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The power industry is the pillar industry of the Chinese economy, and also a major carbon emitter. The performances of both the production and operation of the power industry are crucial for a harmonious development of society. This study proposes an improved data envelopment analysis (DEA) model to analyze the sustainable performance of China's power supply chain (PSC).

To analyze the sustainable performance of PSC systems in China's provincial regions, this study proposes a two-stage directional distance function (DDF) model. The proposed model not only considers the leader–follower game relationship between the power-generation system and the retail system, but also considers the factors that measure the sustainability level of the PSC.

The proposed model is applied to assess the sustainable performance of the PSCs of China's provincial regions. The findings are valuable and mainly include the following aspects: First, compared with other models, this study regards the intermediate variable of the power system as a freely disposable variable; therefore, the efficiency of the proposed model is more realistic. Second, the average efficiency of China's power retailing system is generally lower than the average efficiency of its power-generation system. Third, significant regional differences affect the power-generation efficiency, while the regional differences in power retail efficiency are not significant. The power-generation performances of PSCs in East China and Northeast China are generally higher than in other regions.

This study introduces the convex technique into a DEA model and thus proposes an improved two-stage DDF DEA model. In response to the game-theoretic inherent in power systems, this study also introduces the leader–follower game into the two-stage model. In addition to the theoretic novelty, all PSCs can be classified with this model. Moreover, specific recommendations for each type of PSCs are proposed based on the efficiency results, thus providing vital guidance for the practice.

A Nash bargaining game data envelopment analysis (NBG-DEA) model is proposed to measure the efficiency of dynamic multi-period network structures. This paper aims to propose NBG-DEA model to measure the performance of decision-making units with complicated network structures.

As the proposed NBG-DEA model is a non-linear mathematical programming, finding its global optimum solution is hard. Therefore, meta-heuristic algorithms are used to solve non-linear optimization problems. Fortunately, the NBG-DEA model optimizes the well-formed problem, so that it can be solved by different non-linear methods including meta-heuristic algorithms. Hence, a meta-heuristic algorithm, called particle swarm optimization (PSO) is proposed to solve the NBG-DEA model in this paper. The case study is Industrial Management Institute (IMI), which is a leading organization in providing consulting management, publication and educational services in Iran. The sub-processes of IMI are considered as players where their pay-off is defined as the efficiency of sub-processes. The network structure of IMI is studied during multiple periods.

The proposed NBG-DEA model is applied to measure the efficiency scores in the IMI case study. The solution found by the PSO algorithm, which is implemented in MATLAB software, is compared with that generated by a classic non-linear method called gradient descent implemented in LINGO software.

The experiments proved that suitable and feasible solutions could be found by solving the NBG-DEA model and shows that PSO algorithm solves this model in reasonable central process unit time.

This paper suggests to combine different kind of “other-regarding” preferences as an approach to fair behavior which is observed in controlled experiments. We assert that participants in two-person experiments have a good will capital which may be described by altruistic preferences. These preferences guide a large fraction of participants when they have to make distributional choices in one-stage games. We further show that in games with more than one stage the previous action of the other person may cause reciprocal feelings in addition to the altruistic preferences. A friendly (unfriedly) act of the other person may increase (decrease) the good will capital of the participants. Upon these findings, we conclude that a combination of altruism and reciprocity is able to describe the variety of behavior in several experiments despite their differing strategic context.

With the rapid growth of the economy, people have increasingly higher living standards, and although people simply pursued material wealth in the past, they now pay more attention to material quality and safety and environmental protection. This paper discusses the lack of motivation for investing in fresh-keeping technology for agricultural products by individual members of an agricultural supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer by means of mathematical models and data simulations and discuss the optimal price-invest strategies under different sales models.

First, based on the model of no investment by both sides (NN), this paper considers three models: supplier only (MN), retailer only (NR) and cooperative investment (MR). Then, the authors analyze the influence of consumer price sensitivity and freshness sensitivity on the investment motivation of agricultural products under four models. Subsequently, the paper makes a sensitivity analysis of the optimal strategies under several models, and makes a game analysis of the suppliers and retailers of agricultural products. Finally, we conduct an empirical analysis through specific values.

The results show that (a) when the two sides cooperate, the amount of investment is largest, the freshness of the agricultural products is highest, and the sales volume is greatest; however, when both sides do not invest, the freshness of agricultural products and sales volume are lowest. (b) The price and freshness sensitivity of the consumer have an impact on investment decisions. Greater freshness sensitivity corresponds to a higher investment, higher agricultural product price, greater sales volume, and greater supply chain member income and overall income; however, greater price sensitivity corresponds to a lower investment, lower agricultural product price, lower sales volume, fewer supply chain members and lower overall income. (c) The investment game between the supplier and retailer is not only related to the sensitivity to price and freshness but also to the coordination coefficients of interest. At the same time, the market position of agricultural products should be considered when making decisions. The market share of agricultural products will affect the final game equilibrium and then affect the final benefit of the supply chain and individual members.

These results provide managerial insights for enterprises preparing to invest in agricultural products preservation technology.

At present, the main problem is that member enterprises of agricultural supply chains operate based on their own benefits and are resistant to investing alone to improve the freshness of agricultural products. Instead, they would prefer that other members invest so that they may reap the benefits at no cost. Therefore, the enterprises in each node of the agricultural product supply chain are not motivated enough to invest, and competition and game states are observed among them, and such behavior is definitely not conducive to improving the freshness of agricultural products. However, the current research on agricultural products is more about price, quality and greenness, etc., and there are few studies on agricultural investment. Through the establishment of the model, this paper is expected to provide theoretical suggestions for the supply chain enterprises that plan to invest in agricultural products preservation technology.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the efficiency of Algerian banks and examine the effects of explanatory factors on their performance.

In this paper, a methodology of two-stage network data envelopment analysis (DEA) is used to explore the efficiency of a sample of 13 Algerian banks during the 2013–2017 period. In the first stage, the network DEA is used to assess the overall and stages efficiencies. In the second stage, the partial least squares (PLS) regression is conducted to determine the potential effects of explanatory factors on stages efficiency.

The main empirical results indicate that Algerian banks need an efficiency improvement in both stages. The overall efficiency of the Algerian banking system improves over the study period. The deposit producing efficiency is positively affected by bank size and bank age. The revenue earning efficiency is negatively associated with bank size and bank age. The domestic banks are more efficient than foreign banks in the deposit producing stage and the foreign banks are more efficient than domestic banks in the revenue earning stage.

The results might be used as guidelines for both managers and policymakers in order to improve banks and banking system performance.

To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first that uses the DEA in investigating the efficiency of Algerian banks by dividing the overall efficiency into deposit producing and revenue earning efficiencies. Unlike most studies that have usually used OLS regression, Tobit regression and bootstrapped truncated regression, this study is the first in the bank efficiency literature that uses PLS regression to investigate the potential effect of explanatory variables on deposit producing and revenue earning efficiencies.

In many societies, conflicts of violent nature regularly spring up that usually cause a destruction of economic and social assets and needless loss of human lives. Violent conflicts and food entitlements seem to bear mutual feedbacks: first and foremost, as violent conflicts result in destruction of economic assets, conflicts usually tell upon the cultivation of foods, procurement and storage of foods and also the distribution and marketing of foods. The disruption in the agrarian sector can lead to serious decline in food availability and consequent famines, which can exacerbate and fuel further conflicts. On the other hand, the distribution and availability of foods can trigger violent conflicts in backward societies as a means to acquire and retain food entitlements, which can in turn jeopardise the agrarian equilibrium. Thus, the relationship between food entitlements and conflicts are a double-edged sword that can lend precarious instability to a backward society. During the last five decades, governments in developing nations have kept a close vigil on their agrarian sector, yet there is a clear indication in the global economy that warns of a looming food crisis, especially in the poorer regions of our globe. Food crises can seriously challenge global peace. Conflicts and hunger are hence complex phenomena. This chapter provides a comprehensive, and possibly the first, study of the economics of food entitlements and potential threats of conflicts in the current conjuncture.

We develop an interactive framework to model speculation (over regulation) and regulation (of speculation) in a greenhouse gas (GHG) permits market. In our proposed model, big traders engage in speculation by strategically withholding and releasing permits to influence the temporal path of permit prices in order to maximize their profits. The national government/regulator has an incentive to stabilize permit prices by suitably manipulating stocks of permits. Thus, the GHG permits market can typically be characterized by circular interdependence in which big traders will be “gaming” the regulator to generate profits: the state of the market affects speculative behavior of traders that in turn impacts on government's behavior, which in turn impacts on the state of the market. The interactive framework explores the gaming between speculators and a regulator, or government, to shed crucial insights on the nature of equilibrium in possible global emissions trading schemes (GETS). By so doing, we are able to unravel potential pitfalls of any global trading system in pollution permits for arresting global warming. Once policy makers are aware of these pitfalls, for example, a “culture of speculation” as opposed to a culture of safety, they can devise a suitable mechanism to bypass these potential pitfalls.

This paper aims to propose the mechanism of cross-network effect embedded, which can help cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) platforms strengthen cooperative relationships with sellers more equitably and effectively by using the network structural characteristics of the platforms themselves.

A two-stage evolutionary game model has been used to confirm the influence factors. The mathematical derivation of evolutionary game analysis is combined with the simulation method to examine the role of cross-network effect in cooperation. The evolutionary game model based on the cross-network effect is proposed to achieve better adaptability to the study of cooperation strategy from the two-sided market perspective.

The evolutionary game model captures the interactions of cross-network effect and the influence factors from a dynamic perspective. The cross-network effect has a certain substitution on the revenue-sharing rate of SMEs. CBEC platforms can enhance the connection between consumers and the website by improving the level of construction, which is a good way to attract sellers more cost-effectively and efficiently.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specificCBEC platforms.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specific CBEC platforms.

Investigations that study cooperation strategy from the cross-network effect perspective in CBEC are limited. The research figured out which influence factors are affected by the cross-network effect in cooperation. A two-stage evolutionary game model was proposed to explain the interaction of the factors. The evolutionary game analysis with a simulation method was combined to highlight the role of cross-network effect on cooperation strategy to give a deeper investigation into the sustainable cooperation ofCBEC.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a portfolio procurement framework to response to uncertain customer demand and purchasing price volatility in a simultaneous manner. Then it aims to obtain optimal procurement and production decisions under the portfolio framework to maximize profit.

The portfolio procurement problem is modeled as a dynamic Stackelberg game and Nash equilibrium solutions are obtained. The portfolio procurement framework is analyzed in the settings, with both risk-neutral objective and downside risk constraints measure of contract prices.

By obtaining the Nash equilibrium solutions for both the buyer’s ordering decisions and the supplier’s optimum production decisions, Stackelberg game model for portfolio procurement is proved to be feasible. Additionally, downside risk constrains are proposed to help supply chain participants’ to evaluate the profitability and risk probabilities of the designed procurement contracts under the uncertain customer demand and spot market.

This paper assumes the supplier is risk averse and the buyer is risk neutral, and it would be interesting to examine the performances of portfolio procurement strategy with different risk attitudes participants.

This research could help the buyer respond to not only demand uncertainty but also the volatile spot price in the procurement process. Related optimal portfolio procurement strategy can be carried out to improve the enterprise’ procurement plan by adjusting the order of long-term contract, option contract and the spot market. The proposed framework could also help suppliers design and evaluate contracts for buyers with different risk preference, and on the other hand help the buyers decide if she should accept the contracts from the supplier.

This research should also increase awareness in both academia and industry on the opportunities of using the dynamic portfolio procurement approach to enhance flexibility and to mitigate the inventory as well as price risks in the procurement process. Effective downside risk constrains on contract prices could also help to protect the bottom line of companies with different risk preference.

The portfolio procurement framework proposed in this research can mitigate inventory and price risks simultaneously. Also, instead of solving the portfolio procurement planning problem in computational simulation experiments as in previous research, this paper proposed a dynamic game model for this portfolio-based procurement problem and obtained its Nash equilibrium solutions for both the buyer’s ordering decisions and the supplier’s optimum production decisions. Finally, an innovative and simple downside risk constraints has been designed to help the buyer evaluate supplier’s contract prices according to their individual risk preference.

In the context of the trade war in full swing, the global supply chain systems have experienced a serious shock and become very vulnerable. The purpose of this paper is to explore the intertwining effects between the export-supporting subsidy policy and the import-deterring tariff policy to develop better insights for trade policy-making under the intra-industry-trade (IIT) conflicts. The research results may provide the trade policy makers and international businesses with better insights in making rational trade policy and business decisions.

Two-stage game-/bargaining-theoretical models for the dual competing international supply chains with a unilateral/bilateral tariff imposing or subsidy implementing under six different scenarios of IIT conflict are developed, analyzed and compared. On this basis, the corresponding numerical analyses are conducted to assess the impact of the tariff and subsidy policies and derive the trade policy implications and business insights.

The research results indicate that: (1) the bilateral subsidy implementing from both governments is the best policy for all stakeholders in two countries, which would lead to the highest profits, social welfare and consumer surplus than those of the other scenarios; (2) the bilateral tariff imposing of both governments is the worst policy for all stakeholders in two countries, which would lead to the lowest profits, social welfare and consumer surplus than those of the other scenarios; (3) the fair trade scenario without tariff imposing and subsidy implementing turns out to be the second-best trade policy for the governments. Under the World Trade Organization rule and fair-trade principles, the bilateral subsidy policy is not allowed in most of the cases. Thus, adopting a fair-trade policy may be the most appropriate trade policy for two trading countries.

The modeling approach developed for this study is original and innovative due to the following characteristics. First, based on three trade policy alternatives – fair trade, tariff imposing and subsidy implementing – of two generic governments under IIT conflict, nine different combinations of three policy alternatives are defined. Second, excluding the symmetrical combinations, six IIT conflict scenarios under various tariff/subsidy policy pairs ranging from no conflict to high conflict are assumed for two dual competing international supply chains. Third, a novel two-stage game-/bargaining-theoretical modeling approach is applied to investigate the optimal/equilibrium decisions regarding pricing, ordering quantity and their critical economic outcomes for all possible trade policy scenarios. Fourth, this study lays down a research foundation for the future trade conflict study using a game-theoretical modeling approach.