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The purpose of this paper is to understand what motivates consumers, in particular consumers of local food products or locavores, to purchase in local retail channels vs traditional supermarkets. Using the Theory of Reasoned Action, and reviewing the literature on traceability, social relationships, involvement, values, motivation, and distribution channels, the authors propose a model explaining the antecedents and consequences of local food consumption for both locavores and traditional supermarket consumers.

Face to face interviews were conducted in supermarket and farmers market contexts in a mid-sized city in France. A structural equation modelling was used to explain the relationship between the examined variables.

The results suggest that consumers in traditional food distribution channels are not very involved with local food products. Alternatively, this research shows that for locavores, traceability and social links are positively related to involvement with local food products, which lowers price perceptions and positively influences utilitarian shopping value.

The research provides a first empirical and academic perspective on local food consumption within different food retail channels in Europe. Much of the recent results on locavores and their behaviours have been conducted in North America and/or have remained rather conceptual.

The rapid development of the Internet has led to an increasingly significant role for E-commerce business. This study examines how the green supply chain (GSC) operates on the E-commerce online channel (resell mode and agency mode) and the traditional offline channel with information sharing under demand uncertainty.

This study builds a multistage game model that considers the manufacturer selling green products through different channels. On the traditional offline channel, the competing retailers decide whether to share demand signals. Regarding the resale mode of E-commerce online channel, just E-tailer 1 determines whether to share information and decides the retail price. In the agency mode, the manufacturer decides the retail price directly, and E-tailer 2 sets the platform rate.

This study reveals that information accuracy is conducive to information value and profits on both channels. Interestingly, the platform fee rate in agency mode will inhibit the effect of a positive demand signal. Information sharing will cause double marginal effects, and price competition behavior will mitigate such effects. Additionally, when the platform fee rate is low, the manufacturer will select the E-commerce online channel for operation, but the retailers' profit is the highest in the traditional channel.

This research explores the interplay between different channel structures and information sharing in a GSC, considering price competition and demand uncertainty. Besides, we also considered what behaviors and factors will amplify or transfer the effect of double marginalization.

The paper attempts to discuss the optimal pricing decisions under the decentralized and centralized decision and analyze the influence of online reviews and in-sale service on dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the authors design a two-part tariff coordination mechanism.

To deal with this pricing conflict problems of dual-channel supply chain consisting of dominant manufacturer and a retailer, considering the fact that online reviews and in-sale service are important factors on consumers’ purchase decisions, the authors establish some basic models and exploit them to discuss the optimal pricing decisions under the decentralized and centralized decision and analyze the influence of online reviews and in-sale service on dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the authors design a profit-sharing coordination mechanism.

The results show that the optimal online direct selling price is positively correlated with product perceived quality obtained from online reviews and negatively correlated with the in-sale service. The traditional retail price is positively correlated with the in-sale service and weakly correlated with online reviews. For the manufacturer and retailer, whether decentralized decision or coordination contract, their profits increase with the increase of the in-sale service in a certain range and quality perceived from spontaneous online reviews. Online reviews and in-sale service are important factors on consumers’ purchase decisions. Positive in-sale services and online reviews can provide consumers with a better shopping experience, thereby promoting their enthusiasm for shopping and improving their quality of life. The two-part tariff coordination mechanism improves the profits of the manufacturer and the traditional retailer, respectively, through the transfer fee.

The proposed approach can well analyze the channel conflicts and pricing problems between retailers and manufacturers with respect to product offline price and online price. The analysis and results can inform decision-making for manufacturers and retailers.

The main purpose of this paper is to provide an analytical conceptual framework to help business marketers to identify the effect of consumer's online purchase cost on a firm's performance in a dual‐channel competitive market.

A structural model using game theory is developed to search the optimal strategies for both online and traditional channel retailers.

Our model results show that consumer's online purchase cost consistently has a valuable impact on a firm's profit, and consumer's online purchase cost shows a much more valuable impact on firm's profit when the traditional retail transaction cost and the product web‐fit change. We also find that consumer's online purchase cost has a greater impact on the firm's profit in a Stackelberg competition than in a Bertrand competition.

The present study holds the assumption that all information is known to the online retailers and the traditional retailers. However, information could be incomplete and asymmetric. It is recommended that future research explores the value of consumer's online purchase cost under information asymmetry.

Our paper provides a comprehensive model framework for business managers who currently use or plan to use internet channel to sell their products.

Our research model fills a conceptual and practical gap with a structured analysis of the current state of knowledge about consumer's online purchase cost. The paper provides practical and solid advice and examples demonstrating the application of the different types of optimal marketing strategies for business managers.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: to investigate performance of both manufacturer-owned channel and traditional retail channel when the manufacturer encroaches upon the traditional channel in different forms (brick-and-mortar and online form) under different market structures (Stackelberg and Bertrand). To examine the effect of acceptance of the online channel and travel cost on profits of two channels.

The Hotelling model is employed to depict consumers ' channel choice behavior, where the consumer surplus captures travel cost, spatial distance and consumer heterogeneity in acceptance of the online channel. A game-theoretical framework is developed to determine the optimal encroachment form and market structure for both manufacturer-owned and traditional retail channels.

This paper finds that, in either form of encroachment, Stackelberg market structure always outperforms Bertrand market structure, and channel choice significantly relies on parameters, i.e. consumer acceptance of the online channel and travel cost. Moreover, a Pareto zone is proposed in which both channels consider the strategy that the manufacturer opens bricks-and-mortar channel under Stackelberg market structure as the optimal strategy.

The present work fills a theoretical and practical gap for a structured analysis of the channel performance when the manufacturer encroaches upon the incumbent retail channel in different forms and under different market structure.

Previous studies have rarely integrated the financing modes of a capital-constrained manufacturer with the choices of online sales strategies. To address this gap, the authors study how a manufacturer selects optimal financing modes under different sales strategies in three dual-channel supply chains.

This paper considers three sales strategies, namely, combining a traditional retailer channel with one of the direct selling, reselling and agency selling channels, and two common financing modes, namely, bank financing and retailer financing. The authors obtain equilibrium outcomes of the manufacturer and traditional retailer and then provide the conditions for them to select optimal financing modes under three sales strategies.

The results indicate that the manufacturer’s financing decisions rely on the initial capital and interest rates, and the manufacturer selects retailer financing only if the initial capital is relatively larger. In terms of financing mode options, the retailer financing mode is more beneficial for the manufacturer under the three sales strategies. From the perspective of sales strategies, the direct selling model is more beneficial. In addition, the higher the consumer acceptance of the online channel, the more profits the manufacturer obtains.

This paper provides suggestions on how the capital-constrained manufacturer chooses financing modes and sales strategies.

This paper integrates the financing mode and different sales strategies to investigate the manufacturer’s optimal operational decisions. These sales strategies allow us to investigate the manufacturer’s optimal financing modes in the presence of both different financing modes and sales strategies.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework to help business marketers with a mixed online and traditional retail channel (multi‐channel company) to find the optimal pricing strategy and market structure in order to maximize their profits.

A game theory model is developed to determine the optimal pricing strategy for the multi‐channel company.

It was demonstrated that an optimal pricing strategy exists under different market structures for a multi‐channel company. When a company uses multiple channels to sell its product, the optimal pricing strategy is to use a low‐high pricing strategy if the online marginal cost is equal to or less than the traditional marginal cost, or a high‐low pricing strategy if the online marginal cost is far larger than the traditional marginal cost. Furthermore, in order to maximize its profit, the company using multiple channels should adopt channel integration as the optimal market structure.

The present study assumed that all consumers have perfect information. However, information with the consumers could be incomplete. It is recommended that future research explore the pricing strategy under incomplete information settings.

The paper provides a very useful model framework, pricing strategy, and market structure for business managers who are using or planning to use multiple channels to sell their products.

This paper fills a conceptual and practical gap for a structured analysis of the current state of knowledge about multi‐channel pricing strategies. It provides practical and solid advice and examples demonstrating the application of the different types of pricing strategies for business managers.

This chapter reports the findings of a large-scale study investigating the issues that arise when firms introduce a new Internet channel. Our analysis offers three key contributions. First, we provide a framework to guide firms in anticipating and understanding the unique challenges of introducing an Internet channel. Second, we present a menu of alternatives to address these challenges. Finally, we pose a series of questions which identify which solutions are most appropriate given the particular market and firm context.

Companies are currently moving from multi-channel strategies to offer their customers an omni-channel (OC) experience. So far, OC research has been mainly tackled from a sales-based view, with numerous operational challenges to be fully investigated yet. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how companies set the logistics variables in their OC management strategy and the business logistics models currently most adopted.

A two-step methodology was adopted. First, a systematic combining approach with scientific literature review and case studies allowed to derive a framework for classifying the key logistics variables and the related options. The framework was then used to conduct a qualitative survey targeting 92 Italian companies operating in food manufacturing, food retailing and non-food retailing. Collected data were analysed by means of cluster analysis.

Implementing an OC management strategy requires to set 11 logistics variables belonging to four strategic areas: delivery service, distribution setting, fulfilment strategy and returns management. A broad empirical investigation showed the choices made by companies when setting the logistics variables to implement an OC management strategy. Lastly, four business logistics models, differing in terms of both business sector and OC maturity, were discussed.

The proposed framework extends earlier studies by including additional significant logistics variables. The empirical analysis provides new insights on how to re-structure the business logistics model in OC, suggesting channel integration and the coexistence of multiple configurations as main enablers of an OC proposition.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework to help business marketers with online and traditional retail channels (multi‐channel retailers) to find the optimal branding strategy and market structure in order to maximize their profits.

A game‐theoretic model is developed to determine the optimal branding strategy and market structure for the dual‐channel stores of a multi‐channel retailer.

The paper demonstrates that an optimal branding strategy and market structure exists for the dual‐channel stores of a multi‐channel retailer. When a retailer uses multiple channels in parallel to sell its product, the optimal branding strategy is to employ as large as possible brand differentiation between the dual‐channel stores, particularly when the price is less sensitive for consumers and the market base size is larger. Furthermore, it is also found that the optimal market structure is the Stackelberg mode, especially when the product brands between the two channels are less differentiated.

The present study assumed that all information is known to both the online and traditional channels of a multi‐channel retailer. However, information could be incomplete. It is recommended that future research explore the value of product brand differentiation under incomplete information settings.

The paper provides a very useful model framework, branding strategy, and market structure for business managers who are using or planning to use multiple channels to sell their products.

This paper fills a conceptual and practical gap for a structured analysis of the current state of knowledge about multi‐channel branding strategies. The paper provides practical and solid advice and examples demonstrating the application of product brand differentiation strategies for business managers.