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The proliferation of sanctions programmes over time, each with its own set of regulations and its own peculiar blacklist, makes it more difficult for OFAC to administer the controls in a smooth, consistent and efficient manner. Additionally, unlike other agencies involved in international trade — such as the Commerce Department's BXA, or the State Department's DTC — OFAC has been slow to develop a cooperative relationship with those who must comply with its regulations. While OFAC's singular focus on economic and financial sanctions has enabled it to avoid some of the problems the Commerce Department sometimes experiences as a result of its dual missions of both promoting and controlling trade, it has also fostered a more adversarial relationship with the trading community. As OFAC has focused on each sanctions programme individually, rather than as part of a comprehensive system of controls, it has tended to be insensitive to the needs of those who must integrate its diverse regulatory requirements into an overall business compliance process.

The Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act was enacted on 3rd December, 1999, as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. The Kingpin Act calls for the imposition of a series of US economic and financial sanctions — with a worldwide reach — on ‘foreign narcotics traffickers’, their related ‘organisations’, and those ‘foreign persons’ who support their activities, enforced by penalties ranging up to fines of $10m and imprisonment for ten years. In passing this legislation, Congress specifically looked to the example provided by an earlier set of economic sanctions that prohibited dealings with Colombian narco‐traffickers or entities which they controlled, established by the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and administered by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC). The controls established by the Kingpin Act, and the associated Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations (FNKSR), accordingly, are neither a unique nor an isolated programme. Rather, they represent the latest step in the evolution of a series of distinct, but related, economic sanctions programmes administered by OFAC.

Those parties who do become caught up in the sanctions and are blacklisted face a daunting situation. Their property and accounts are often blocked, and dealings with US parties, and frequently their overseas affiliates as well, are essentially cut off with little or no warning by virtue of decisions made by a relatively small and obscure office within the Treasury Department. US as well as foreign parties can be blacklisted, and these restrictions can even extend to a firm's employees. The practical consequence of being touched by one of the Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC) economic sanctions programmes may be the economic equivalent of capital punishment. By virtue of the restrictions, the blacklisted business may cease to exist as a viable entity.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight some of the most significant US sanctions risks faced by persons that operate in the securities and investment marketplace, in order to encourage firms to maintain comprehensive, risk‐based compliance controls that will strengthen their ability to comply with US sanctions regulations.

The paper begins with a brief overview of the sanctions programs administered by the US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), followed by examples of potential sanctions violations that emphasize the risks and challenges faced by the securities and investment sector with respect to sanctions. Finally, the paper describes how firms can develop measures intended to mitigate their OFAC risk and prevent the potentially costly monetary penalties associated with violations of US sanctions regulations.

The nature of the securities and investment sector can make identifying the often indirect sanctions implications of engaging in certain activity a challenging task; however, a well thought out, responsibly implemented OFAC compliance program can help mitigate sanctions risks in an effective manner.

The paper provides insight regarding OFAC compliance in the securities and investment sector directly from the government agency responsible for administering and enforcing US sanctions.

To understand and analyze sanctions evasion and enforcement via virtual currencies.

Discusses various jurisdictions’ attempts to further the use of virtual currency to facilitate and maximize access to international funds; analyzes the aspects that make virtual currency uniquely suited to evade sanctions; suggests best practices for industry participants to be sure to account for the differences in crypto asset structure and related risks.

The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has explicitly stated that despite virtual currency’s anonymity, industry participants are still responsible for policing and enforcing client compliance. Although sanctioned jurisdictions are thinking creatively about ways around SWIFT, the use of virtual currency to skirt sanctions presents certain challenges.

Virtual currency industry participants should understand OFAC’s specific guidance regarding compliance obligations in the cryptocurrency space, and should implement best practices and conservative measures to avoid unknowingly running afoul of sanctions laws.

Expert analysis and guidance from experienced investigations and sanctions lawyers.

In 2012, the New York Department of Financial Services threatened to revoke Standard Chartered Bank’s U.S. license for alleged money laundering violations involving Iran. The bank’s settlement with US regulators and law enforcement cost the bank approximately $1.099 billion. In 2013, as a signal that no bank was too big to jail, the Holding Individuals Accountable and Deterring Money Laundering Act was introduced into the U.S. Congress. We focus on a clinical examination of the Standard Chartered money laundering case and examine the role of the US regulators and law enforcement in the settlement.

Since, at least 9/11 financial institutions and financial intermediaries are considered to be at the forefront in the international attempt to halt illicit money transfer. Most financial institutions if involved at all play an unknowing or lax, but major role in dictating money laundering schemes. The purpose of this paper is to argue that to avoid sanctions including criminal liability, financial institutions and financial intermediaries must be better prepared and willing to assess prototypical money laundering typologies. To do otherwise will invite civil and criminal liability.

This paper examines legislative pronouncements in general and US caselaw in particular in order to assess compliance and liability: real or imagined.

There appears to be considerable agreement concerning at least one goal of terrorists attacks and that is to disrupt directly and indirectly economic global stability. Further, those charged with the task of identifying terrorist assets in a financial system and developing a profile of terrorist financial transactions has, at least according to unclassified documents, proved to be futile. Closer international investigation and co‐operation appears to be more a slogan than a reality.

Reviews examples of blatant illegal acts of money laundering within the banking community and examines the exploding real estate market and its transmigration into the world of laundering illicit money.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an alternative opinion on the current debate on Iran and its place in the world, while seeking to avoid unnecessary dogma or propaganda.

The paper is a pure opinion paper and has not been designed as a methodological research paper.

The findings are entirely subjective and are the sole opinion of the author.

The practical implications are to stimulate a debate over the use of specific legal powers possessed by the USA, and the way in which they are used.

The paper is an entirely original piece of work by the author and its value or worth must be determined by the reader.

An exhaustive analysis of the current state of play of both the old and new law and the regulations promulgated thereunder. A one‐stop analysis of the state of the requirements under the USA Patriot Act and particularly how it affects broker‐dealers.