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The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, the article explores an understudied side of invention commercialization–the rejection of business as something “dirty” among Russian scientists. As such, the paper contributes to the individual-level explanations of innovation promotion, hence balancing extant literature's excessive focus on institutional explanations. Second, the article suggests that Russian scientists' rejection of business is rooted in broader Russian work ethics rift between “material” and “ideational” aspects of life. As such, the paper shows how dominant collective values refract in the management practice of specific social class, i.e. of scientists.

To analyze the rift between material and ideational aspects of Russian scientists' work, the article employs directed content analysis (DCA) of in-depth interviews with 45 Russian scholars. To address credibility bias of the research findings stemming from DCA, I further draw on the survey of existing studies, researches and polls highlighting Russian population attitudes toward the dichotomy between “material” and “ideal” realms.

This study argues that Russian scientists' likelihood of invention commercialization is positively associated with their ability to integrate in a personal psyche business and science as equally valuable facets of life.

The article identifies the three groups of scientists – opportunity-seekers, idealists and integrators – with different attitudes to invention commercialization. The article shows how policymakers should apply institutional incentives differently to each group of scientists to achieve higher rates of invention commercialization.

The article offers an empirical investigation of the incidence and scale of household marriage overspending around the world, and the governments' reaction once the problem emerges.

This study relies on regression analysis of open source data from legislation, mass media, and judiciary hearings for 141 countries. In the Phase 1 logistic regression of cross-country large-N data is used to identify country-incidence of marriage cost escalation. In the Phase 2 ordered logistic regression is used to uncover statistically significant factors that predict the probability of alternative government reactions in 87 countries which experience marriage cost escalation.

In a strong collectivist sociocultural environment, driven by informality, the rise of middle classes, combined with the decline of traditional hierarchies, and limited opportunities for economic mobility motivates households to enter emulative wedding spending, thus leading to overspending. Governments' reaction depends on available policy resources, and the economic scale of the problem.

The research findings suggest that rising living standards in the developing countries are more likely to escalate wedding costs, and consequently reinforce traditional values.

Academic literature links marriage-related overspending to armed insurgency, child marriage and decreasing state efficiency. Despite the problem's scope, existing research has not comprehensively addressed both its causes, and cross-country differences in government reactions to it. The article addresses both of the mentioned gaps, by offering a conceptual model of marriage cost escalation.

The purpose of this paper is to explore relatively neglected side of corruption – citizen-initiated bribe offers – to identify the degree to which citizens on the grassroots level are ready to support top-down government anti-corruption policies.

Drawing on Avessalom Podvodny’s framework of modalities, this research analyzes the results of the nationally representative survey of 1,002 respondents, and ten in-depth interviews – both held in Azerbaijan. The author uses both logistic regression and qualitative description to highlight research inferences.

Modalities provide a new way of making sense of the factors affecting corruption, and informality. Bribe offers are associated with imbalance within Local-Global, Symbol-Content, Active-Passive pairs of modalities. All of the relevant independent variables (except for one), drawn from relevant theories and organized around modalities, are statistically significant in predicting bribe offers.

The paper is able to pose and answer fundamental policy questions: why villagers in Azerbaijan prefer to invest in building mosques and cemeteries rather than schools and kindergartens? Why insurance is not perceived as a sphere of business by the Azerbaijani population? On a practical level, the paper shows that governments’ selective focus on bureaucratic graft neglects formidable argument that the problem of corruption is tightly woven into political culture of a post-Soviet society. Simple administrative measures cannot overcome fundamental value orientations within a society.

The paper adds to corruption researchers’ toolkit, by expanding research to factors affecting citizen voluntary choices to bribe. The research shows what specific variables should be considered and which of them are statistically significant in explaining citizen choices.