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This article aims to explore legal challenges regarding the regulation and supervision of Islamic Fintech and to construct Sharia compliance regulations to strengthen the supervision of Islamic Fintech operation.

This type of research is legal research, adopting the statute approach, comparative approach, and conceptual approach. The focus of the study is Indonesia with comparative studies with Malaysia and the United Kingdom.

Malaysia, Indonesia, and the United Kingdom are all on the top five countries in the Global Islamic Fintech (GIFT) Index. The list comprises countries that are most conducive to the growth of the Islamic Fintech market and ecosystem. However, weak supervision and low Sharia compliance are still becoming prominent challenges in the implementation of Islamic Fintech, while Sharia compliance is the core principle for Islamic finance regulation. Another finding is that a good ecosystem of Islamic Fintechs needs supportive regulations and policies, a Sharia Supervisory Board, and standards of Islamic Fintech Shariah governance.

This study examines the regulation and supervision of Islamic Fintech in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the United Kingdom countries whose Islamic Fintech industry is growing rapidly.

This study is a strong reference for countries with potential Islamic finance, especially when they are constructing the Sharia compliance regulations to strengthen the regulation and supervision of the Islamic finance industries.

Sharia compliance regulations can be a subsystem in the Islamic financial ecosystem to encourage Sharia economic growth in various countries.

To ensure Sharia compliance, it is recommended to take some steps: (a) creating the Sharia compliance regulations; (b) creating the Sharia supervisory boards; and (c) standardizing the Sharia governance of Islamic Fintech.

This paper aims to address the question: What is the distribution of value (in pounds) created in a sample of domestic takeovers in the United Kingdom from 2013 to 2020 among acquirer and target stockholders?

The author employs a traditional event study methodology to calculate the percentage excess returns of companies on the announcement date. These returns are then converted into pound-denominated excess returns using the companies' market capitalizations. This allows the author to estimate the synergies of the mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and how they are allocated between acquirers and targets. This innovative transformation from percentage to pound excess returns establishes a new ratio methodology for addressing the paper's objective.

This paper reveals that in UK takeovers, 40 percent of the synergies in pounds are allocated to the stockholders of acquiring companies, while 60 percent go to the stockholders of target companies. In other words, acquirers retain a significant portion—more than half—of the synergies generated in these domestic deals. This original finding is statistically significant at the one percent level and strongly contradicts the hypothesis that acquirers, at best, merely break even.

The evidence that UK takeovers distribute value gains nearly equally between domestic deal parties challenges the enduring conventional insight in the M&A literature. This conventional wisdom suggests that the value created by business combinations is entirely distributed to target company stockholders. Consequently, this reexamination may have broader implications, offering an alternative perspective on the motives behind business combinations. This perspective differs from the “managerial hubris hypothesis,” which aligns with the prevailing conventional insight but receives limited support in the original finding reported here.

The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2008 had far-reaching consequences for the global economy, triggering widespread economic turmoil. We use the event-study method to investigate whether investors priced the effect of significant events before the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy in European and Asia-Pacific banks. Abnormal returns on the event days range from −4.32% to 5.03% in Europe and −5.13% to 6.57% in Asia-Pacific countries. When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt on September 15, 2008, abnormal returns averaged the lowest at −4.32% in Europe and −5.13% in Asia-Pacific countries. The significant abnormal returns show that Lehman Brothers' collapse was a turning point, and investors paid attention to the precrisis events as warning signs of the oncoming crisis.