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Guided by a conceptual model developed by Davison and Wright, the research was conducted to determine which types of contract administration problems (e.g., delays) were perceived as most likely for seven types of contracts (e.g., small supplies and purchases). The survey was sent electronically to all members of the National Institute of Government Purchasing (NIGP). Postcards with the survey URL were also distributed to a random sample of members of the Institute for Supply Management (ISM). Data were obtained from 557 respondents. The results for the perceived relationship of the occurrence of contract administration problems for the various contract types provided partial support for the conceptual model. The results also showed that construction contracts were perceived as having the most problems overall and delay was perceived as the most common contract administration problem. The implications and limitations of the research are discussed.

Guided by a conceptual model developed by Davison and Wright (2004), Davison and Sebastian (2009) surveyed National Institute of Government Purchasing (NIGP) and Institute of Supply Management (ISM) members to determine empirically which types of contract administration problems (e.g., delays) were perceived as most likely for seven types of contracts (e.g., small supplies and purchases). The mean ratings of the perceived occurrence of the ten problems for each contract problem were reported. The types of contract that had the greatest overall perceived occurrence of problems across all problem types and the types of problem that were perceived to be the most common across all contract types were also reported. This research extends these analyses by examining specifically which types of contract administration problems were perceived to be most common for each of the seven contract types and by examining which contract types were perceived to be most affected by the ten contract administration problems. The implications of the research results for procurement professionals and the limitations of the research are discussed.

This paper focuses on how the producer inspires his cooperative research partner to reduce carbon emission, by developing a menu of incentive contracts both in research and development (R&D) stage and recycling stage.

The proposed mechanism combines the researcher with the producer in a two-staged closed-loop system. Based on the concept that the producer takes the environmental responsibility, this paper designs a dynamically updating contract for the producer to encourage low-carbon efforts. Meanwhile, the producer offers a menu of contracts against the asymmetric information, that is, the R&D partner owns private information on his low-carbon R&D capability. According to incentive mechanism, the researcher decides whether to tell the truth and how much effort she would exert in R&D and recycling stages.

Discriminating between different types of researchers hurts the producer’s profit. But the updated screening contract can inspire researchers to tell the truth and is beneficial in reducing carbon emissions in the two stages. The results give the optimal solutions of the incentive mechanism. The low-type researcher only obtains reservation profit, whereas the high-type is given more to induce the information.

This paper proposes a strategy of updating the contract factors for avoiding adverse selection and moral hazard. Considering the environmental responsibility of waste products, the producer would like to encourage low-carbon designs among the R&D partners in a closed-loop supply chain.

This paper aims to study a strategic decision of banks in Thailand to signal their types to the market and derive the optimal credit derivatives contract to guarantee their loans and credibly signal their quality under different economic determinants, namely, the maximum credit risk investment constraint, opportunity cost and opaqueness of the credit derivative market.

Contract theory is deployed to derive the expected payoff of different bank types under different economic and financial constraints. Hence, different bank types offer derivatives contracts to signal their loan quality and resell their loans in the secondary loan markets of Thailand.

The optimal derivatives contract is constructed on a basis of asymmetric information when banks have more private information concerning quality of their loans. A digital credit default swap is an optimal derivatives contract to send credible signal when banks are restricted to the maximum investment constraint. Moreover, profit of banks is reduced, as the optimal derivatives contract is more costly when banks are subjected to positive opportunity cost and opacity of the credit derivatives market. These results depict impact of changes of the maximum credit risk investment constraint on Thai credit derivatives market.

The optimal credit derivatives design that signifies bank types and facilitates loan purchase agreement has not been studied in Thai secondary loan markets before. In addition, this study provides insights of banks' strategic decisions to signal their types and transfer risk to risk buyers in Thai markets.

This paper aims to investigate the Chinese employment relationship under the framework of psychological contracts. The authors explored the effects of firm ownership (in terms of state-owned and private enterprises) and employment type (in terms of permanent and temporary employees) on employee perceptions of psychological contract. In addition, the associations between fulfilled psychological contract and various dimensions of employee attitudes were examined.

The authors adopted a questionnaire as the primary instrument to investigate the impact of firm ownership and employment type on psychological contract perceptions and outcomes. The analysis was based on a Chinese sample of a size of 363 employees.

The results indicate that state-owned employees overall reported fewer promises (employer under-obligation promised psychological contract), while private employees tended to have more promises (mutual high obligation, employer over-obligation and quasi-spot obligation promise-based psychological contract). Permanent employees reported high fulfillment (employer over-obligation, mutual high obligation and employer under-obligation fulfilled psychological contract). In contrast, temporary employees presented many promises (mutual high obligation promised psychological contract) and low fulfillment (quasi-spot fulfilled psychological contract). In general, firm ownership had weak effects on permanent and temporary employees’ perceptions of promise-based psychological contract, but no significant influence on fulfillment-based psychological contract. Moreover, psychological contract fulfillment was positively related to employees’ fairness perception and job satisfaction, while negatively related to the intention to quit. The authors failed to find comprehensive statistical support for the moderating effects of firm ownership or employment type.

The study contributes to the literature through a number of ways. First, instead of psychological contract breach, the authors use psychological contract fulfillment as a direct measure to examine the relationship between psychological contract and employees’ attitudes. Second, they investigate the effects of firm ownership on employment relationship under the psychological contract framework, enriching the institutional lens of the issue. Third, while majority of psychological contract studies concerning employment type concentrate on either permanent or temporary employees, the authors take both types into account. Fourth, they integrate perspectives of firm ownership and employment type. Finally, the authors perform the study in the Chinese context, which offers extra evidence to the body of psychological contract literature.

Presents a discussion of the research survey carried out at the Faculty of Technology Management at the Eindhoven University of Technology concerning contractors’ maintenance. First, gives a brief introduction to the emerging contracting out phenomenon in The Netherlands. Then, provides an overview of several contract types that can be offered by contractors and the potential difficulties that have to be solved in establishing such contracts. Complements this with some first‐hand experiences gained in actual situations. Further discusses the importance of taking the initiative by the contractor in developing a contracting out market for maintenance. Finally, makes suggestions with respect to developing in‐depth research in this area.

The purpose of this paper is to summarise a successfully defended doctoral thesis. The main purpose of this paper is to provide a summary of the scope, and main issues raised in the thesis so that readers undertaking studies in the same or connected areas may be aware of current contributions to the topic. The secondary aims are to frame the completed thesis in the context of doctoral‐level research in project management as well as offer ideas for further investigation which would serve to extend scientific knowledge on the topic.

Research reported in this paper is based on a quantitative study using inferential statistics aimed at better understanding the actual and potential usage of earned value management (EVM) as applied to external projects under contract. Theories uncovered during the literature review were hypothesized and tested using experiential data collected from 145 EVM practitioners with direct experience on one or more external projects under contract that applied the methodology.

The results of this research suggest that EVM is an effective project management methodology. The principles of EVM were shown to be significant positive predictors of project success on contracted efforts and to be a relatively greater positive predictor of project success when using fixed‐price versus cost‐plus (CP) type contracts. Moreover, EVM's work‐breakdown structure (WBS) utility was shown to positively contribute to the formation of project contracts. The contribution was not significantly different between fixed‐price and CP contracted projects, with exceptions in the areas of schedule planning and payment planning. EVM's “S” curve benefited the administration of project contracts. The contribution of the S‐curve was not significantly different between fixed‐price and CP contracted projects. Furthermore, EVM metrics were shown to also be important contributors to the administration of project contracts. The relative contribution of EVM metrics to projects under fixed‐price versus CP contracts was not significantly different, with one exception in the area of evaluating and processing payment requests.

These results have important implications for project practitioners, EVM advocates, as well as corporate and governmental policy makers. EVM should be considered for all projects – not only for its positive contribution to project contract development and administration, for its contribution to project success as well, regardless of contract type. Contract type should not be the sole determining factor in the decision whether or not to use EVM. More particularly, the more fixed the contracted project cost, the more the principles of EVM explain the success of the project. The use of EVM mechanics should also be used in all projects regardless of contract type. Payment planning using a WBS should be emphasized in fixed‐price contracts using EVM in order to help mitigate performance risk. Schedule planning using a WBS should be emphasized in CP contracts using EVM in order to help mitigate financial risk. Similarly, EVM metrics should be emphasized in fixed‐price contracts in evaluating and processing payment requests.

This paper provides a summary of cutting‐edge research work and a link to the published thesis that researchers can use to help them understand how the research methodology was applied as well as how it can be extended.

The purpose of this paper is to approach the issue of fraud prevention by using the theory of incentives to design a mechanism that makes employees to reveal their true type, that is, their willingness or ability to combat corruption. Based on this information, the manager may propose particular contracts for different types of employee.

The mechanism design approach assumes that the manager or the principal is entrusted with the power of making the employees agents – to provide effort. This methodology is adapted to assess the efficiency of the labor contracts to prevent fraud.

The paper shows that the labor contracts are efficient to combat fraud when the type of the employee, measured by his/her willingness to cope with fraud prevention is known by the manager. If this worker's private information not available for the manager, then the contract is not efficient due to the problem of hidden information that leads to a moral hazard. Only a second‐best solution is attained in this case.

The labor contracts are subject to the problem of hidden information.

This is a theoretical result that points out the importance of using labor contracts in order to stimulate workers to cope with fraud prevention.

The paper presents an attempt to apply an incentive theoretic approach to evaluate the efficiency of the labor contract scheme of combating fraud. Also, it reveals the fragile points of such an approach and how to overcome them.

Participative budgeting can benefita firm by incorporating subordinates’ private information into financing and operating decisions. In the managerial accounting literature, studies of participative budgeting posit superiors that range from passively committed to highly active participants, some of whom are permitted to communicate, choose compensation schemes, negotiate with subordinates, and reject budgets. This paper synthesizes and analyzes experimental research in participative budgeting with a focus on the role of the superior defined in the research design, and on how that role affects budget outcomes, subordinate behavior, and in some cases superior behavior. We demonstrate how superior type influences economic and behavioral predictions, and likewise affects budgeting outcomes and the interpretation of the results. This paper is intended to further our understanding of how superior type affects behavior in participative budgeting studies, and to facilitate the choice of superior type in future research designs.

How to determine the appropriate contractual structure for an outsourcing relationship has been a major theme in the business process outsourcing (BPO) literature. Drawing on transaction cost economics, this study aims to examine how anticipated coordination and adaptation costs in a BPO relationship affect the choice of contract types. Specifically, this research categorizes contracts types (fixed-price, time and materials and hybrid contracts) based on levels of contract design comprehensiveness and flexibility to change.

The research setting is the BPO for a focal firm, involving a contractor. Data from 153 US companies are collected using a structured questionnaire on senior executives of functional areas of marketing, IT and finance. Hypotheses were tested using ordered probit model.

The results show that maturity is negatively associated with anticipated adaptation costs, while modularity and IT detachability are negatively related to anticipated coordination costs. Furthermore, adaptation costs have a direct impact on the choice, whereas the anticipated coordination costs do not have a significant direct impact on contract choice. The strength of adaptation costs' impact, however, is significantly reduced when coordination costs are high.

This study explicitly examines the role of anticipated coordination and adaptation costs in shaping the strategic choice of contract types in the BPO market. By differentiating the two types of anticipated transaction costs, this research enables a better understanding of the dynamics between transaction characteristics, anticipated transaction costs and contract types in complicated relationships such as BPO relationships.