Search results

Supermaxes across the United States detain thousands in long-term solitary confinement, under conditions of extreme sensory deprivation. Almost every state built a supermax between the late 1980s and the late 1990s. This chapter examines the role of federal prisoners’ rights litigation in the 1960s and 1970s in shaping the prisons, especially supermaxes, built in the 1980s and 1990s in the United States. This chapter uses a systematic analysis of federal court case law, as well as archival research and oral history interviews with key informants, including lawyers, experts, and correctional administrators, to explore the relationship between federal court litigation and prison building and designing. This chapter argues that federal conditions of confinement litigation in the 1960s and 1970s (1) had a direct role in shaping the supermax institutions built in the subsequent decades and (2) contributed to the resistance of these institutions to constitutional challenges. The history of litigation around supermaxes is an important and as-yet-unexplored aspect of the development of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in the United States over the last half century.

Years ago, the Katz Commission questioned the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1962. The purpose of this article is to investigate the general principles of human rights litigation and the progress made to date in respect of rectifying the unconstitutional provisions of the Income Tax Act that were identified by the Katz Commission. It has been established that, although some unconstitutional provisions have been amended, others still prevail, and that, in the light of the factors identified, they will probably not be challenged successfully by taxpayers.

The first amendment, a crucial component of American constitutional law, is under attack from various groups advocating for censorship in universities and public schools. The censors assert that restrictive speech codes preventing anyone from engaging in any expression deemed hateful, offensive, defamatory, insulting, or critical of sacred religious or political beliefs and values are necessary in a multicultural society. These speech codes restrict critical comments about race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, physical characteristics, and other traits in the name of tolerance, sensitivity, and respect. Many hate speech codes are a violation of the first amendment and have been struck down by federal and state courts. They persist in jurisdictions where they have been ruled unconstitutional; most universities and public schools have speech codes. This assault on the first amendment might be a concern to all citizens, especially university professors and social studies educators responsible for teaching students about the democratic ideals enshrined in our constitution. Teachers should resist unconstitutional speech codes and teach their students that the purpose of the first amendment is to protect radical, offensive, critical, and controversial speech.

In this article Professor Perry argues that Plessy v. Ferguson and the de jure segregation it heralded has overdetermined the discourse on Jim Crow. She demonstrates through a historical analysis of activist movements, popular literature, and case law that private law, specifically property and contract, were significant aspects of Jim Crow law and culture. The failure to understand the significance of private law has limited the breadth of juridical analyses of how to respond to racial divisions and injustices. Perry therefore contends that a paradigmatic shift is necessary in scholarly analyses of the Jim Crow era, to include private law, and moreover that this shift will enrich our understandings of both historic and current inequalities.

This study analyses and discusses the application and constitutionality of the general onus of proof provision (section 82 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 [the “Act”]), the presumption in favour of the State when criminal sanctions are applied to an offending taxpayer (section 104(2) of the Act) and the mechanics for imposing administrative sanctions in terms of section 76(1)(b) of the Act. The conclusion reached is that the reverse onus presumption, as provided for in terms of section 104(2) of the Act, is unconstitutional. It is penal in nature and offends against the constitutional right of an accused to a fair trial (sections 35(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 108 of 1996 [the “Constitution”]). The section 36 limitation of rights clause of the Constitution does not save it. Section 76(1)(b) of the Act read in conjunction with the deeming provision of section 76(5) of the Act, is inextricably linked to the section 82 general reverse onus provision of the Act. Hence, when these three sections are applied together, they create a reverse onus that, prima facie, violates the right to just administrative action (section 33 of the Constitution). Regarding the general reverse onus burden as provided for in terms of section 82 of the Act, the conclusion reached is that it is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society and can therefore be regarded as constitutional.

On two different occasions, the Jordanian Constitutional Court has ruled that Articles 51 and 54 of the Jordanian Arbitration Act no. 31 of the year 2001 are unconstitutional and null. In view of this, this paper aims to attempt to give the reader a brief preview of the Jordanian Arbitration Act, the Jordanian Constitution and the Jordanian Constitutional Court. It also highlights and critically analyzes the Jordanian Constitutional Court two decisions pertaining to the Arbitration Act and its special implications in this regard from the perspective of arbitration law and the distinct characteristics embedded in it.

To examine how effective is the approach followed by the Constitutional Court in ruling the unconstitutionality of the aforementioned Articles, this work makes use of the primary and secondary data available in this regard as the main method to complete such an examination. By critically analyzing and comparing the various data contained in these sources, this work identifies the problems associated with such decisions.

This work submits that while the Constitutional Court has rested its rulings largely on constitutional principles, concerns arising from the Arbitration Act perspective have not been dealt with adequately by the Court. Furthermore, it argues that while the principles of the constitution shall be respected, the distinct characteristics of the arbitration law warrant a more careful approach than actually followed by the Court.

Taking into consideration the importance of arbitration as an alternative mean for dispute resolution, the Jordanian legislator has addressed the application of arbitration as early as the year 1953. However, while the Constitutional Court’s questionable approach to the aforementioned articles would necessarily hinder the use of arbitration, no comprehensive scholarly work has either examined such approach or addressed its implications. Accordingly, this work derives its originality and value from being the first of its kind to examine and address such a matter.

In 1994, after the 1993 Constitution had been adopted, the Katz Commission questioned the constitutionality of some provisions of the Income Tax Act. The purpose of this article is, firstly, to follow up on the progress made in amending the provisions concerned and, secondly, to establish reasons for the lack of success achieved by taxpayers who attack the constitutionality of certain provisions. Some progress has been made, but in this article, the author argues that SARS should amend section 104(2) of the Act. The establishment of a specialist ombudsman’s office is also proposed. Such an office that could assist taxpayers to enforce their constitutional rights against the Commissioner is the essential missing element.

The object of this research is the reconstruction of the existing legal response by European Union states to the phenomenon of immigration. It seeks to analyse the process of conferral of protection.

One main dimension is selected and discussed: the case law of the national courts. The study focuses on the legal status of immigrants resulting from the intervention of these national courts.

The research shows that although the courts have conferred an increasing protection on immigrants, this has not challenged the fundamental principle of the sovereignty of the states to decide, according to their discretionary prerogatives, which immigrants are allowed to enter and stay in their territories. Notwithstanding the differences in the general constitutional and legal structures, the research also shows that the courts of the three countries considered – France, Germany and Spain – have progressively moved towards converging solutions in protecting immigrants.

The research contributes to a better understanding of the different legal orders analysed.