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This study aims to identify the gaps in current policy and propose a viable framework for policy improvement regarding people-centered tsunami early warning chain in Padang City. The objectives are: to describe the gaps and flaws in the current policy regarding local tsunami early warning chain, to identify potential actors to be involved in the tsunami early warning chain and to assess the roles and capacity of actors, and their potential for involvement in early warning.

This study is an exploratory study using social network analysis (SNA) on regulations and other legal documents, and primary data sources from a focus group discussion and semi-structured interviews.

The study found that the existed regulation lacks extension nodes to relay warnings to the populations at risk, often referred to as “the last mile.” Moreover, receiving warning information from both formal and informal sources is important to mobilize people evacuation more effectively during an emergency. The study found that mosque communities and disaster preparedness leaders are the potential actors who should be involved in the local early warning chain.

The research findings were presented as a recommendation to Padang City Government and have been legalized as the new tsunami early warning chain procedure in the Padang City Mayor Regulation 19/2018.

This research investigated local tsunami early warning dissemination in Padang City using SNA. The study demonstrates a close collaboration between researchers, practitioners and the community.

This paper aims to provide a broad overview of the South Asian tsunami in relation to the development of the early warning system (EWS) as well as its integration within the seismic safety chain.

The paper focuses on social and administrative aspects that require detailed attention as key elements within the overall system. The observations grow from experience gained by Ian Davis from working on the UK IDNDR Flagship project Warnings and Forecasts from 1996‐9 and from participation in the Working Group advising Prime Minister, Tony Blair, on the development of warnings in preparation for the G8 meeting held in Scotland in June 2005.

The conclusions of the paper grow from variety of experiences that both the authors have gained in working for many years in the field of disaster management. A number of requirements emerge from the experience such as specific administrative measures, political will, scientific knowledge and the development of tsunami safety culture.

The paper provides an overview of some of the social and administrative measures needed to enable scientific warnings to be disseminated and applied at every level to protect people and their property.

The message of this paper is an attempt to stress the importance of the totality of an effective warning system. At present, the scientific side has secured vital attention. But this has to be complemented with the social and administrative elements on which all scientific detection depends. The authors argue that these neglected safety elements require urgent attention if a full safety system is to function effectively.

The 2004 Boxing Day tsunami prompted global efforts to develop end-to-end multi-hazard warning systems. Taking this event as a starting point, and drawing on experiences from the following advancement of the Indonesian tsunami early warning system, this paper aims to highlight the importance of paying attention to human factors and the perceptions and behaviors of end recipients when trying to design efficient early warning systems.

The study is a viewpoint where theoretical frameworks for the design of efficient early warning systems are used as backdrop to an extensive review and analysis of secondary data, including scientific papers and newspaper articles.

The paper presents what an end-to-end warning system means, explores process problems related to perception and communication and concludes with views and recommendations toward more inclusive early warnings.

Research and practice related to early warning systems have traditionally had a strong focus on technological elements whilst the target groups of early warnings (i.e. communities) have received far less attention and resources. This paper focuses on the human dimension of warning systems and uses a real case to exemplify how efficient warning systems not only require a sound scientific and technological basis, but also depend on the awareness, trust and will of the people they aim to protect.

This paper seeks to provide a timely consideration of how regional governments in Asia and other national governments around the world collect, manage, and share critical geo‐technical information in what is becoming an increasingly global community.

The paper addresses the socio‐technical perspective of government information systems and management, and draws on the collection and analysis of several public reports, media articles, and expert opinions published in the aftermath of the Asian tsunami of 26 December 2004.

On the basis of the published material, the paper observes how critical early warning information was handled by government authorities in the hours before the tsunami wave strike, discusses the availability of technological solutions that can provide earthquake and tsunami warning information, and poses that government bureaucracies and human relations form the weakest link in the information chain.

The paper concludes with a potential research agenda for government warning information systems and management.

The type of early warning information system that might be created to avoid another loss of life, suggested improvements to inter‐government information sharing and communications, and the emerging requirement for earthquake and tsunami information dissemination and education in lesser developed countries are also discussed.

The research enabled the examination of weaknesses in critical information sharing between governments and members of the international community, and highlights the issue of strong human relationships as a key to preventing the loss of life and better managing disasters.

To highlight the failure of the tsunami early warning system and the challenges of successfully responding to, and managing a transnational catastrophe of this nature. The paper also highlights unique challenges in the management of this catastrophe and suggests potential strategies for good disaster response and management in this response and beyond.

Primary data collection was by telephone interviews with experts in the South and South‐East Asian region, supplemented by a comprehensive literature review of scholarly journals, reports from relief agencies and United Nations situation reports and bulletins amongst others. The scope of the paper is limited to the issue of a warning not been passed onto appropriate authorities in the region, the unique challenges of the relief response and the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the affected communities.

From the study, there is a need for further investigation into the catastrophic warning failure; as reasons proffered by the early warning officials for their inability to pass on a warning to authorities in the affected area appear weak at this stage. The study also found unique geographical, political, economic and social challenges facing the international relief and reconstruction effort. Specifically some of the challenges include the management of the media and information, logistics and coordination, needs and damage assessment, donations and safety and security issues amongst others. In summary, the author found that there is also a need for foreign assistance agencies to be seen to be fair, to build trust and ownership of relief and reconstruction efforts amongst the local populace, as well as use local people as much as possible.

The study was conducted only 21 days (three weeks) after the tsunami catastrophe of 26 December 2004, hence it is a snapshot of events in the days immediately after the catastrophe. The relief action is an on‐going event and there may be changes as new information emerges from the field.

A world wide network of integrated submarine earthquake and tsunami monitoring and early warning system should be set up. Critical warning information in any potential disaster should be shared as inclusively as possible. Relief workers must be seen to be politically and religiously neutral, especially in the civil conflicts of Banda Aceh Indonesia. Finally relief and aid should be given on the basis of sound humanitarian principles such as need, not just on wider economic criteria.

The study highlights specific potential challenges which relief organisations must deal with in responding effectively to the disaster, and in assisting to reconstruct the region. The paper proffers specific strategies for effective management of the international assistance effort. Finally, the study adds to the literature on developing countries and is valuable for governments, emergency and relief workers, policy makers in both developed and developing countries.

This paper aims to provide a general overview of the international Tsunami warning system mandated by the United Nations, particularly on cataloging past studies and a strategic focus in the Indian Ocean, particularly on the Bay of Bengal region.

Present research assimilates the secondary non-classified data on the Tsunami warning system installed in the Indian Ocean. Qualitative review and exploratory research methodology have been followed to provide a holistic profile of the Tsunami rarly warning system (TEWS) and its role in coastal resilience.

The study finds the need for strategic focus to expand and interlink regional early warning cooperation mechanisms and partnerships to enhance capacities through cooperation and international assistance and mobilize resources necessary to maintain the TEWS in the Indian Ocean region. The enhanced capacity of the TEWS certainly improves the resilience of Indian Ocean coastal communities and infrastructures.

The study is original research and useful for policy planning and regional cooperation on data interlinkages for effective TEWS in the Indian Ocean region.

The current National Early Warning System for Sri Lanka (NEWS: SL) was established after the devastations of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. Although early warning (EW) systems and evacuation procedures are in place, several areas which need improvements have been emphasized in recent studies carried out in the country. Therefore, this paper aims to outline the gaps in existing EW and EP related to tsunami and other coastal hazards with a special focus on the use of social media for disaster communication based on age groups.

This study has drawn on a review of past studies carried out by the same research team to identify the scope of the study. In addition to that, a conceptual framework was developed for the use of social media in the event of a disaster. Based on this conceptual framework, an online questionnaire was administered to identify the current status of the use of social media in Sri Lanka during a disaster situation. In total, 408 responses were collected and analyzed using the binary logistic regression method to evaluate the variation of different predictors associated with the use of social media for disaster communication.

Findings of the study revealed that the use of social media for disaster communication depends on the previous experience of users and their age. The gender of users does not affect the use of social media for disaster communication. Therefore, the accuracy and timeliness of disaster information distributed via social media should be improved further to enhance the use of social media for disaster communication. Moreover, the findings have highlighted unaddressed issues in areas such as governance; communication of technical agencies; evacuation and shelters; and response of the community.

This paper has identified key areas that need attention in the process of enhancing the use of social media for disaster communication. More use of technological platforms such as social media for receiving disaster-related information can address issues such as bottlenecks in communication, poor awareness and lack of last-mile dissemination. Furthermore, this paper has proposed recommendations for addressing the identified gaps in the overall EW mechanisms and EP pertaining to tsunamis and other coastal hazards to enhance the coastal disaster resilience in Sri Lanka.

The massive human and economic impact of the Asian tsunami in later 2004 is mirrored in the aftershocks felt among humanitarian organisations, development agencies, and policy makers. This paper raises a number of these troubling, fundamental issues. Firstly, the call for an Indian Ocean tsunami warning system raises fundamental issues about what warning systems can, and cannot, do. Secondly, one is also forced to consider why in the first place so many people live on exposed coasts today, vulnerable not only to tsunamis but tropical storms and rainy season flooding among other hazards. Thirdly, one is challenged to question the very meaning of “recovery”. Such massive damage has been done and so many people and their livelihoods have been dislocated, is it actually possible to imagine a return to the status quo ante? Fourthly, reconstruction of the magnitude now underway in the affected areas raises many difficult questions about accountability, transparency, and the unevenness with which the international community responds to crises. The paper finishes with some recommendations.

The paper aims to discuss the findings of a humanitarian logistics manager field study on response activity concerning the 2004 tsunami disaster in terms of what should have occurred and to present a comprehensive hindsight‐analysis case for a model placing natural disaster response activity clearly within the context of local‐nation‐led, holistic and inclusive natural disaster planning.

The qualitative testing of a conceptual framework of natural‐disaster response requirements through interviews with tsunami‐response logistics managers, the analysis of the findings in the light of tsunami‐hindsight “effective disaster management” themes of recent academic literature and multi‐agency reports and the development of the holistic, inclusive planning model.

That natural disaster response activity needs to be viewed holistically in the context of a disaster management planning continuum that ideally starts well before the response action is required and of which locally‐led inclusiveness is a crucial component.

The model needs to be tested for its applicability as a planning instrument and guide for response activity in the context of future natural disasters.

The holistic/inclusive planning model has been developed to guide natural disaster planners as well as add to academic discourse in the search for natural disaster management solutions.

The study is original with its field‐based qualitative research foundation and reflective hindsight analysis.

Myth is a story of archetypical personas who behave in ways and with motives that we recognize in ourselves. We use myth as a way of reminding ourselves of the relationship between motives, actions, and consequences. Myths can serve either as inspirational or cautionary tales, and sometimes as both. But “myth” can also mean a fabricated story intended to create a false impression, and to achieve storytellers’ ends when they have decided the truth will not suffice. We apply the myth of Cassandra to the millennium-long recorded history of giant tsunamis in Japan. After each of these catastrophes, survivors sought to warn future generations of their recurrences. But, each time, their progeny eventually lost the memory of these lessons, and lost their lives when the next monster wave overwhelmed them. Only when they kept the lessons as living knowledge in everyday life, could they manage to escape from monster tsunamis. In this chapter, we use the myth of Cassandra in conjunction with the myth of Prometheus, the bringer of fire to humankind, as a metaphor for Japan’s growing reliance on nuclear power. Government and utility companies built powerful but inherently dangerous cauldrons in the nation’s disaster-prone landscapes, assuring the public they could control the fire’s fury and defend it against nature’s. As images of atomic bomb victims were still vivid and widely shared in Japan, they had to overcome the public fear of radioactivity by fabricating a “myth of safety.” The nuclear disaster made the public distrust the government and utility companies, which lingers in the process of reconstruction from the disaster. Myths can either reveal hidden truths or mask hidden lies. The Japanese people must now learn to distinguish one from the other.