Search results

This paper aims to outline a decision process for how consumers choose among two‐part tariffs which consist of a flat fee plus a per unit charge for usage over an allowance. The paper also seeks to examine what types of decision aids help consumers choose lower cost tariffs.

The approach used is two experimental studies.

Most consumers do not choose a tariff by calculating an expected cost because of usage uncertainty. They instead rely on simple comparisons of the overage rate, usage allowance, and flat fee attributes. These heuristics lead to systematic biases, beyond what actual true cost justifies, for favorable comparisons on these attributes. An online calculator improved choice of the lower cost option from 65 percent to 80 percent, yet this increased to 91 percent if people were also forced to consider a range of usage levels.

Consumers struggle to choose the lowest cost tariff, especially with uncertain usage. Consumers should realize the biases in their decision shortcuts and use the presented decision aids. Firms can leverage these biases by offering larger usage allowances (often done) and smaller overage rates (often not done), or correct them with decision aids.

Much work on tariffs assumes consumers calculate a cost, but the authors question this assumption, and show that consumers instead use simple attribute comparisons to deal with uncertain usage. An understanding of the specific heuristic consumers use allows the authors to better account for past effects, predict and establish new effects, and design effective decision aids. Results indicate tariff biases largely result from information processing shortcomings.

Synopsis This paper has two purposes, closely connected with one another. The first is to fill a gap by presenting a consistent theory of block tariffs; the second is to dispel some misconceptions found in the works of standard authors concerning this form of pricing. The main misconceptions here discussed are three in number: first, that the extent to which the consumer's surplus can be exploited depends on the number of blocks; second, that a lower price is necessarily ineffective if it occurs at a quantity which is larger than what the consumer would have bought had the price of the preceding block been valid throughout; and third, that block tariffs may prove inefficient in practice.

Analyses alternative forms of pricing and pricing strategies of bank payments services and reports the results of an international survey of pricing practices in 11 countries. Makes a distinction between implicit and explicit pricing and, in the context of British banks′ policy of implicit pricing for personal accounts maintained in credit, compares the pricing practice of British banks and those in other countries. Considers how each compares with optimal strategies indicated by the theoretical analysis. Finds that British banks are alone in not making explicit charges for payments services which is sub‐optimal: there is no incentive for customers to economize on their use of current account; this induces behaviour which raises the costs of banks, and there is no incentive for consumers to use cheaper forms of payment media. Implies a structure of cross‐subsidies which is unlikely to be sustainable in a more competitive market environment.

This paper aims to study a dominant e-retailer operating its own e-marketplace (B2C) to host peer competitor as well as acting as a traditional retailer (“dual-format” retailing as in Mantin and Krishnan 2014). The dominant retailer offers a two-part tariff charging scheme to a third-party seller. The seller decides whether to join the e-marketplace. The present paper is interested in addressing the following questions: What is the pricing equilibrium before/after the formation of the e-marketplace? What will be the “optimal” charging scheme? What is the impact on the e-marketplace operator if the third-party seller has the option to become “featured”.

This paper adopts a stylized model to capture the competition between the two retailers and applies game theory to solve the pricing equilibrium. The authors model the dual-format retailing in a two-stage decision: Stage 1, the e-marketplace operator offers a two-part tariff; Stage 2, if the other retailer is participating, they engage in a pricing competition. They assume that the e-marketplace operator is a profit maximizer by choosing its charging scheme subject to the condition that the participating retailer is no worse off.

The authors find that the e-retailer and the third-party seller in the e-marketplace are not always hurt by intensified price competition. They identify conditions under which higher expected prices are charged as a result of agglomeration effect. The authors’ model also provides theoretical evidence on this popular charging scheme, and shows the feasible region in which the e-marketplace operator could allocate the surplus resulted from the formation of the e-marketplace between itself and the participating retailer. Finally, the authors demonstrate that if the third-party seller has the option to become a “featured” retailer (He and Chen, 2006), it can be detrimental to the e-marketplace operator.

This work is different in three ways: First, the authors model an e-marketplace adopting a “dual-format” retailing, facing the trade-off between its direct retailing revenue and the rents collected from the member store, while the literature mainly focuses on e-marketplaces playing the intermediary role. Second, they explicitly model the “market expansion effect” caused by the agglomeration after the formation of the e-marketplace. The present study complements this stream of research by investigating and providing theoretical evidence on the charging scheme popularly adopted by the e-marketplaces and proposes ways to share the surplus to the participating store.

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of collaboration between supply chain entities in a dyadic setting where the manufacturer invests in greening and technology adoption effort leading to a price premium effect for the supply chain players.

The paper uses game theoretic approach to analyze the model of inter-firm interaction in a vertical channel setting consisting of a retailer and manufacturer. The paper studies strategic decisions of the channel members in a decentralized and centralized structure and extends this to decision making under contractual settings.

A two-part tariff completely coordinates the green supply chain, while a cost sharing and revenue sharing contract only achieve partial coordination. Nevertheless, a cost sharing, as well as a revenue sharing contract, increases the greening and technological adoption effort by the manufacturer while yielding the supply chain members a strictly larger profit. Furthermore, a revenue sharing contract in comparison to a cost sharing contract, leads to a larger greening and technological adoption effort by the manufacturer, lower wholesale and retail prices and a strictly larger profit for both the manufacturer and the retailer.

This paper contributes to the green supply chain pricing, technology and contract literature considering strategic interactions between a manufacturer and retailer in a supply chain under price premium effects of greening activities and technological advancements.

Providers of cloud computing storage services (CCSS) charge offers in several unit bundles for a lump sum per bundle. This non-linear pricing approach is known as a bucket-pricing plan (BPP). If a customer exploits the purchased bucket, he/she can opt for the next higher bucket or refrain from further CCSS use. CCSS suppliers are faced with an optimization problem concerning the number of buckets as well as their lower and upper storage volume boundaries. The purpose of this paper is to develop a model, which supports CCSS suppliers in deriving a BPP-structure and which maximizes their profit in varying market constellations.

The authors develop a multi-period model of tariff choice decisions of private customers of CCSS. The model is applied in Monte Carlo simulations to determine profit-maximal tariff structures as a function of different market characteristics such as median demand saturation, demand heterogeneity, average price per storage unit and bucket ceiling allocation (identical size of each bucket within the frame set by the lower and upper overall boundary, varying sizes of the buckets offered, so that the interval between two ceilings consecutively increases for subsequent buckets) and type of a customer’s utility function.

The simulation analysis suggests that demand heterogeneity and average price per unit are the most influential factors for CCSS tariff structure optimization. Price plans with more than two buckets tend to generate higher profits than simple schemes with two buckets only if demand heterogeneity is low and the average price per storage unit is high and/or median saturation level of customers is low.

Despite the popularity of BPP among providers of CCSS for consumers, there is a lack of scholarly modeling work on the profit implications of the number of buckets entailed in a scheme and the size/ceilings of the various buckets on offer. The model suggested in this paper is a first step toward narrowing this research gap.

This paper describes the experiences and the contentious issues on eight existing PPAs in Nepal with varying type of investment, the key areas where IPPs are treated fairly and the areas where IPPs are discriminated against by the clauses are highlighted. Power Purchase Agreements on IPPs in Nepal are of three types: with foreign investment, local investment and investment in JV with the Utility. A critical issue in designing power purchase agreements is to create a level playing field for the players to secure successful and sustainable IPPs and PPAs. To create this environment, discriminatory clauses or unequal treatment to IPPs in the key issues of the PPAs should be avoided; the key issues being power purchase guarantees, force majeure guarantees, financial and foreign exchange guarantees, operation guarantees, and guarantees concerning insurance and dispute resolution. The analysis shows that discriminatory clauses and unequal treatment are present in the key issues of the agreements.

Many companies lack insights or fact-based support for the pricing decisions they make in an increasingly complex environment. In order to optimize their pricing process, managers need to identify key indicators that may influence the performance of their decisions. The purpose of this paper is to report an investigation of pricing determinants in large companies manufacturing capital goods in France. First a conceptual framework is proposed, in order to fill several gaps identified in the literature on pricing practices and more precisely by operating a distinction between environmental variables (determinants), decision making (pricing strategy and price and product-line structures) and its consequence in terms of price level.

The author conducted an empirical research on the determinants of the pricing process. This study consistedof a questionnaire survey addressed to pricing managers (or executives in charge of pricing) in 98 of the largest manufacturing companies in France about their new-product pricing decision-making process.

The author studies environmental determinants and their influence on the pricing and describes the structure of pricing determinants as a five dimensions construct: market-based, value-based, position-based, competition-based and production-based. The results show that firms rely on environmental determinants as indicators of their pricing flexibility. These indicators operate as pricing levers: a good position on these variables gives firms more pricing power. But in the vast majority of the cases, companies extensively relied on competitive conditions instead of taking advantage of a favorable position, described as pricing myopia.

This paper describes current pricing practices in leading companies with key informants (mainly pricing managers) highly involved in the pricing decision process, and contrasts two pricing orientations, pricing power vs pricing myopia.