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Article
Publication date: 27 September 2011

Bibhas Saha and Tridib Sharma

The aim of this paper is to develop a theory of sharecropping with cost sharing after allowing for an explicit role of a creditor. In the tenancy literature, the…

Abstract

Purpose

The aim of this paper is to develop a theory of sharecropping with cost sharing after allowing for an explicit role of a creditor. In the tenancy literature, the prevalence of sharecropping has remained an important issue. While most contributions have focussed only on output sharing, very few have studied the issue of cost sharing. Besides, the existing models have considered interactions only between a landowner and a tenant. The purpose of this paper is to extend this setup to a third player – creditor.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors adopt a static contract approach with full information and no uncertainty and model possible credit‐cum‐tenancy arrangements among a money‐lender, a landowner and a tenant under the restrictions that the money‐lender cannot charge a lump‐sum fee and the input choices are left with the tenant.

Findings

It is shown that all Pareto optimal arrangements between a creditor, a landowner and a tenant must involve interest rate discrimination between the tenant and the landowner and a share tenancy with cost sharing, or a fixed rent tenancy with cost sharing, or a mixture of the two. None of the polar contracts – wage or rent – is possible. Lending schemes that feature credit rationing or credit delegation can implement some Pareto efficient outcomes.

Originality/value

The model developed in the paper presents a framework for studying various tripartite arrangements observed in rural economies of developing countries. Also, it provides a benchmark for studying contracts under asymmetric information and uncertainty.

Details

Indian Growth and Development Review, vol. 4 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1753-8254

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 1 October 2006

F. Scott Thomas and John C. Jaye

The article seeks to outline the requirements under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Investment Company Act”), the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers…

427

Abstract

Purpose

The article seeks to outline the requirements under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Investment Company Act”), the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”) and related US Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) rules and interpretive guidance for structuring performance‐based fees for investment advisers and sub‐advisers to registered investment companies (or mutual funds).

Design/methodology/approach

The article discusses the appropriate structure and timing for performance fees and describes in detail how SEC standards for structuring performance fees have evolved over time. The article explains recent SEC enforcement actions against investment advisers for improperly structured performance fees, and notes that the use of performance fees has once again become a focus of SEC scrutiny.

Findings

The article concludes that, despite a common perception that performance fees create an effective incentive to improve fund performance by more closely aligning the interests of the adviser and fund shareholders than traditional fee arrangements, there is minimal empirical evidence proving that the use of performance fees translates into superior fund performance. Investment advisers who charge performance fees to mutual fund clients should consider reevaluating the structure and payment process for the performance fees in light of recent SEC scrutiny and enforcement actions, adviser compliance obligations under Rule 206(4)‐7 of the Advisers Act, and fund compliance obligations under Rule 38a‐1 of the Investment Company Act.

Originality/value

The article provides a concise overview of the regulatory requirements for structuring performance fees charged by mutual fund advisers.

Details

Journal of Investment Compliance, vol. 7 no. 4
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1528-5812

Keywords

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