RIV), IPO advertising was proved to cause stock price to be more overvalued in the secondary market: a positive relationship was found between advertising and the degree of stock overvaluation relative to its theoretical value. Accordingly, an alternative hypothesis, that advertising inflates the short-run stock price, was proposed. The results of this study are consistent with the view of Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), namely that the stock price of newly listed firms can be overvalued.

We investigate the nature of mid-loan relationships between bank-lenders and borrowers, to test whether firms borrow from banks to signal quality. Using the LPC DealScan, CRSP, and Wall Street Journal databases, we test whether borrower abnormal returns are related to bank, borrower, deal, and/or event characteristics during the duration of the loan. We demonstrate that borrower abnormal returns are related to mid-loan bank events, defined as an event resulting in bank abnormal returns beyond a specified threshold. The results suggest that borrowers are affected by bank events mid-loan, even when the event is not directly related to bank default.