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The chapter draws on historical evidence from Central America to test two of the most influential theories of the development of democracy: (1) structural theories derived from the work of Barrington Moore and (2) theories of the “political economy of democratic transitions.” The Central American evidence confirms Moore's theory in regard to the anti-democratic role of landed elites, but not the democratic role of the bourgeoisie. Contrary to some structural theories, the industrial working class was also not important in the development of democracy in Central America. Nor does the Central American evidence fit the political economy of democratic transitions model of negotiated or imposed “transitions from above.” A new model, termed the route to democracy through socialist revolution from below is proposed to account for the Central American evidence and the implications of the model are explored for the development of democracy generally.

The literature studying the effect of democratic political systems on financial development has found conflicting results. Besides, recent work has focused on the level effects of democracy on financial outcomes showing evidence of positive, negative and no direct impact. This paper aims to investigate the dynamic effects of democratic transition on financial development, namely, short run and long run effects.

The author wants to see whether financial development improves after a transition to a democratic system and, if it does, for how long. Using a panel data set of 48 events of democratic transitions, the paper relies on an event study and on the estimation of dynamic panel after controlling for other potential determinants.

The author finds that transition to a democratic system raises the development of the financial sector. Particularly, these positive effects occurred in the long run, i.e. about 5 years following the democratic transition. However, in the short run, the author finds that the move to democracy does not impact financial outcomes.

The author contributes by studying the role of political system change on financial development finding that democratic transition increases the development of the financial system. Further, the author contributes by finding that the move to democracy produces positive effect only in the long term.

Considering the recent trends of the increasing globalization of the market economy and the diffusion of democracy, the modern world needs to pay closer attention to pro-women and pro-girls policies if gender discrimination is to be challenged. Such policies could mark an era of building greater gender equality across the world by strengthening domains of women’s well-being that have been shown to decline in the initial years of the democratization and globalization of countries.

Women, who have more complex societal roles than men and whose employment is more tenuous, are more vulnerable to the rapid restructuring in macro-political and economic systems and bear more of the costs of systemic changes. My world-scale analyses show that women and men benefit unequally from the growth of democracy and the global economy – men’s well-being improves with the growth of democracy and globalization but women’s well-being declines. According to my follow-up studies, the decline lasts for over a decade (2014). These findings suggest that prior results of research proposing that democracy and the global economy improve people’s well-being are most likely biased when gender and the level of development in countries are not accounted for. To protect women and girls and to avoid gender discrimination, globalizing and democratizing countries should prioritize gender mainstreaming in their policies.

It is often said that we live in a time of crisis for social democracy. Many of the West European centre-left parties that seemed the natural parties of government in the second half of the twentieth century are in decline. The most common long-term explanations centre on a shrinking working class, a widening gap between the party elite and their core voters, and the challenges from new populist parties and/or greens. Short-term policy factors include the failure to address the recent financial and refugee crises. None of these factors carry much explanatory weight for developments in Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic in the three decades since the transition from communism. We find that much of the explanation for the rise and the fall of the five social democratic parties in these countries lies in the dynamics of party competition and party system change. All parties face dilemmas of policy, electoral appeal and coalition-building. The Central European cases suggest that it is how social democrats handle such challenges and make difficult choices about strategy and tactics that ultimately shapes their long-term fate. Centre-left parties are stronger masters of their fortunes than much of the literature on the decline of social democracy suggests. Consequently, seeking a common structural explanation for the rise and decline of social democratic parties might be a double fallacy: both empirically misleading and a poor base for policy advice.

Capitalist peace theory asserts that economic freedom or capitalism, contract-intensity, trade, foreign investment, financial openness, or the avoidance of state property ownership promote peace. But the capitalist peace also includes the democratic peace. If democracy itself is an effect of economic freedom or the prosperity generated by it, then the democratic peace is no more than a mere component of the capitalist peace. Then capitalism and economic interdependence promote peace by two or even three routes, directly and indirectly, through democracy and, possibly, by common memberships in intergovernmental organizations, too. Admittedly, this argument relies on compiling lots of diverse pieces of evidence, some of which are still debated in the scientific community. The idea that capitalism might be more important as well as more beneficial for peace than democracy rests on two reasons. First, without capitalism or the prosperity it promotes, democracy might no longer be viable. Under capitalism, nations may enjoy prosperity and peace together. Better still, poor nations benefit from the existence of more advanced ones that are sources of technology, models for emulation, and markets for labor-intensive products. Second, democratic peace theory has invited the dangerous idea that one might or even should promote democracy by war. The consequences of the financial crisis of 2008 and the political responses to it, however, threaten to undermine globalization. That is why the capitalist peace faces an uncertain future at a time when we need it. The rapid economic rise of Asia, in particular of China and somewhat later probably of India to great power status, is likely to undermine the global pecking order and to imply some power transitions. In the past, power transitions have been related to increased risks of war. That is why we need a capitalist peace between China and the West.

Since their independence from the European colonial powers, most of the countries of the American region have been unable to build solid, stable democracies. Only a few countries in the region today have solid and effective democratic processes, and some of them are even involved in unpredictable situations, such as Bolivia or Venezuela. As a result, the historical march of our democracies has been one of advances and retreats, all of them interrupted at some time in the 20th century.

It is common to identify democracy with a form of organization of national states and to study democratization primarily at the national level. But in the early twenty-first century, questions are being raised about a variety of geographic scales, from transnational and global processes to sites much smaller than national states. We describe here a program of research into the relationship of local struggles for democracy and national processes in Spain over an extended period of time. Apart from its well-known democratic transition beginning in the mid-1970s Spain has not garnered much attention from students of democratization and within Spain rural Andalusia has not seemed in the forefront of democratization at any time. We are assembling data on local social movements and local political life for two contrasting small Andalusian towns and their surrounding countryside. Preliminary results suggest that these apparently unlikely places have been sites of significant movements for democracy and that there is much to learn about the history of democracy generally from the study of such sites. We describe here the kinds of data we have been assembling and present a few preliminary results.