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This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model between the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports and uses the system dynamics model to simulate and find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, aiming to promote the development of foreign trade of film copyright and innovation and development of the film industry so as to improve the overall social benefits of the film industry and provide policy enlightenment for enhancing the import power of foreign core enterprises to introduce domestic film copyrights.

In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports is constructed, the evolution process of cooperation strategy is derived, the impact of innovation income coefficient, mixed incentive policy and single incentive policy on the evolution results is analyzed, and the system dynamic model is used to simulate to find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, so as to provide reference for the government’s dynamic incentive decision-making.

The results show that export-oriented core firms are more sensitive to mixed incentives, while import-oriented core firms respond more quickly to single incentives. The large innovation income coefficient has a negative impact on the willingness of import-oriented core enterprises to cooperate. The study proposes measures to increase the willingness of core companies to participate.

Due to the fact that numerical simulation is based on simulation, there may be a certain gap between it and the actual situation. Therefore, it is necessary to further use actual data to conduct empirical analysis on the theoretical model.

This article mainly focuses on analyzing the impact of strategy choices and related parameters of various entities on the incentive mechanism and studying the foreign trade cooperation strategies of film copyright export enterprises under policy support from a theoretical model perspective. Furthermore, research has proven that in order to effectively enhance the willingness of foreign import core enterprises to participate in the foreign trade of domestic film copyrights, the government needs to coordinate the use of single incentive policies and mixed incentive policies. This study provides a major contribution for policymaker to develop film copyright import and export trade.

Based on the research conclusions, this paper puts forward management countermeasures to further improve the development of the film copyright import and export trade. The first is to enrich government incentive methods and stimulate the vitality of film copyright and foreign trade market entities. The second is to guide the core enterprises of film copyright export to increase investment in innovation and stimulate the endogenous driving force of industrial development. Finally, lengthen the foreign trade industry chain of film copyright and increase the income of film derivatives.

Firstly, this paper applies the research methods of evolutionary game and system dynamics simulation to the field of foreign trade research on film copyright and expands the research perspectives and methods of the film industry. Secondly, by analyzing the “cost-benefit incentive” relationship of the evolutionary game of government export-oriented core enterprises and importing core enterprises, an evolutionary game model is constructed, the quantitative point of tripartite interest decision-making is solved and the research object of the evolutionary game method is expanded. Finally, the system dynamics model is used to simulate and find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, so as to provide reference for the government’s dynamic incentive decision-making.

This study explores how social partners contribute to the successful return to work (RTW) of individuals affected by chronic diseases, employing the framework of actor-centred institutionalism.

This paper adopts a comparative case study methodology to assess the role of social partners in the workplace (re-)integration of people with chronic disease in Belgium and Italy, both of which represent well-developed industrial relations systems yet having different institutional and policy frameworks on RTW.

Institutional factors are found to affect the type and degree of social partners' commitment and contribution to RTW. Differences in their commitment can be explained by their varied degrees of integration in public policy formation, which explain their different preferred stages of interactions in this field: national tripartite social dialogue for Belgium; and sectoral collective bargaining for Italy. Unsatisfactory outcomes of social partners’ contribution in facilitating RTW processes are attributed to the fragmentation of the legal framework and uneven development of collective bargaining in Italy. In Belgium, the authors find the presence of cumbersome RTW procedures downplaying the role of the worker representative.

This paper adds empirical evidence to the limited literature on the role of social partners in facilitating RTW and sheds light on how to improve the current policy context. It suggests involving the social partners in the development of a comprehensive public policy framework, which should allow for an early, flexible and multi-stakeholder (re-)integration procedure following chronic disease.

This paper makes a conceptual contribution by intersecting two strands of literature (return to work following health issues and industrial relations) to facilitate our understanding of the potential role of social dialogue in supporting return to work (RTW) following the diagnosis of a chronic illness. It conceptualises the levels and channels through which various actors and their interactions may play a role in RTW facilitation within the actor-centred institutional framework.

The paper uses an exploratory design based mainly on desk research but is also informed by roundtable discussions done in six countries as part of a larger project.

The conceptual and analytical framework (CAF) is developed to explain how various actors interact together in ways shaped by the RTW policy framework and the industrial relations systems, resulting in a continuum of RTW facilitation situations.

There is limited research on return-to-work policies following diagnosis of chronic illness from a comprehensive actor-oriented perspective. The existing literature usually focusses on just one stakeholder, overlooking the role of social dialogue actors. By bridging the two streams of literature and incorporating all potential actors and their interactions in a unitary model, the proposed framework provides a valuable tool to further discuss how successful RTW after a diagnosis of chronic illness can be facilitated.

The existing literature on business incubators has rarely addressed network establishments thus far. The purpose of this study is to shed light on the process of network formation and its structure during the incubator creation process. The study focuses on establishing a network involving three key types of partners in the initial phase of setting up four agribusiness incubators. These partners come from universities, research organisations and private companies operating in a developing context.

This study uses social network theory, using a combination of qualitative and network survey approaches in Kenya, Uganda and Zambia. The qualitative data were used to investigate partnership formation, while the network survey was conducted to map the organisational network of business incubator partners. Constructs of social network theory, including relational content, relational form, centrality of actors and instrumentality, were qualitatively measured in this study.

The findings indicate that partners rely on previous informal relationships, which are formalised during the creation of business incubator partnerships. In the African context, once these relationships are formalised, they become part of what is referred to as business networks, irrespective of the nature of the relationship content. Personal networks serve as precursors to establishing organisational networks that cater to incubated firms. Incubator partners facilitate the networking process and enhance the formation of new connections in the early-stage partnership-based tripartite business incubators. They act as brokers, bridging structural holes by coordinating actors across the hole and linking disconnected nodes by activating their sub-networks. The results reveal that the partners' level of embeddedness in various organisational settings increases the diversity of contacts integrated into the incubator networks. In terms of relational content, partners tend to perceive the ties as business-oriented, even though the content of the relationship may differ. The strength of relationships depends on their formalization and the frequency of interaction.

The findings of the study contradict the reviewed social network literature, emphasising the necessity to adapt methodological approaches based on the cultural and institutional context in which they are applied. The social network questionnaire requires modification when used in different contexts and settings. Specifically, methodologies should be adjusted in situations where actors need to be discreet concerning their various relationships. It is important to note that organisational culture does influence actors' behaviours.

This study is deemed relevant to managers and practitioners of business incubators alike. It highlights that understanding the contextual factors that influence networking practices, the type and strength of networks and the resources provided to participants are crucial elements that should be considered in future policy and intervention initiatives.

This paper addresses the identified gap in examining network formation during the establishment of business incubators. The research is significant as it provides insights into networking at the incubator level of analysis within a tripartite business incubator setup. Ultimately, this paper helps increase our understanding of networking within the context of emerging countries.

The construction of geographical indications agri-food (GIAF) brands play an important role in rural revitalization in China, this study aims to explore how to jointly promote brand building among multiple parties.

A tripartite game model of the producers, sales operating enterprises, and local governments is constructed to analyze the strategy choice of the parties in the complex system behavior evolution stability, and the simulation analysis of the influence factors of brand construction of GIAF and verify the game result.

(1) Increased government subsidies and supervision costs are beneficial to accelerating variety improvement and quality improvement of agri-food, but it is not conducive to the government, Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that the subsidy and supervision cost is kept within a reasonable range; (2) The dividend distributed to producers by sales operating enterprises play an important role in encouraging producers to improve the quality safety of agri-food, but it must be kept within a reasonable range to avoid discouraging the enthusiasm of sales operating enterprises; (3) Cost reduction, and revenue improvement are also effective ways to cooperate with all parties in brand co-construction.

This study does not consider consumers or logistics companies in the evolutionary game model.

This study proposes innovative policies and suggestions for improvement of the brand co-construction of all parties.

Based on the “Rural Revitalization” initiative, this study enriches research methods about brand value and provides a new perspective for brand value co-construction, and theoretical guidance, and empirical basis for formulating innovation policies and recommendations.

The paper aims to elucidate effective strategies for promoting the adoption of green technology innovation within the private sector, thereby enhancing the value of public–private partnership (PPP) projects during the operational phase.

Utilizing prospect theory, the paper considers the government and the public as external driving forces. It establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of government regulators, the private sector and the public. The paper uses numerical simulations to explore the evolutionary stable equilibrium strategies and the determinants influencing each stakeholder.

The paper demonstrates that government intervention and public participation substantially promote green technology innovation within the private sector. Major influencing factors encompass the intensity of pollution taxation, governmental information disclosure and public attention. However, an optimal threshold exists for environmental publicity and innovation subsidies, as excessive levels might inhibit technological innovation. Furthermore, within government intervention strategies, compensating the public for their participation costs is essential to circumvent the public's “free-rider” tendencies and encourage active public collaboration in PPP project innovation.

By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model, the paper comprehensively examines the roles of government intervention and public participation in promoting green technology innovation within the private sector, offering fresh perspectives and strategies for the operational phase of PPP projects.

To further promote application of BIM technology in construction of prefabricated buildings, influencing factors and evolution laws of willingness to apply BIM technology are explored from the perspective of willingness of participants.

In this paper, a tripartite game model involving the design firm, component manufacturer and construction firm is constructed and a system dynamics method is used to explore the influencing factors and game evolution path of three parties' application of BIM technology, from three perspectives, cost, benefit and risk.

The government should formulate measures for promoting the application of BIM according to different BIM application willingness of the parties. When pursuing deeper BIM application, the design firm should pay attention to reducing the speculative benefits of the component manufacturer and the construction firm. The design firm and the component manufacturer should pay attention to balancing the cost and benefit of the design firm while enhancing collaborative efforts. When the component manufacturer and the construction firm cooperate closely, it is necessary to pay attention to balanced distribution of interests of both parties and lower the risk of BIM application.

This study fills a research gap by comprehensively investigating the influencing factors and game evolution paths of willingness of the three parties to apply BIM technology to prefabricated buildings. The research helps to effectively improve the building quality and construction efficiency, and is expected to contribute to the sustainability of built environment in the context of circular economy in China.

The development of China's solar photovoltaic (PV) industry is in a transition period from pursuing scale and speed to focusing on efficiency and quality. “Smart PV projects” (SPVPs) were proposed by the ministries of the Chinese government in 2018 to encourage intelligent upgrading and to fill the gaps in traditional PV projects. However, only a small number of PV enterprises are in progress, and only a few SPVPs have been built. The intelligence level of China's PV projects needs to be improved. The purpose of this study is to analyze the willingness of the main participants to be involved in the intelligent upgrading of PV projects by establishing an evolutionary game model that includes three parties.

A tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed that considers PV enterprises, project owners and the government. The evolutionary stability strategies of each party and the corresponding stable conditions are obtained. The parameters that affect the decision behaviors are also analyzed.

The four stages of the intelligent upgrade of PV projects and the effects of the government subsidy strategies are examined. At different stages, adopting different measures to promote cooperation among the three parties involved is necessary. Government subsidies should be provided to PV enterprises during the initial stage and should be biased toward project owners during the intermediate stage. During the peak stage, PV enterprises constantly need to decrease project costs and improve quality and service, thus helping project owners reduce their initial investments and obtain additional gains. The government's reputation drives it to continually adopt incentive strategies.

This research focuses on the interactions among the three parties. Based on evolutionary game analysis, several conditions that facilitate the intelligent upgrading of PV projects are illustrated. Implications for different developing stages are proposed from the perspectives of each party for the decision-makers of SPVPs.

In the context of constructing an integrated national strategic system, collaborative innovation among enterprises is the current social focus. Therefore, in order to find the interest relationship between multiple game subjects, to explore the influencing factors of collaborative innovation of civil-military integration enterprises. This paper constructs a collaborative innovation mechanism for military–civilian integration involving four game subjects (military enterprises, private enterprises, local governments, and science and technology intermediaries). It aims to solve and reveal the evolutionary game relationship among the four parties.

To explore the mechanism of military–civilian collaborative innovation involving four players, this study employs game theory and constructs an evolutionary game model for collaborative innovation with the participation of military enterprises, civilian enterprises, local governments, and technology intermediaries. The model reveals the evolutionary game patterns among these four entities, analyzes the impact of various parameters on the evolutionary process of the game system, and numerical simulation is used to show these changes more specifically.

The research findings demonstrate that active government subsidies promote cooperation throughout the system. Moreover, increasing the input-output ratio of research and development (R&D), the rate of technological spillovers, and the R&D investment of civilian enterprises all facilitate the tendency toward cooperation within the system. However, when the government chooses to actively provide subsidies, increasing R&D investment in military enterprises may hinder the tendency toward cooperation. Furthermore, central transfer payments, government punishment from the central government, and an increase in the information conversion rate of technology intermediaries may suppress the rate of cooperation within the system.

Most of the previous studies on the collaborative innovation of military–civilian integration have been tripartite game models between military enterprises, private enterprises, and local governments. In contrast, this study adds science and technology intermediaries on this basis, reveals the evolution mechanism of collaborative innovation of civil-military integration enterprises from the perspective of four-party participation, and analyzes the factors influencing the cooperation of the whole system. The conclusion of this study not only enriches the collaborative innovation evolution mechanism of military–civilian integration enterprises from the perspective of multiple agents but also provides practical guidance for the innovation-driven development of military–civilian integration enterprises.

The quality liability of prefabricated components (PCs) is a major issue among key stakeholders. The blockchain-based quality tracking systems are supposed to support a more transparent and trusting quality control process. However, many factors affect the stakeholders' willingness toward the adoption of such quality tracking systems. The purpose of this research is to investigate the key factors that influence the stakeholders' adoption decisions toward the application of the quality tracking system in PCs and develop coping strategies.

An evolutionary game model is established that includes the manufacturer, constructor and developer. Four scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. Based on the tripartite game model, two representative projects are used as case studies to simulate how different factors affect the stakeholders' decisions.

First, trade-offs between cost and benefits were the most prominent factor in the adoption decision-making. Second, the advancement of technologies would compensate for their immaturity. Third, subsidy and penalty provision of the developer and high-level trust both incentivize the stakeholders to adopt the quality tracking systems.

This research investigates the influence of technology, environment and participant related factors on the adoption decisions of the quality tracking system for PCs and discovered that technology maturity and advancement played an essential role. It is expected that the research findings would be of value to policy makers and project management personnel for better quality control of prefabricated construction.