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Transaction costs on the housing market are, arguably, inevitable. They are also diverse. While fees and taxes are easily identified and observed, transaction costs can arise from the functioning of the market and its regulatory framework. For instance, there are costs related to obtaining information. Lack of information creates uncertainty, which increases risk, which increases transaction costs. Thus, market transparency affects the level of transaction costs. For the regulatory framework to be effective, rules must be effectively enforceable; accordingly, the judicial and administrative institutions must function properly. Thus, there is a clear, albeit complex, relation between transaction costs on the one hand and market transparency, government efficiency, regulatory quality, and property rights protection on the other.

The aim of this chapter is to discuss transaction processes and transaction costs in real estate conveyances for both the seller and the buyer with respect to taxes, fees, and obtaining information. To that end, we compare the transaction processes and costs involved in Croatia and Sweden, respectively.

Neither Croatia nor Sweden displays prohibitive costs, yet Croatian transaction costs are significantly higher than those in Sweden. This is hardly surprising given that the Croatian transaction process features at least one additional party to be remunerated compared to the Swedish process. Thus, it would seem that the Swedish regulatory regime – where the estate is charged with handling the legal aspects of the transaction – render lower transaction costs.

There is also the issue of how and to whom fees are paid. For instance, there are more bank fees in Croatia, whereas in Sweden more of the fees are paid to the state. On the other hand, Croatia is one of the few countries where no capital gains tax is levied on real estate conveyances, whereas Sweden has a capital gains tax of 22 per cent – a tax that may hamper movement from one region to another with differences in property prices. Overall, however, with the exception of the capital gains tax for the seller, it is clear that the Swedish transaction process carries lower and more predicable costs than its Croatian counterpart.

Williamson's systematic treatment of transaction costs in explaining governance structures has rarely been applied to the field of environmental economics. The aim of this chapter is to address this oversight by analysing how transaction cost economics can help choose among environmental policy tools.

We apply the analytical framework of discrete structural alternatives – market, hybrid forms and hierarchy – to the choice of environmental policy instruments. Environmental-related transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with categories of policy instruments, which differ in their cost and competence, so as to effect a discriminating – mainly transaction costs economizing – result.

First, we suggest defining the transaction as the trading of property rights to the use of natural resources. Second, the characteristics of the transaction are described as mainly measurement costs. Third, we determine the conditions under which a particular ‘governance structure’ that is a policy instrument is chosen.

A major contribution of our analysis is to question the relevance of many economists’ prescription in favour of incentive-based instruments. Indeed, in some plausible circumstances a command-and-control instrument may be more efficient by economizing on transaction costs.

Environmental economics has employed the seminal contribution of Ronald H. Coase (1960) intensively but has remained relatively unaffected by the contributions of perhaps his most influential follower, Oliver E. Williamson. Our chapter is a first step towards an operationalization à la Williamson of Coase's (1992, p. 778) ‘fundamental insights’ in the environmental realm.

Interfirm contracts are a ubiquitous economic institution in market economies. In this study, we examine the determinants of one important aspect of interfirm contracts – contract duration. We begin with Joskow's (1987) study that demonstrated that contract duration is governed by mechanisms that economize transaction costs. Our study extends Joskow's study in several ways: First, while Joskow's study focuses on one particular area of extreme resource dependence, between the coal mine and the power company, we examine patterns of contract duration and their determinants across broader economic sectors, thereby providing a more general test of the key ideas in transaction cost economics. Second, we investigate the role of social institutions as a distinct mechanism underlying the design of contract duration, especially in terms of mitigating risks and transaction costs. Finally, by situating our study in China, we extend the research context beyond industrialized market societies to a transitional economy where interfirm contracts are an emerging economic institution. The empirical study is based on the analyses of information on 877 contracts from 620 firms collected in two Chinese cities, Beijing and Guangzhou, in 2000.

The purpose of this chapter is to present an economic perspective of how understanding individual decision-making can be impacted by transactional costs, and benefits in the context of gastronomic tourism. This chapter broadly discusses observable and perceived information search, bargaining and decision, policing and enforcement costs, and benefits in the context of gastronomic tourism in India. The proposed framework incorporates elements of Indian gastronomic offerings for tourists. Implications are discussed for future research and in the backdrop of the post-COVID-19 crisis.

The aim of both marketing theorists and resource-based view proponents is to explain the creation and the sustainability of competitive advantages (Srivastava et al., 2001, p. 777). What has not been considered so far is the role of exploitation positions within the competitive game. The purpose of this article is to investigate the consequences of a strategy concerning the active creation of exploitation positions on the side of the customers. The reason for this is the observed tendency in several industries – elevators, paper machines, gas turbines – to actively create such positions. The underlying assumption is that this strategy leads to a competitive advantage for the initial transaction as well as to higher profits for the supplier taking into account the entire relationship. Mainly the second advantage of a higher profit depends heavily on the sustainability of an exploitation position. Therefore, this paper identifies the drivers controlling the sustainability of an exploitation position. In order to derive a broad understanding three different theoretical approaches – Transaction Cost Economics, the Resource-Based View, and Market Process Theory (Austrian Economics) – will be used to explain the effects of exploitation on the competitive position and the profit of the supplier. Finally, the outcome of this paper is threefold: First, the competitive consequences of an exploitation strategy will be identified. Second, the impact of each theoretical approach on the question of exploitation will be analyzed. Third, the integrative potential of the three different theoretical approaches will be examined. More precisely, we discuss institutional economics and information asymmetry in a truly dynamic setting and the impact of radical ignorance and alertness on the idea of isolating mechanisms. This will be done in a parallel discussion of the problems in general and along one case study which focuses on the elevator market.

A recent stream of research in strategy has demonstrated the effect of boundary of the firm decisions on firm performance by integrating concepts and methods from organizational ecology with predictions from transaction cost economics (e.g. Silverman et al., 1997; Bigelow, 1999; Nickerson & Silverman, 2003; Argyres & Bigelow, 2005). This work has confirmed that managing organizational boundary choices (or governance structures) efficiently has ramifications for firms’ survival chances. But further questions delineating the conditions under which governance structure alignment has a greater or lesser effect on firm survival remain. In this paper, we consider how selection pressures may differ according to a firm's adoption of either a mature or an evolving technology. Using ecological insights regarding competitive intensity and sub-population density, we test for the evidence of the role of sub-population organizational (governance) structure within a technology class. We present preliminary results using an 18-year panel of the population of U.S. automobile manufacturers from 1916 to 1934.

The primary preliminary findings: Within a population, individual misalignment diminishes survival. However, the aggregate governance structure of firms within a technology sub-population has a greater effect on the survival of a focal firm than the governance choice of the individual firm. These findings suggest that governance choices in aggregate within technologically localized sub-populations may influence firm survival. Further, this paper adds to a body of work that utilizes ecological concepts to extend organizational theory.

This chapter provides a theory model of trade finance to explain the “great trade collapse.” The model shows that, first, the riskiness of international transactions rises relative to domestic transactions during economic downturns; and second, the exclusive use of a letter of credit in international transactions exacerbates a collapse in trade during a financial crisis. The basic model considers banks’ optimal screening decisions in the presence of counterparty default risks. In equilibrium, banks will maintain a higher precision screening test for domestic firms and a lower precision screening test for foreign firms, which constitutes the main mechanism of the model.