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This paper develops an integrative framework explaining multinational firms’ managerial staffing decisions in initial foreign-entry situations from resource-based theory, agency theory, and transaction-costs theory, and it offers a set of theoretically grounded, testable propositions concerning these staffing decisions. In particular, we maintain that managerial staffing decisions are influenced by: (1) the value that managerial expatriates and local hires could potentially add to the firm; and (2) the relative contractual risks associated with the use of managerial expatriates and local managers.

This paper indicates that the use of managerial expatriates can improve contractual efficiencies in at least four ways. First, the use of expatriates helps align the economic incentives between the headquarters and the foreign subsidiaries. Second, the headquarters knows better the characteristics of expatriates relative to local hires. The use of expatriates reduces the uncertainty of the headquarters in recruiting managers and mitigates the incomplete contracting problem. Third, expatriates are better equipped with firm-specific capabilities than local hires, reducing contractual (small-numbers) problems. Fourth, expatriates have committed greater sunk cost investments in the multinational firm than local hires. These investments support their cooperative relationships with the firm and mitigate potential bargaining problems in employment contracting. However, although managerial expatriates can potentially improve contractual efficiency and may relieve a firm’s concern over its limited control on managers, expatriates may not have adequate abilities in managing local idiosyncrasy.

This chapter develops a multi-path theory of diversified international expansion that explains how multiple wave-shaped performance curves are created as multinational companies expand into increasingly distant and dissimilar countries. According to this theory, multinational mobile network operators (MNOs) recover from over-diversified expansion by improving their local adaptation strategies by means of reconfiguring the value chain and entering local partnerships, by improving their global replication capabilities or by concentrating expansion to clusters of similar country markets. Three dynamic propositions are developed and exemplified concerning MNOs’ diversified international expansion. Implications for international diversification research finalize the chapter.

The application of real options theory to international strategy has surged in recent years. However, it is still a relatively new and loosely defined field, and there are several constraints on practical applications of this powerful theory. To move forward this field, the paper first provides a systematic analysis of theoretical and empirical contributions of real options theory to three critical issues in international strategy: (1) valuing multinational networks, (2) assessing market entry modes, and (3) evaluating market entry timing. The paper further suggests that future studies can focus on a refined treatment of uncertainty and the development of a dynamic theory in international strategy. Five testable propositions are developed in these directions.

In this chapter I would like to recall how I got started on my research on the multinational enterprise (MNE) and outline how my thinking on this important economic institution has evolved through the years.11I thank Sondra Grace of Gracefully Put for editing this manuscript.

This paper illuminates the distinction between individual and organizational actors in business-to-business markets as well as the coexistence of formal and informal mechanisms of coordination in multinational corporations. The main questions addressed include the following. (1) What factors influence the occurrence of personal contacts of foreign subsidiary managers in industrial multinational corporations? (2) How such personal contacts enable coordination in industrial markets and within multinational firms? The theoretical context of the paper is based on: (1) the interaction approach to industrial markets, (2) the network approach to industrial markets, and (3) the process approach to multinational management. The unit of analysis is the foreign subsidiary manager as the focal actor of a contact network. The paper is empirically focused on Portuguese sales subsidiaries of Finnish multinational corporations, which are managed by either a parent country national (Finnish), a host country national (Portuguese) or a third country national. The paper suggests eight scenarios of individual dependence and uncertainty, which are determined by individual, organizational, and/or market factors. Such scenarios are, in turn, thought to require personal contacts with specific functions. The paper suggests eight interpersonal roles of foreign subsidiary managers, by which the functions of their personal contacts enable inter-firm coordination in industrial markets. In addition, the paper suggests eight propositions on how the functions of their personal contacts enable centralization, formalization, socialization and horizontal communication in multinational corporations.

Cultural and geographical distances create friction in multinational enterprises (MNEs), friction that indigenous firms do not experience in the same manner. This friction or liabilities of distance is conceptualized as governance costs in this chapter. Unfortunately, governance costs seem to be a rather equivocal concept, although it is one of the building blocks of internalization theory, and the raison d’être of the idea that certain kind of transactions have to be internalized to overcome the most prohibitive consequences of business activities across cultural and geographical distances. By going back to an award-winning paper, published in IBR in 2009, we put forward some nuances and reflections upon theory and findings presented in that paper, as well as upon implications and behavior of governance costs. The reason for this endeavor is grounded in the idea that theories must be challenged, empirical finding, just as well. Building upon survey data from 159 Norwegian MNEs, we explore and test six hypotheses by structural equation modeling (SEM). The results indicate that information fallacies seem to be the main driver of monitoring – and bargaining costs in the relationship between MNE HQs and their foreign subsidiaries, and thereby also the indirect driver of the observed negative effects of monitoring and bargaining on subsidiary performance. On the other hand, trust shaped by bonding activities seems to be an important factor in reducing bargaining costs and improving subsidiary performance.

Building on transaction cost economics (TCE) and recent critique on international business (IB) research, we intend to sharpen our knowledge on the application of TCE in entry mode studies.

We develop a two-sided model of transaction costs by considering the multinational corporation (MNC) and the local partner.

Overall, we illustrate that the decisions firms undertake are not always in line with traditional MNC-centric TCE reasoning. Specifically, we identify three situations when “traditional” TCE predicts transaction costs lower than they actually are. Based on our findings we derive implications for future TCE studies.

Our study is among the first to highlight the relevance of potential partners’ transaction costs during market entry. Our model of dually impinged transaction costs is supposed to guide future research and can be of direct use to firms assessing costs of entry.

The traditional view of the multinational firm, from the early analyses in the 1960s and early 1970s, is one of a large industrial company with operations in multiple countries and a centralized chain of command. By definition, a multinational firm has activities in more than two countries. Although this simple definition is not widely used, it is a reasonable baseline from which to begin thinking about such firms. If the firm has sales operations in multiple countries, production in multiple countries, or some other permutation of international business activities physically present in multiple countries, then it is multinational.