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We review previous research on intergenerational conflict, focusing on the practical implications of this research for organizational leaders. We explain how the interaction between the interpersonal and intertemporal dimensions of intergenerational decisions creates the unique psychology of intergenerational decision-making behavior. In addition, we review the boundary conditions that have characterized much of the previous research in this area, and we examine the potential effects of loosening these constraints. Our proposals for future research include examination of the effect of intra-generational decision making on intergenerational beneficence, consideration of the role of third parties and linkage issues, investigation of the effects of intergenerational communications and negotiation when generations can interact, examination of the role of social power in influencing intergenerational interactions, investigation of the interaction between temporal construal and immortality striving, and exploration of the ways in which present decision makers detect and define the intergenerational dilemmas in their social environments.

This chapter analyses efforts exerted and utilities obtained in a double lawsuit. This is a usual situation when insurance companies are involved in damage compensation. A victim files the first lawsuit against its insurance company for coverage. If the victim loses, there are no further lawsuits. If the victim wins, the insurance company files the second lawsuit against the perpetrator to recover its expenses.

The situation is described as a two-period game, which is solved with backward induction. The model is based on the Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001) litigation success function that expresses influence of the counterparts’ efforts on the outcome of a lawsuit.

The chapter analyses the optimal resource allocations in each lawsuit as functions of effort unit costs, the value of each lawsuit and the contest intensities in the lawsuits. It is shown that a one-period game where the victim, the insurance company and the perpetrator choose their efforts simultaneously and independently gives the same solution as the two-period game.

In 2008 in the United States 15 million lawsuits were filed. Several of these were linked in the sense that subsequent lawsuits depend on the outcomes of earlier lawsuits.

Lawsuits are commonly analysed separately. The chapter analyses in a novel manner the implications of two linked lawsuits referred to as a double lawsuit.

To remedy the inherent defect in current research that focuses only on a single type of participants, this paper endeavors to look into the situation as an evolutionary game between a representative Logistics Service Integrator (LSI) and a representative Functional Logistics Service Provider (FLSP) in an environment with sudden crisis and tries to analyze how LSI supervises FLSP's operations and how FLSP responds in a recurrent pattern with different interruption probabilities.

Regarding the risks of supply chain interruption in emergencies, this paper develops a two-level model of single LSI and single FLSP, using Evolutionary Game theory to analyze their optimal decision-making, as well as their strategic behaviors on different risk levels regarding the interruption probability to achieve the optimal return with bounded rationality.

The results show that on a low-risk level, if LSI increases the degree of punishment, it will fail to enhance FLSP's operational activeness in the long term; when the risk rises to an intermediate level, a circular game occurs between LSI and FLSP; and on a high level of risk, FLSP will actively take actions, and its functional probability further impacts LSI's strategic choices. Finally, this paper analyzes the moderating impact of punishment intensity and social reputation loss on the evolutionary model in emergencies and provides relevant managerial implications.

First, by taking both interruption probability and emergencies into consideration, this paper explores the interactions among the factors relevant to LSI's and FLSP's optimal decision-making. Second, this paper analyzes the optimal evolutionary game strategies of LSI and FLSP with different interruption probability and the range of their optimal strategies. Third, the findings of this paper provide valuable implications for relevant practices, such that the punishment intensity and social reputation loss determine the optimal strategies of LSI and FLSP, and thus it is an effective vehicle for LSSC system administrator to achieve the maximum efficiency of the system.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the current state of Korea’s internal negotiation system and the role of domestic policy factors in the process of Korea’s joining the mega FTAs such as Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

Along with Putnam’s three determinants of win-set size, the authors analyze a new set of policy factors – including Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), the FTA Domestic Planning Division, and the Trade Procedure Act – to examine the institutional arrangements available for the ratification of the TPP in Korea.

To minimize the social cost of the internal negotiation process of the trade, better understanding of the role of domestic policy factors is essential. The paper proposes some important policy suggestions which will scale up the benefit of the trade.

The very same analysis can be easily extended to examine the domestic reactions for future FTA negotiation, especially for Mega FTA negotiation.

The authors propose six policy suggestions: a Master Process Manual; measures to diagnose domestic reactions; emphasizing non-economic issues; strengthening human resources; considering the strategic role of the Trade Procedure Act; and reshaping TAA, to ensure that a tranquil environment exists for domestic negotiation and confirmation and the authors believe these policies can be implemented widely in trade negotiations.

This paper contributes to the existing literature in at least three respects. First, the authors made the first attempt to integrate the domestic policy tools with the domestic determinants of trade negotiation outcomes. Second, the policy proposals can be extended to other countries’ cases with a minor adjustment. Finally, the analysis is based on the assumption that international trade negotiations are multi-level frameworks where domestic influences play a vital role in the aftermath of bilateral FTAs.

Although green logistics has become a new focus of cooperation between government and enterprises under environmental constraints, how local governments formulate subsidy policies to effectively guide the green transformation of regional logistics and how to facilitate the reasonable cost-sharing are rather critical. This paper will deeply explore the dynamic process of the tripartite participation (government, platform, and logistics enterprises) in the selection of regional green logistics strategy, and reveal the evolutionary game relationship of the three parties.

To explore the dynamics involving the government, platform and logistics enterprises for the green logistic transformation, and reveal the evolutionary gaming among the three parties, based on the bounded rationality premise, this study constructs the tripartite asymmetric evolutionary game models, uses the stability theorem of differential equation to explore the evolution and stability strategy of the system in different cases and explicates the paths of influence on the tripartite behaviors via simulations.

Results of this study indicate that there exist stable equilibrium strategies among the three parties regarding the regional green logistics, and they are affected by different factors. The government's subsidy, subsidy intensity and the platform's cost-sharing proportion can generate positive effects, but the latter two can also impact negatively beyond the effective ranges. The findings provide a theoretical basis for local governments, platforms and logistics enterprises to formulate justifiable subsidy intensity and determine reasonable sharing proportion.

Firstly, considering the significant relevance of local government, it is included in the evolution model, and the tripartite game (among government, platform and enterprises) is explored; Secondly, by comparing the equilibrium results under different game conditions, this paper analyzes the evolution of each party's game strategy to achieve the optimal return under bounded rationality and the important factors determining the strategic selection; Finally, the key factor of platform cost sharing is involved, and to what extent the change of platform cost sharing ratio will influence the systematic stability is explored.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect of brand placement strength on gamers’ brand recall as moderated by gamers’ prior game playing experience and game involvement in the context of advergames. Specifically, this research utilizes Limited Capacity Model of attention to explain how and under what conditions brand placements create attention, elaboration and subsequent brand recall.

A 2 (brand placement strength: prominent versus subtle) × 2 (prior game playing experience: experienced versus inexperienced) × 2 (game involvement: high versus low involvement) between-subjects measures design is used. Empirical data were obtained from 220 undergraduate student gamers. A between-subjects measures ANOVA is used to test the hypotheses.

There are several important findings that can be inferred from the results. First, inexperienced gamers report high brand recall in prominent brand placements than subtle brand placements, whereas for experienced gamers, no significant difference in recall rates is found between prominent brand placement and subtle brand placement. Second, inexperienced gamers with low game involvement playing an advergame with prominent brand placement report high brand recall compared to inexperienced gamers with high game involvement playing an advergame with prominent brand placement.

The study contributes to the advertising literature from a non-traditional advertising perspective, particularly in the context of online advergames, and explains the role of brand placement and its boundary conditions to create customers’ brand memory. Moreover, this research contributes to the marketing knowledge on how to locate and embed the brands effectively in advergames, taking into account the individual characteristics of each advergame.

The findings are very important for advertising practitioners because selecting media that enhances the brand memory of the consumers through entertainment is a planning strategy that has been widely used by media planners today. Hence, advertising managers should think about designing advergames by taking into account the game involvement factor to make sure that the implementation has the strongest positive effect on consumers’ memory.

This research contributes to the literature of online advertising, especially the advergames by exploring the impact of brand placement strength and prior gaming experience on gamers’ brand recall. In addition, this study is the first step toward understanding the moderating role of game involvement on Indian gamers recall in the context of online advertising.

Working conditions, pay rates and the rights of workers to collectively negotiate have become important points of discussions in recent years, with support for unions and union applications rising to levels long unseen in America. In many instances, though, companies have responded aggressively. This is not the first time such a dynamic has played out in American business. This study aims to take a fresh look at one of America’s most prominent historical disputes between labor and ownership – the Homestead Massacre of 1892 – to glean lessons from that conflict that remain relevant to today’s business environment.

This study adopts game theory and the principles of repeated interaction to assess how differing discount factors led to differences in time orientations between the workers and the Carnegie company. These differing time orientations affected both the strategy each side deployed in the negotiations and the payoffs received by the parties. Letters, contemporary news reports and histories of the events leading up to and immediately following the 1892 Homestead Massacre are qualitatively analyzed with a genealogical pragmatic approach.

Differences in temporal orientation between management and workers exacerbated the conflict, with the workers adopting a more cooperative stance and distal time orientation, while the Carnegie company negotiated with a proximal time orientation and played to “win” a game that, in fact, could not be fully won or lost given its infinitely repeating nature. The result was a short-term victory for the Carnegie company but with long-term negative consequences that highlight the suboptimal outcome the company achieved by playing a proximal strategy in an infinite game.

Although the incident at Homestead is a well-studied labor dispute, many of the themes that preceded the incident have resurfaced in the modern work context. This work, by adopting game theory as an analytical framework, provides new insights into management mistakes that led to the labor conflict and lessons for what present-day managers can do to avoid exacerbating labor strife.

This chapter is concerned with examining Pokémon Go in light of the digital economy and surveillance capitalism. The chapter begins by developing the theoretical framework underpinning this undertaking, which includes Bauman and Lyon (2013) ‘liquid surveillance’ and Zuboff's (2019) ‘surveillance capitalism’. Following this, we outline the various implications involved in the playing of Pokémon Go, when the production of locative data is not framed as leisure but labour. While Pokémon Go might be suited to the machinations of surveillance capitalism, as we establish, little research has examined this topic from the position of familial locative play or joint-media engagement. As a corollary to this, then, one of the aims of this chapter is to understand how issues of surveillance are perceived by the parents who play this hybrid reality game (HRG) with their children. Consequently, the chapter is driven by the following research questions. First, are families cognisant of the data they produce by playing this HRG, and how these data might be used? Second, do families think critically about the gamic mechanics of this HRG, such as the spawning locations of Pokémon and the reasoning behind these decisions? Third, are participants concerned about the potential application of their gamic data, and if so, how are these concerns reconciled? Fourth, do participants use the familial playing of Pokémon Go as an opportunity to discuss the production of data and its multifaced uses with their children?

This exploratory paper investigates gamification as a medium for knowledge workers to interact with each other. The purpose of this paper is to open the discussion around the sustaining impact that gamification might have on knowledge management (KM).

The paper employs an exploratory literature review investigating the current state of the art in relation to KM and gamification; this literature review serves as the starting point of subsequent theorizing.

Based on the literature review the authors theorize that the use of gamification in KM can go far beyond the motivational aspects. To name just a few uses of gamification, it can help in: supporting flexibility, facilitating transparency and therefore improving trust, visualizing skills and competences as well as generating requirements for new competences and promoting a collaborative environment among the knowledge workers.

This paper opens the discussion around KM and gamification and suggests a wide range of areas for further research.

In this paper the authors argue that by looking at gamification as more than just a set of tools for improving motivation and engagement a company can address some pitfalls of a particular type of knowledge workers.

Gamification is a new, but increasingly popular approach, which has been shown to be powerful in many areas. This paper is novel in that it initiates a dialogue around the impact that gamification might have on KM.

Purpose – This chapter proposes a theoretical framework – the Conflict Templates Model – that depicts how people conceptualize their outcome interdependence in conflict and negotiation situations. We focus on perceptions of outcome interdependence in dyadic conflicts, with a particular emphasis on intergroup interactions.

Approach – Integrating ideas and concepts from game theory with social psychological principles, we propose that: (a) people's mental representations of interdependence are predictably constrained to a small set of mixed-motive games; (b) different motivational goals often lead group members to endorse different games to describe the same intergroup conflict; and (c) these interdependence perceptions influence parties' strategic behavior, and ultimately, their outcomes.

Findings – We review empirical evidence that provides initial support for each of these propositions and discuss future directions for research on the mental representation of conflict and negotiation.

Originality/value – We generate a number of novel predictions concerning the mental representation of conflict. We also discuss how identifying disputants' mental representations can help conflict managers devise effective strategies for managing and resolving conflicts.