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Introduction – The banking sector is one of the most important building blocks of the financial system. A failure in the banking sector can cause serious problems in a country’s economy. In order for countries to achieve economic growth and development goals, the banking sector, which affects all sectors significantly, needs to be strong. Countries with a robust and reliable banking system have a high credit rating. As a result of this high credit rating, the interest of foreign capital in the country increases. Thus, the credit volume of banks expands and loans are provided at a more appropriate rate for investments. In this respect, the performance and profitability of banks are important. The CAMELS performance model is a valuation system used to determine the general status of banks. The CAMELS model consists of six components. According to this, C represents capital adequacy; A, asset quality; M, management adequacy; E, earnings; L, liquidity; and S, sensitivity to market risks.

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the effect of the CAMLS variables on the variable E.

Methodology – In the implementation part of the study, the data of 11 banks in the BIST Bank Index between 2004 and 2018 were used. In the analysis part of the study, a panel data analysis method was used.

Findings – The capital adequacy (C), management adequacy (M) and liquidity (L) variables were effective on profitability. This study revealed the importance of the capital, management and liquidity variables, which are internal factors, in increasing the profitability of banks.

Purpose – This study investigates the links between strategy, execution, and financial performance with particular attention to the underlying performance drivers that describe how a company executes strategy to create financial value.

Methodology – This study empirically investigates companies in the United States and 22 other countries over a 20-year period (11 successive 10n-year periods: 1988–2007): (1) to compare financial performance characteristics of HPC versus non-HPC; (2) to study the sustainability of performance in HPC; and (3) to identify the companies that exit or enter the HPC classification and the performance drivers and performance measures that characterized the change in HPC classification.

Findings – The 20-year longitudinal results confirm the results of prior studies as to the long-term superior performance of HPC over other companies (Objective 1). For sustaining HPC, results were consistent as to total asset management, profitability, financial risk, and liquidity (Objective 2). Declining HPC companies fail at total asset management, profitability, and operating asset management and significantly increase their financial risk. Emerging HPC companies improve liquidity through improved operating asset management and cash flows (Objective 3).

Practical implications – To become a HPC management must generate increased cash flows from income, manage receivables and inventory vigorously, and reduce its debt in relation to equity. Thereafter, management must concentrate on maintaining its asset turnover and growth in revenues while maintaining its profit margin and not increasing its debt to equity.

Value of the paper – The results provide direction for management of companies that aspire to HPC status and to maintain HPC status.

The present study investigates whether companies that exhibit high performance characteristics in the pre-financial crisis period can maintain their high performance in the financial crisis period of 2007–2009 and, in particular, the post-financial crisis period of 2010–2011.

The current study of 1,473 companies in 25 countries and 66 industries (MSCI index) (1) extends the empirical research of prior studies through the year 2011; (2) identifies the operating characteristics (performance drivers and performance measures) and associated risk factors which were most critical with regard to sustaining, exiting, and entering HPC companies during the five 10-year periods since 1998–2007, and (3) summarizes conclusions about HPC results from the 13 ten-year periods (1989–1998 to 2002–2011) in this stream of research.

(1) Companies that sustain high performance over periods of financial stress clearly excel in asset turnover performance driver and on the performance measures of growth in revenues, profit margin, return on equity and return on assets. Sustaining HPC had less debt than other companies and consistent cash flow yields. Operating turnover ratios became less important in recent years as an indicator of high performance. (2) Although exiting companies maintained profitability, financial risk and liquidity, the key factor in their dropping out of HPC status is their failure to grow revenues. (3) Entering companies did not exhibit the superior performance in all categories.

The results provide strategic direction for management of companies that aspire to HPC status and to maintain HPC status once gained, particularly in times of global financial stress.

Prior research shows that companies that achieve high performance excel at certain financial objectives. This chapter addresses the question: Do companies that excel at these financial performance objectives also excel in integrated reporting and sustainability reporting?

We compare a sample of high performance companies (HPC) with a sample of companies that purport to support integrated reporting, and a sample that purport to support sustainability reporting. Our hypotheses are that HPC will equal or exceed the integrated reporting and sustainability reporting practices shown by International Integrated Reporting Committee (IIRC) and Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) companies and US companies will be less at these practices than non-US companies.

Our findings indicate that IIRC companies and GRI companies generally do not meet the high financial performance measures of the HPC. Based on an integrated reporting and sustainability reporting matrix, we show that HPC exhibit equal performance on the practices of sustainability and integrated reporting compared to GRI companies, but both HPC and GRI are lower on these practices than IIRC companies. Also, US companies disclose less information in sustainability reports and integrated reports as compared to non-US companies. Overall, all three groups fall short of full compliance with standards of integrated reporting and sustainability reporting.

This chapter provides evidence as to the financial performance and the current state of integrated reporting and sustainability reporting among HPC, GRI, and IIRC companies. This chapter highlights the global need for a generally accepted set of standards for sustainability and integrated reporting practices.

This study establishes a baseline evaluation of sustainability reporting (SR) and integrated reporting (IR) practices among groups of companies globally using a combined evaluation matrix. We evaluate a sample of high performance companies (HPC), global reporting initiative (GRI) companies, international integrated reporting committee (IIRC) companies, and a control group of companies that do not belong to any of these groups. We test for high performance and compliance with a 30-point evaluation matrix for financial reporting, corporate governance, integrated disclosure, SR, and assurance developed from the standards set by GRI and IIRC. This chapter provides evidence as to the current IR and SR states, and shows that considerable variation exists even among companies that have pledged to improve reporting in this arena. The analysis also shows that companies that belong to no special group do in fact score on a level that shows that SR and IR standards are being implemented by many companies in the world, not just those in special groups like the HPC, GRI, and IIRC. Finally, this study provides direction for global regulators and professional associations, and to the management of companies that aspire to HPC status while meeting the IR and SR standards.

Through its effect on the cost of capital, impact investing has the potential to improve the pricing of externalities, reducing the current overproduction and consumption of goods with negative social and environmental impacts and stimulating production and consumption of goods with positive social and environmental impacts. For this potential to be realised, the design of impact investing needs to be better aligned with portfolio management in two respects: (1) it needs to be possible to assess the impact of both asset classes and individual assets and (2) the analysis of the characteristics of assets needs to be separated from the use of mandate-related screens.

We survey private foundations for governance factors and internal processes that help explain why they barely miss (or not) the benchmark for qualifying distributions that would save them taxes on net investment income. Private foundations are subject to a 2% tax rate on their net investment income. If qualifying distributions are above a benchmark, the foundation qualifies for a 50% reduction in the tax rate to a 1% tax rate. This tax rate structure provides a “cliff effect” where the additional distributions required to qualify for the lower tax rate may actually be less than the potential tax savings (Sansing & Yetman, 2006). For example, one foundation in our sample could have saved $15,613 in tax by paying an additional $318 in distributions. We view this situation as a clear governance failure. Our first contribution to the literature is that board interest and information system strength affect the likelihood of avoiding such a governance failure, even after controlling for the general quality of management with management compensation and professional fees. Our second contribution is that foundations without sufficient financial savvy and sophistication appear to pay higher taxes. Given the large number of small, relatively unsophisticated foundations in America, differential tax rates based on sophistication is an interesting policy debate.

We examine the relationship between how mutual fund sponsors configure their board(s) of directors and the performance of the funds under a particular board's purview. Fund sponsors utilize either one board to oversee all the funds within a fund family or multiple boards that oversee one fund or a subset of the family's funds. Our results suggest that fund families – that is, sponsors – that use multiple boards have significantly higher objective-adjusted board-level weighted excess returns. But, there are no significant differences in the objective-adjusted board-level weighted excess expenses. These results are consistent with the argument that multiple boards provide superior monitoring.

Purpose – The financial crisis has exposed a behavioral paradox: although asset managers are putting significant effort into meeting institutional pressures to demonstrate transparency and responsible behavior, their actual investment behaviors seem to remain inconsistent with responsible ownership. We seek to understand asset managers’ motivations to use externally defined environment, social, and governance (ESG) information to engage in sustainable investment.

Methodology/approach – We draw on insights from the sensemaking literature, as well as institutional, behavioral, and cognitive theories to shed new light on asset managers’ motivations to demonstrate conformance with ESG criteria.

Findings – The more asset managers demonstrate conformance, the less likely they are to make an effort to integrate sustainability and long-term, return-making concerns in their investment behaviors. As a result of the organization’s decoupling strategy, asset managers who are obliged to justify responsible behavior tend to have a limited sense of responsibility for encouraging long-term changes in corporate behavior.

Practical implications – We argue that calls for greater transparency in investment decisions under the guise of demonstrating conformance to ESG information requirements will not lead to more sustainable investment behavior.

Originality/value – This chapter challenges the assumption in the sustainable investment literature that the common use of ESG criteria enables investors to pressure and empower companies in the long term.

Section 529 college savings plans are tax-favored investment vehicles, which saw tremendous growth after the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 expanded 529 plan benefits to include tax-free distributions for qualified higher education expenses. However, regulators, the press, and fund advisors criticized the Section 529 college savings plan industry for inadequate and nonuniform disclosures of investor information, such as historical returns, fees, taxes, and underlying investments. We investigate consumers’ investment choices after a disclosure regime change in 2003 and find that after enhanced disclosures became widely available, investors selected fewer plans offered exclusively through brokers, increasingly chose portfolios based on past investment performance, but remained unresponsive to state tax benefit disclosures. We also analyze the plans’ performance and find evidence that 529 investors are constrained to invest in portfolios with high, return-eroding fees. Nearly 20 percent of the portfolios have a statistically significant negative alpha, the measure of risk-adjusted excess return, while less than 1 percent have a statistically significant positive alpha.