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This research provides a new perspective in explaining cardholders' willingness to use debit cards instead of cash by applying the transaction costs economic theory. This study also expands the adaptation of transaction cost economics theory in explaining consumer behaviour by investigating the moderating effects of income and education level on the relationship between perceived transaction costs and willingness to use debit cards.

The conceptual framework was developed primarily from the transaction cost economics theory. An in-depth interview method was employed to further support hypothesis development and the development of measurement scales. A structural equation model linking asset specificity, behavioural uncertainty, environmental uncertainty, frequency of payment, perceived monitoring costs, perceived adaptation costs and willingness to use debit cards was tested using data from a sample of 384 Vietnamese debit card holders.

This study's results support the transaction cost economics theory that asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of payment all positively contribute to the perceived transaction costs associated with debit card usage. However, only environmental uncertainty and perceived adaptation costs have significant negative impact on willingness to use debit cards, with the relationship between environmental uncertainty and willingness to use debit cards being totally mediated by perceived adaptation costs. Moreover, the relationship between perceived adaptation costs and willingness to use debit cards becomes less negative among richer and better-educated cardholders.

The research provides insights into the hidden obstacles for developing cashless economies, thereby supporting policy makers in designing more effective and comprehensive strategies to make debit cards more widely used as a true substitute for cash.

This study provides a new lens in explaining customer willingness to use debit cards, while expanding the transaction costs economics theory by incorporating demographic factors as moderators in the relationship between transaction costs and the card-or-cash choice.

The process of managing the design and construction of a project on behalf of a client may be analysed using project management theory based on a contingency approach. The analysis provided by this approach, whilst useful for understanding the interaction of the parts of the system, the functions of project management and the effectiveness of the organization structure, may be limited by not incorporating an economic explanation of how a project organization structure is chosen. The transaction cost approach to the study of economic organization may provide a theoretical basis for such an explanation. This approach holds that an understanding of transaction cost economizing is central to the study of organizations as it determines whether functions are provided by the market or by hierarchy. This paper seeks to explore the relationship between these two powerful approaches in explaining the structuring and management of project organizations on behalf of clients and to explain the benefits of combining these approaches in furthering construction project management theory.

Global entrepreneurship may be defined to be the creation of new, value-adding transactions or transaction streams anywhere on the globe. The objective of this chapter is to present and examine a theory of global entrepreneurship. At the World Economic Forum held in Davos, Switzerland, in January 1999, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called for global entrepreneurship to meet the needs of the disadvantaged and the requirements of future generations. This chapter first presents a transaction cognition theory of global entrepreneurship that is intended as a path for research that responds to this call. Second, this chapter examines the theory from three critical viewpoints: (1) capability for explanation; (2) theoretical and operational utility; and (3) verifiability through the logic of scientific inference, and presents likely propositions that are surfaced by the analysis. Finally in this chapter, some of the likely implications of this theory within the context of globalization are discussed.

The paper provides a detailed historical account of Douglass C. North's early intellectual contributions and analytical developments in pursuing a Grand Theory for why some countries are rich and others poor.

The author approaches the discussion using a theoretical and historical reconstruction based on published and unpublished materials.

The systematic, continuous and profound attempt to answer the Smithian social coordination problem shaped North's journey from being a young serious Marxist to becoming one of the founders of New Institutional Economics. In the process, he was converted in the early 1950s into a rigid neoclassical economist, being one of the leaders in promoting New Economic History. The success of the cliometric revolution exposed the frailties of the movement itself, namely, the limitations of neoclassical economic theory to explain economic growth and social change. Incorporating transaction costs, the institutional framework in which property rights and contracts are measured, defined and enforced assumes a prominent role in explaining economic performance.

In the early 1970s, North adopted a naive theory of institutions and property rights still grounded in neoclassical assumptions. Institutional and organizational analysis is modeled as a social maximizing efficient equilibrium outcome. However, the increasing tension between the neoclassical theoretical apparatus and its failure to account for contrasting political and institutional structures, diverging economic paths and social change propelled the modification of its assumptions and progressive conceptual innovation. In the later 1970s and early 1980s, North abandoned the efficiency view and gradually became more critical of the objective rationality postulate. In this intellectual movement, North's avant-garde research program contributed significantly to the creation of New Institutional Economics.

This paper introduces a new mathematical model for analyzing the economic benefits of incorporating the fourth party logistics (4PL), which is a contractor (i.e. agent) for the supply chain coordination and construction based on the division of community and the outsourcing development. Based on the physical theory and the wave-particle duality, a supply chain is the special organization whose characteristic has wave-particle duality. The mathematical model enriches the connotation of 4PL and it broadens the thought for 4PL development. Secondly, the proposed mathematical model predicated on transaction costs, is supported by Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) and acts as the theoretical analysis tool of 4PL for coordinating 3-party generic supply chain. Through the model, some trendy conclusions can be drawn to provide theoretical support for 4PL’s practices. Finally, a case illustrates our conclusions.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the process of entrepreneurial growth from the perspective of the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm and transaction cost theory (TCT) and to formulate propositions regarding the entrepreneurs’ decisional rules and structural elements in this process.

The argumentation draws upon three fields of academic research, namely, entrepreneurship studies on firm growth as well as strategic management and organization science studies on company scope and size (boundary). A systematic review of the literature was performed that combines the RBV and TCT to explain a firm’s boundary.

Three levels of entrepreneurial decisional rules in the process of growth were identified. The first level includes main decisional criteria. The second level approaches the structural elements of growth process, namely, its motives, rationale, mechanism and modes. The third level assumes evolutionary approach to decision making, namely, feedback relationships among transaction costs, governance and capabilities to create value from growth.

The paper broadens the early stream of research in the process of entrepreneurial growth. It contributes to explaining the way growth is realized, instead of identifying its predictors, which has dominated in to-date studies. The entrepreneurs’ decisional rules and choices in the process of expansion were suggested. Moreover, the integrated RBV-TCT approach was proposed as a theoretical background for studying this phenomenon.

Two major advances in the theory of the firm and (micro)economics more generally are arguably transaction costs economics (TCE) and the theory of firm resources. TCE has originally been applied to the theory of the firm, but found applications in virtually all fields of economic inquiry. The theory of firm resources currently spans much of the industrial organisation (IO) and strategic management literature. In some fields, e.g. diversification, it has already acquired dominant status. Despite significant progress in TCE there still seem to remain significant unresolved issues. Indeed we claim that transaction cost economics fail to supply convincing answers to the issues of the nature of the firm (why do firms exist?), and their essence (running a business). It offers a partial explanation of the “nature” and little on the “essence”. The resource value view complements the nature side and goes far beyond on the essence issue. It provides a fruitful starting point for an integrative framework. This, we suggest, should be based on the resource value perspective story and craft (dynamic) transaction costs in the ensuing evolutionary tale.

Transaction cost economics sees a broad spectrum of governance structures spanned by two types of economic adaptation: autonomous and cooperative. Stakeholder theorists have drawn much inspiration from transaction cost economics but have not paid explicit attention to the centrality of the idea of adaptation in this literature. This study aims to address this gap.

The authors develop a novel conceptual framework applying the distinction between the two types of economic adaptation to stakeholder theory.

The authors argue that the idea of cooperative adaptation is particularly useful for describing the firm’s collaboration with primary stakeholders in the joint value creation process. In contrast, autonomous adaptation is more relevant for firms interacting with secondary stakeholders who are not directly engaged in joint value creation and may not have formal contractual relationships with the firm. Accordingly, cooperative adaptation can be seen as vital for resolving team production problems affecting joint value creation, whereas autonomous adaptation addresses how the firm maintains legitimacy within the larger stakeholder environment.

Similar to its significance for transaction cost economics, the distinction between the two types of adaptation equips stakeholder theory with a new systematic understanding of a potentially broad spectrum of firm–stakeholder collaboration forms.