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Introduction: Today the ability of nations to develop and implement innovations is core for their international competitiveness. Ukraine is striving for innovation progress; however, its innovation performance is relatively low. The research problem is to find the bottlenecks, affecting Ukraine’s innovation capability.

Purpose: This study aims to research the national innovation capability profiles, based on cluster analysis, to develop an understanding of drivers and threats for the innovation capability of Ukraine.

Need of the study: The knowledge-based economy, which had already turned into one of the most efficient developmental models of the 21st century, became a key driver of international competitiveness for the leading developed countries due to their progressive structural shifts towards the growth of high-technology manufacturing and knowledge-intensive sectors. These trends are significant to capture for the sake of increasing the innovation capability of the economy of Ukraine.

Methodology: The study is based on the K-means clustering method, which is employed for identifying 10 country clusters based on the indicators of their R&D and innovation activities, which allowed us to assess the innovation capability of Ukraine in comparison with 140 countries of the world. Data selection and normalisation were based on the 2019 Global Competitiveness Report indicators.

Findings: The study showed that Ukraine’s innovation capability problems are typical for most developing countries and are prevalently connected to low R&D expenditures, patent applications, and international co-invention activities. Most countries, except for the technologically developed ones, follow the so-called ‘passive technological learning’ strategies, which usually result in low economic productivity.

Practical implications: Several innovation policy implications have been developed for the government of Ukraine based on the cluster analysis results and accounting for the problems of the national innovation system (NIS).

Conflict and violence are the main drivers of globally escalating humanitarian needs. Local grassroots initiatives are pivotal in distributing humanitarian supplies in the acute response phase until more established humanitarian aid organizations can enter. Nevertheless, scant research exists regarding the role of grassroots associations in providing humanitarian assistance during a military conflict. The purpose of this paper is to understand the role of grassroots associations and identify important themes for effective operations.

This paper adopts a case-study approach of three Ukrainian grassroots associations that began operating in the immediate days of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The findings are based on analyzing primary sources, including interviews with Ukrainian volunteers, and are supported by secondary sources.

Grassroots associations have local contacts and a contextual understanding of population needs and can respond more rapidly and effectively than large intergovernmental agencies. Four critical themes regarding the operations of grassroots associations emerged: information management, inventory management, coordination and performance measurement. Grassroots humanitarian response operations during conflict are challenged by personal security risks, the unpredictability of unsolicited supplies, emerging volunteer roles, dynamic transportation routes and shifting demands.

Grassroots responses are central to humanitarian responses during the acute phase of a military conflict. By examining the operations of grassroots associations in the early months of the 2022 war in Ukraine, the authors provide a unique perspective on humanitarian logistics. Nonetheless, more inclusive models of humanitarian responses are needed to harness the capacities and resilience of grassroots operations in practice.

This study aims to examine the impact of the beginning of the Russia–Ukraine war and the Wagner Group’s attempted military coup against Putin’s regime on the European defense sector, consisting of weapons manufacturers.

The authors use the event study methodology to quantify the impact. That is, the authors assume that markets are efficient, and abnormal stock returns around the event dates capture the magnitudes of the impacts of the two events studied on European defense sector companies. The authors use the capital asset pricing model and two different multifactor models to estimate expected stock returns, which serve as the benchmark necessary to obtain abnormal returns.

The start of the war on February 24, 2022, when the Russian forces invaded Ukraine, was followed by high positive abnormal returns of up to 12% in the next few days. The results are particularly strong if multiple factors are used to control for the risk of the defense stocks. Conversely, the authors find a negative impact of the rebellion initiated by the mercenary Wagner Group’s chief, Yevgeny Prigozhin, on June 23, 2023, on the abnormal returns of defense industry stocks on the first trading day after the event.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study of the impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on the defense sector. Furthermore, this is the first study to measure the financial implications of the military coup initiated by the Wagner Group. The findings contribute to a rapidly growing literature on the financial implications of military conflicts around the world.

This paper aims to investigate the dynamic volatility connectedness among 13 G20 countries by using the volatility indices.

The connectedness approach based on the time-varying parameter vector autoregression model has been used to investigate the linkage. The period of study is from 1 January 2014 to 20 April 2023.

This analysis revealed that volatility connectedness among the countries during COVID-19 and Russia–Ukraine conflict had increased significantly. Furthermore, analysis has indicated that investors had not anticipated the World Health Organization announcement of COVID-19 as a global pandemic. Contrarily, investors had anticipated the Russian invasion of Ukraine, evident in a significant rise in volatility before and after the invasion. In addition, the transmission of volatility is from developed to developing countries. Developed countries are NET volatility transmitters, whereas developing countries are NET volatility receivers. Finally, the ordinary least square regression result suggests that the volatility connectedness index is informative of stock market dynamics.

The connectedness approach has been widely used to estimate the dynamic connectedness among market indices, cryptocurrencies, sectoral indices, enegy commodities and metals. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, none of the previous studies have directly used the volatility indices to measure the volatility connectedness. Hence, this study is the first of its kind that has used volatility indices to measure the volatility connectedness among the countries.

This study aims to develop and test a multivariable psychosocial prediction model of subjective well-being in Ukrainian adults (n = 1,248) 1.5 years after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The research design followed the “Transparent reporting of a multivariable prediction model for individual prognosis or diagnosis” checklist. The online survey combined a questionnaire on sociodemographic characteristics and specifics of living in wartime, as well as validated self-reported inventories: The Modified BBC Subjective Well-being Scale, Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – Version 2 and Connor–Davidson Resilience Scale-10.

The initially developed model was tested through regression analysis, which revealed nine variables as predictors of the subjective well-being scores within the sample, explaining 49.3% of its variance. Among them, the strongest were living with a friend and receiving mental health care systematically. They were almost twice as influential as forced displacement abroad and trauma exposure, which predicted lower well-being, and living with a spouse, which forecasted higher well-being scores. Two resilience subscales – adjustment and restoring and resistance – as predictors of better well-being and perceived unsuccess in life and age as predictors of lower well-being were relatively weaker but statistically significant.

The obtained results support the previous evidence on the essential role of accessible mental health services and social support in times of war, as well as the deteriorative effect of trauma exposure and forcible taking refuge on subjective well-being.