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This study aims to investigate the question concerning whether tournament incentives motivate chief executive officers (CEOs) to be socially responsible.

Data from all A-share Chinese companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for the period from 2010 to 2015 are used. To draw inferences from the data, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and cluster OLS are used as a baseline methodology. To control for the possible issue of endogeneity, firm-fixed-effects regression, two-stage least squares regression and propensity score matching are used.

A reliable evidence is found that tournament incentives motivate CEOs to be more socially responsible. Additional analysis reveals that the positive effect of CEO tournament incentives on corporate social responsibility performance (CSRP) is more pronounced in state-owned firms than it is in non-state-owned firms. The study’s findings are consistent with tournament theory and the conventional wisdom hypothesis, which proposes that better incentives lead to competitiveness, which improves financial and social performance.

The study’s findings have implications for companies and regulators who wish to enhance CSRP by giving tournament incentives to top managers. Investment in social responsibility may reduce the conflict between executives and employees and improve the corporate culture.

This study contributes to the existing literature by providing the first evidence that CEOs’ tournament incentives play a vital role in CSRP. The study’s findings contribute to tournament theory.

This paper examines an apparent contrast in organizing innovation tournaments; seekers offer contestant-agnostic incentives to elicit greater effort from a heterogeneous pool of contestants. Specifically, the study tests whether and how such incentives and the underlying heterogeneity in the contestant pool, assessed in terms of contestants' entry timing, are jointly associated with contestant effort. Thus, the study contributes to the prior literature that has looked at behavioral consequences of entry timing as well as incentives in innovation tournaments.

For hypothesis testing, the study uses a panel dataset of submission activity of over 60,000 contestants observed in nearly 200 innovation tournaments. The estimation employs multi-way fixed effects, accounting for unobserved heterogeneity across contestants, tournaments and submission week. The findings remain stable across a range of robustness checks.

The study finds that, on average, late entrant tends to exert less effort than an early entrant (H1). Results further show that the effort gap widens in tournaments that offer higher incentives. In particular, the effort gap between late and early entrants is significantly wider in tournaments that have attracted superior solutions from several contestants (H2), offer gain in status (H3, marginally significant) or offer a higher monetary reward (H4).

The study's findings counter conventional wisdom, which suggests that incentives have a positive effect on contestant behavior, including effort. In contrast, the study indicates that incentives may have divergent implications for contestant behavior, contingent on contestants' entry timing. As the study discusses, these findings have several implications for research and practice of managing innovation tournaments.

This paper is a study of how people with heterogonous individual characteristics self-select into different compensation schemes. A laboratory experiment is designed in which “workers” can join “companies” that pay according to various schemes: piece rate, revenue sharing, individual tournament, and team tournament. The main findings are: (1) Subjects with high relative performance always prefer individual tournament. (2) Risk-averse subjects are less likely to choose competitive schemes. (3) Individual tournament attracts fewer women than men, which is partially explained by gender-specific social preferences. (4) Compared to people with siblings, only children are less likely to accept any team-based schemes without information about their teammates. (5) The provision of feedback about relative performance can adjust individuals’ biased self-beliefs and then influence their self-selections.

Research on makers and innovation has been equivocal regarding whether maker innovation is driven by internal motivation or external incentives. The motivation view favors the intrinsic motives of makers, whereas the incentive view supports external economic incentives. The authors combine both views to explore how innovation tournaments promote the product innovation outcomes of different creative and entrepreneurial makers, using economic incentives (money) or social incentives (love).

The authors interviewed 42 makers and collected a panel dataset of 29,823 makers from the largest digital maker community in China using a Python crawling program. The authors analyzed the data using multiple methods, including cluster analysis, discriminant analysis, factor analysis and negative binomial regression.

Compared with entrepreneurial makers, the product productivity of creative makers is inferior, but their product popularity is greater. The social incentive of innovation tournaments promotes the product productivity and popularity of creative makers compared with that of entrepreneurial makers, but the economic incentive is contradictory. In addition, social and economic incentives interact to generate inconsistent influences.

The study identifies creative and entrepreneurial makers and contributes to user innovation and innovation tournaments by integrating motivation and incentive views.

Using data from the Senior PGA Tours we analyze the incentive effects of rank order tournaments. Previous studies using data from the PGA Tour reached conflicting conclusions. To resolve the issue, the Senior PGA Tour was chosen for its unique format where players are not cut from the tournament before completion, eliminating any survival bias. The findings support the hypothesis that the level of prizes in Senior PGA tournaments influences players’ performance, indicating that tournaments can be used to motivate performance.

Tournament theory provides important insights into organizational reward systems. It examines the incentive properties of reward systems based on rank‐order rather than absolute individual performance. Tournament theory may explain the pattern of managerial pay. It may also explain risk‐taking behavior by mutual fund managers. We use data from the PGA tour to examine the pattern of risk‐taking by professional golfers in an explicit tournament. The PGA tour provides a natural laboratory where such behavior can be studied. Our evidence shows that behavior by players in golf tournaments is consistent with the predictions of tournament theory.

This paper investigates the influence of tournament incentives, measured by Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay slice (CPS), on the acquisition decisions of Australian firms.

This study applies ordinary least squares regression analyses to a sample of 1,429 acquisition observations announced by 986 unique Australian firms spanning the 2001–2015 period. Event study methodology was employed to capture the market reaction to acquisition announcements. Multinomial logit models, a two-stage least squares instrumental variable (IV) approach and propensity score matching (PSM) technique were performed for robustness and endogeneity correction purposes.

The results suggest that CPS has a positive and significant relationship with the announcement period abnormal return realised by acquirers, implying that executives are motivated to exert best efforts and support the CEO in making value-creating acquisitions. Further analyses reveal that management teams of high CPS firms demonstrate efficiencies in executing acquisitions. The positive relationship between the CPS and abnormal return is more pronounced in acquisitions of private targets, domestic targets and bidders with high-quality CEOs. These acquisitions make a significant contribution to the long-run performance of the firm, which provides support for the effort inducement hypothesis.

The study's empirical evidence implies that the strong governance environment in Australia and a highly monitored acquisition market and compensation contracts motivates executives to exert their efforts to make value-enhancing acquisitions.

This paper appears to be the first investigation that makes a link between CPS in different components (i.e. short-term, long-term and total pay) as proxy for tournament incentives and the outcomes of both public and non-public acquisitions in the Australian setting.

The purpose of this study is to determine how self-driven (intrinsic motivators) and monetary incentives (extrinsic motivators) are mediated by an effort to affect fundraising outcomes. This integration sheds light on crowding out between the two types of incentives as well the drivers of fundraising outcomes, specifically effort and donations.

A field experiment is conducted over a two-month period, involving an online fundraising campaign with over 300 volunteers assigned to one of five different incentive conditions. A special website was created to monitor fundraiser efforts. Fundraisers filled out pre- and post-study surveys.

While high monetary incentives result in the greatest immediate increase in funds raised, they crowd out future intentions to volunteer once incentives are withdrawn. Mediation analyzes show that fundraiser effort fully mediates the effect of intrinsic motivators and partially mediates the direct effect of extrinsic motivators on funds raised.

A major limitation of field experiments is the lack of control, resulting in higher variation. However, while a more controlled experiment will reduce this variation, this goes at the expense of lower external validity.

Results indicate that – at least in the short run – monetary incentives can result in higher fundraising outcomes. However, this goes at the expense of a reduction in future volunteering once the incentives are withdrawn.

This study examines whether extrinsic or intrinsic motivators have a greater impact on funds raised and whether extrinsic motivators crowd out future intentions to volunteer. Different from previous research in which effort is a latent variable, the effort is directly observed over time.

In this paper, we review the literature on pay variation (e.g., pay dispersion, pay compression, pay range) in organizations. Pay variation research has increased markedly in the past two decades and much progress has been made in terms of understanding its consequences for individual, team, and organizational outcomes. Our review of this research exposes several levels-related assumptions that have limited theoretical and empirical progress. We isolate the issues that deserve attention, develop an illustrative multilevel model, and offer a number of testable propositions to guide future research on pay structures.

Although most labor and microeconomic textbooks contain a theoretical discussion of the backward‐bending labor supply curve, scant empirical evidence of this phenomenon exists. In this paper we investigate the behavior of PGA golf professionals as they make labor‐leisure choices for performing on the PGA Tour. Using tournament theory to model this labor market and data from tournament performances over three seperate years, we find significant evidence that higher paid PGA Tour players do indeed operate in the backward‐bending region of their labor supply curves.