Search results

The social protests on the streets of indebted sovereigns in crises across the Eurozone have made debt restructuring an imperative. Further delay in achieving this expeditiously and equitably significantly exacerbates the social costs of crises from which current and future generations will struggle to recover. This article examines the feasibility of the drastic and widespread debt restructuring needed to resolve the problem in the face of existing private law sanctions that protect individual creditor rights. It relies on an analysis of US policy in the transition to a securitized market and of key sovereign debt cases to reveal the historical contingency of private law protections. It concludes by showing that the effectiveness of private law protections have always been constrained by the overriding imperative to achieve debt sustainability with negotiated and consensual workouts. This can be achieved in the Eurozone with statutory constraints on enforcement action pending the settlement of debt workouts as suggested in a recent proposal.

This paper aims to investigate how firms’ relationships with employees define their debt maturity. The authors empirically test the role of employee litigations in influencing firms’ choice of short-term versus long-term debt. The authors study employee relations by analyzing the importance of the workplace environment on capital structure.

The author’s test hypotheses using a sample of US publicly traded firms between 2000 and 2017, including 3,056 unique firms with 4,256 unique chief executive officer, adopting the fixed effect panel model.

The authors document that employee litigations have a significant negative effect on the use of short-term debt and a significant positive affect on long-term debt. Employee litigations, along with legal fees, outcomes and charging parties, matter the most in explaining debt maturity. In addition, frequently sued firms abandon the short-term debt market and use less shareholders’ equity to finance their operations while relying more on the longer debt market.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to examine the role of employee mistreatment in debt maturity choice. The study extends the lawsuit and finance literature by examining unique, hand-collected data sets of employee lawsuits, allegations, violations, settlements, charging parties, case outcomes and case durations.

The purpose of this study is to examine whether firm-specific litigation risk affects independent director conservatism in the oversight of financial reporting.

This study considers the enactment of Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the main US stock exchanges' corresponding corporate governance regulations in 2002–2003 as an exogenous shock event to increase board independence. OLS regressions with fixed effects are conducted to test the hypothesis.

Changes in discretionary accruals from the pre-event year (2001) to the post-event year (2004) are more negatively associated with an exogenous increase in board independence for firms with high litigation risk than for firms with low litigation risk.

The results suggest that independent directors are more conservative in overseeing financial reporting when they face higher litigation risk, consistent with the notion that they are still concerned about liability risk although they seldom have to pay damages or legal fees out of their own pockets.

Audit firm bankruptcy can have significant negative impacts on the stock prices of client firms. The purpose of this paper is to identify determinants of audit firm bankruptcy risk as measured by costs of debt.

Using audit firm data publicly available in Korea, this study empirically examines whether client portfolio, financial, and organizational characteristics are associated with the weighted average interest rates assumed by auditors.

The authors find empirical evidence that audit firms’ client portfolio characteristics, including the incidence (or number) of lawsuits against the auditor, the proportion of audit clients under surveillance, the proportion of initial audit engagements, and the proportion of listed companies of audit clients, are positively associated with the cost of debt. The authors also find several financial and organizational characteristics associated with the cost of debt.

The findings of this study suggest that client portfolio characteristics as well as financial and organizational characteristics are important determinants of the cost of debt in audit firms, and that these characteristics are different from those of firms in other industries. Identifying the determinants of audit firms’ cost of debt provides insight to regulators, client firms, and capital market participants.

This study examines the default risk of audit firms that play an important monitoring role in capital markets. By utilizing unique data about audit firms available in Korea, this study is the first study to empirically examine the effect of detailed audit firm characteristics on audit firm’s default risk.

This study aims to address the following four research questions: first, whether auditors report critical audit matters (CAMs) to shield themselves against possible litigation; second, whether reporting quality affects auditors’ propensity to report CAMs; third, whether auditors’ tenure length – reflecting familiarity with clients’ financial reporting – affects their likelihood to report CAMs; and fourth, whether auditors’ conservatism increases the likelihood of CAMs reporting.

Data are manually collected from audit reports including CAMs in 10-K, then financial data are collected from the Capital IQ database, and market data are collected from the CRSP database. Using propensity score matching, the initial sample of companies with CAMs is matched with companies without reported CAMs. Performance adjusted discretionary accruals, real earnings management proxy, Khan and Watts’ (2009) C-score, propensity to issue a going concern opinion, Dechow et al.’s (2011) F-Score, Rogers and Stocken’s (2005) model and Houston et al.’s (2010) model are used to measure reporting quality, auditor conservatism, misstatement risk and litigation risk, respectively.

The results do not show that auditors report CAMs opportunistically to shield themselves from litigation risk. However, the results do suggest that auditors have a greater tendency to report CAMs when reporting quality is low and when they are more conservative. On the other hand, they have less tendency to report CAMs in their first year of engagement.

The findings of this study have important implications for the auditor behavior literature as it shows that, when it comes to reporting CAMs, auditors actually behave objectively and do not report in a trite way. This study also provides early archival evidence on a standard that relates to the first major change to the auditor’s report in decades. To the best of the author’s knowledge, it is the first to provide evidence on the association between auditor conservatism and auditors tendency to report CAMs and the first to triangulate prior research on auditor litigation risk by providing the first archival evidence on the auditors “litigation-shielding” concern.

This study examines whether auditors attempt to meet the stated objective of reporting CAMs by signaling information about reporting quality. This study demonstrates that reporting CAMs is not a “boilerplate” communication. This study has implications for standards setters, as it shows that CAMs are reported in a way consistent with the objectives of the new standard, namely, via signaling information in the audit report on the quality of the financial statements.

In terms of originality, this paper uses a manually collected sample and, to the best of the author’s knowledge, is the first to focus on auditor’s behavior rather than on investors or clients reactions to CAMs. Also, this paper addresses a recently issued standard using US data and archival approach, rather than experimental. This paper also provides relevant evidence related to concerns raised earlier but were not empirically examined, such as reporting CAMS as “boilerplate” expectations. This paper provides new evidence on the auditors’ behavior with regard to litigation risk.

This paper aims to investigate whether the choice for a Big4-affiliated local audit firm affects the capital structure of listed companies in Indonesia, a fast-growing emerging country that is characterized by high information asymmetry and low litigation risk. A unique characteristic of the Indonesian audit environment is that Big4 auditors can only enter the market indirectly through affiliation with a local audit firm.

A sample of Indonesian listed companies between 2008 and 2015 is used to investigate this relation using ordinary least squares (OLS). To address the concern that the choice for Big4-affiliated auditors might reflect client characteristics, the authors also perform OLS on a matched sample, using both propensity-score and entropy-balance matching.

Across all three samples, the authors document that companies audited by a Big4-affiliated local audit firm display lower debt ratios. The authors find no such effect for affiliation with second-tier audit firms. Surprisingly, they find that the negative effect of Big4 affiliation is increasing in client size.

This study provides evidence of the consequences of hiring Big4 auditors on the perceived information asymmetry by financial markets under extreme conditions: in an environment characterized by low litigation risk and where Big4 auditors can operate only indirectly through affiliation.

The results of this study are of interest to policymakers, managers and financial stakeholders in emerging countries where external financing is important yet difficult to obtain because of severe information asymmetry. Hiring a Big4 auditor, even only through affiliation, might reduce perceived information asymmetry and increase the access to external equity financing.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to provide evidence of the effect of Big4 auditors on their clients’ capital structure when they can operate only indirectly through affiliation with a local auditor.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

The practice of management having control over auditor appointment and compensation is believed to be a fundamental cause for the lack of auditor independence. While researchers propose alternative auditor appointment procedures to improve auditor independence, there are a few settings that allow researchers to examine alternative auditor appointment procedures such as regulator designation of auditors. This research aims to investigate the effects of regulator designation of auditors and litigation risk on auditor independence in a Chinese setting

This study adopts a 2 × 2 between-subjects experimental design. A total of 110 surveys were sent out and 81 were collected from eastern China.

The results of an experiment with 81 Chinese auditors indicate that regulator designation of auditors improves auditor independence. In particular, auditors designated by the regulator feel less pressure from the audited company, perceive themselves to be more independent and are more willing to challenge the audited company’s aggressive financial reporting compared with those directly hired by the company. In addition, litigation risk moderates the effect of regulator designation of auditors on auditor independence such that regulator designation of auditors has a stronger impact on auditor independence when the litigation risk is low.

This study is also subject to limitations. First, regulator designation of auditors in China was examined. While regulator designation of auditors seems to improve auditor independence in the Chinese context, it is unclear if the same results will be observed in other economies, as China is a unique setting. For example, the majority of listed companies in China are under the control of government-related agencies. Consequently, the government has significant power in influencing auditor appointment policy. In contrast, the majority of other economies are more market-oriented with less government influence. Future studies in other markets will further enrich the understanding on regulator designation of auditors. Second, only regulator designation of auditors for state-owned enterprises was examined. It is unclear how regulator designation of auditors would affect non-state-owned enterprises. Moreover, future research could investigate the designation of auditors in other forms such as the designation of auditors by investors. Third, auditor appointment procedure may affect perceived risk of loss of client which in turn influences auditor independence. Future research could further investigate the mechanism through which regulator designation of auditors affect auditor independence.

Results of an experiment with 81 Chinese auditors show that regulator designation of auditors can improve auditor independence. In a decision context where auditors must provide judgments relating to a proposed audit adjustment that is quantitatively material and will affect the client’s ability to meet debt covenants, auditors designated by the State-Owned Assets Management Bureaus are more resistant to management pressure and are less willing to accept the management’s aggressive financial reporting practice than those directly hired by the company.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether client‐specific litigation risk affects the audit quality differentiation between Big N and non‐Big N auditors. Specifically, the authors examine whether higher quality audits of Big N auditors relative to non‐Big auditors is more pronounced for clients with high litigation risk than for clients with low litigation risk.

The authors develop the hypothesis based on auditors' potential monetary and reputational losses, collect the data of US listed companies from the Compustat and CRSP databases, and conduct regression analyses.

The authors find that the higher effectiveness of Big N auditors over non‐Big N auditors in constraining earning management is greater for high litigation risk clients than for low litigation risk clients, suggesting that clients' high litigation risk can force big auditors to perform more effectively.

This paper contributes to the literature by providing novel evidence on the effect of client‐specific litigation risk on the audit quality differentiation between Big N and non‐Big N auditors. The authors' findings complement the extant research on the relationship between the audit quality differentiation and country‐level litigation risk.