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The paper aims to help explain how certain smaller university endowments are able to provide investment results that are more typical of much larger endowments. Investment teams' characteristics and risk-reward perceptions are examined in relation to portfolio composition and performance.

This exploratory study uses a grounded-theory approach consisting of 20 in-depth interviews of financial officers at US colleges and universities with assets between $100 million and $200 million. Ten were conducted from the top performance quartile and ten from the bottom quartile. Interviews were transcribed and coded; afterward, emerging themes and constructs were identified. Objective investment performance over a ten-year period was employed from a well-known industry survey.

Top-performing endowments were described as having endowment teams with greater investment expertise, efficacy, decision-making independence and learning commitment than teams from the low-performing endowments. Teams from top-performing endowments assessed alternative investments more favorably and made greater portfolio allocations to them as compared to teams from low-performing endowments.

Because of the chosen research approach, the research results may not be generalizable.

The paper includes implications for colleges and universities in the management of their endowments, and particularly in the selection of committee and other team members.

The paper is original in exploring certain team characteristics and practices of institutional investment decision-makers and their relationship to portfolio composition and performance.

The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which chief executive officers (CEOs) deserve the pay they receive both in terms of over and underpayment.

Rather than using the traditional normal distribution view in which CEO performance clusters around the mean with relatively little variance, the authors adopt a novel power law approach. They studied 22 industries and N = 4,158 CEO-firm combinations for analyses based on Tobin’s Q and N = 5,091 for analyses based on return on assets. Regarding compensation, they measured the CEO distribution based on total compensation and three components of CEO total pay: salary, bonus, and value of options exercised.

In total, 86 percent of CEO performance and 91 percent of CEO pay distributions fit a power law better than a normal distribution, indicating that a minority of CEOs are producing top value for their firms (i.e. CEO performance) and a minority of CEOs are appropriating top value for themselves (i.e. CEO pay). But, the authors also found little overlap between CEOs who are the top performers and CEOs who are the top earners.

The findings shed new light on CEO pay deservingness by using a novel conceptual and methodological lens that highlights systematic over and underpayment. Results suggest a violation of distributive justice and offer little support for agency theory’s efficient contracting hypothesis, which have important implications for agency theory, equity theory, justice theory, and agent risk sharing and agent risk bearing theories.

Results highlight erroneous practices when trying to benchmark CEO pay based on average levels of performance in an industry because the typical approach to CEO compensation based on averages significantly underpays stars and overpays average performers.

Results offer new insights on the extent of over and underpayment. The findings uncover an extremely large non-overlap between the top earning and top performing CEOs and to an extent far greater in magnitude than previously suggested.

Objetivo – El objetivo de nuestro estudio fue examinar si los directores ejecutivos (CEOs) merecen la remuneración monetaria que reciben.

Metodología – En lugar de utilizar el enfoque tradicional que asume que la distribución del rendimiento de CEOs sigue la curva normal (con la mayoría de CEOs agrupados en torno a la media y relativamente poca variación), adoptamos un enfoque diferente basado en la ley de potencia. Incluimos 22 industrias y N = 4.158 combinaciones de CEO-firma para análisis basados en Tobin’s Q y N = 5.091 para análisis basado en la rentabilidad de los activos. En cuanto a la remuneracion, medimos distribuciones basadas en la remuneración total y tres componentes del pago completo a los CEOs: salario, bonos, y el valor de las opciones ejercitadas.

Resultados – 86% de las distribuciones de rendimiento de CEOs y el 91% de las distribuciones de pago de los CEO se aproximan mejor a una distribución de ley de potencia que a una distribución normal. Esto indica que una minoría de los CEOs produce un valor muy superior para sus empresas (es decir, el rendimiento CEO) y una minoría de los CEOs apropia valor superior para sí mismos (es decir, pago de los CEO). Sin embargo, encontramos muy poco solapamiento entre aquellos CEOs que se desempeñan mejor y los CEOs que ganan más.

Implicaciones – Nuestros hallazgos usando una conceptualización y metodología novedosas ponen en relieve que a muchos CEOs se les paga demasiado y que a muchos no se les paga suficiente (en comparación con su desempeño). Los resultados sugieren una violación de los principios de justicia distributiva y no apoyan la hipótesis de “contratación eficiente,” y tienen implicaciones para para la teoría de la agencia, de la equidad, de la justicia, y de la distribución de riesgos.

Implicaciones prácticas – Los resultados destacan las prácticas erróneas con respecto a la distribución de compensación a CEOs que se basan en los niveles medios de rendimiento en una industria. Estas prácticas llevan a no pagar suficiente a los directivos “estrella” y pagar demasiado a los directivos con desempeño medio.

Originalidad/valor – Los resultados ofrecen nuevas perspectivas sobre la relación entre desempeño y compensación de CEOs y que los que se desempeñan mejor no son los que reciben más pago, y viceversa. Estas diferencias son mucho más grandes de que lo que se creía anteriormente.

Objetivo – O objetivo do nosso estudo foi examinar se os CEOs merecem a compensação monetária que recebem.

Metodologia – Em vez de utilizar a abordagem tradicional que assume que a distribuição do desempenho do CEO segue a curva normal (com a maioria dos CEOs agrupados em torno da média e relativamente pouca variação), adotamos uma abordagem diferente com base num enfoque inovador da lei de potência. Incluímos 22 indústrias e N = 4.158 combinações de CEO-empresa para análise baseada no Q de Tobin e N = 5091 para análise baseado na rentabilidade dos ativos. Em relação à compensação, medimos as distribuições de CEO com base no total de compensação e três componentes do pagamento total dos CEOs: salário, bônus e o valor das opções exercidas.

Resultados – 86% do desempenho do CEO e 91% das distribuições de pagamento do CEO correspondem a uma lei de potência melhor do que uma distribuição normal, indicando que uma minoria de CEOs está produzindo valor superior para suas empresas (ou seja, desempenho do CEO) e uma minoria de CEOs se apropriando do valor superior para si próprios (isto é, o salário do CEO). Mas, também encontramos pouca sobreposição entre CEOs que tem os melhores desempenhos e os CEOs que tem as maiores ganancias.

Implicações – Nossas descobertas lançam nova luz sobre o merecimento do pagamento do CEO, usando uma nova lente conceitual e metodológica que destaca o excessivo e o baixo pagamento sistemático. Os resultados sugerem uma violação da justiça distributiva e não apoiam a hipótese da contratação eficiente, e tem implicações para a teoria da agência, teoria da igualdade, teoria da justiça e distribuição de riscos.

Implicações práticas – Os resultados destacam práticas errôneas quando se tenta benchmark de remuneração do CEO baseado em níveis médios de desempenho em uma indústria, porque essas práticas levam a não pagar o suficiente aos CEOs “estrela” e pagar em excesso CEOs com desempenho médio.

Originalidade/valor – Os resultados oferecem novas perspectivas sobre a relação entre desempenho e retribuição dos CEOs e que os que desempenham melhor não são os que recebem um pagamento maior, e vice-versa. Estas diferenças são muito maiores do que se pensava anteriormente.

Construction organizations' investment in effective talent-development programs is a key strategy in attracting, developing and retaining staff. Such programs are especially important given the current challenges in the construction workforce, including labor shortages, an aging workforce, generational differences in the workforce, supply chain disruptions and the need to effectively train staff in the skills that are essential in a constrained labor environment. To address these challenges, this study proposes a performance measurement strategy that construction companies can use as input to design their talent development programs.

The strategy intends to assess the performance of project managers and develop criteria that define categories of their performance, including the top performers' category. This enables construction organizations to provide each project manager with individualized training that addresses areas of weakness and in turn, develops the skills that correspond with being top performers. The proposed strategy was developed and tested by surveying the immediate supervisors of 187 project managers working for general and specialty contractors in the United States. Principal component analysis was used to develop a single performance construct from seven performance criteria.

This construct was used to organize the project managers into the categories of top, above-average and below-average performers. According to the findings, top-performing project managers have well-rounded skills in the areas of leadership, communication, technical proficiency and overall job knowledge.

The outcomes of this study can help construction organizations focus their talent-development programs on the skills most associated with PMs being top performers.

This study provides construction organizations with a comprehensive performance-measuring construct to focus their talent-development programs on the skills most associated with top-performing project managers. Researchers can use this study as a foundation for further understanding how performance is related to various construction professions.

The purpose of this study is to empirically quantify the factors that are perceived to drive or inhibit performance of information technology (IT) outsourced employees from a range of information technology outsourcing (ITO) stakeholders in South Africa.

The first phase was a qualitative study on 19 stakeholders focussed on the development of the constructs. The second phase was quantitative, with a sample of 116 ITO stakeholders of the largest IT company in South Africa.

The study revealed that the ITO stakeholders had misaligned perceptions on inhibitors and somewhat congruent perceptions with regards to drivers of performance. Managers and poor performers’ perceptions of inhibiting factors of performance were significantly different. The empirical evidence showed that the key drivers of performance were intrinsic factors and leadership, whilst the inhibiting factors were mainly related to poor leadership.

The major limitation was that the population was represented by one large organisation in the South African IT industry and its clients, thereby excluding the rest of the IT industry participants, specifically the medium and small IT companies. The quota sample resulted in a non-probability study, and thus, the results of this study may not necessarily be generalised to other populations. This study’s findings on differences between good and poor performers must be investigated in other industries.

For outsourced employees to perform optimally, some key intrinsic factors must be fulfilled. Passion and pride, aligned to a meaningful job role, will unleash outstanding performance. Organisations need to ensure that there is regular feedback to managers on their performance and subsequent leadership development. Alignment of managers and poor performers’ perceptions on drivers and inhibitors could improve performance.

These findings demonstrate the large gap in perceptions about the key drivers and inhibiters of performance.

The study reveals that top performers tend to have higher order and intrinsic motivators, compared to poor performers, who have a mixture of extrinsic and intrinsic needs, and managers have a misaligned expectation of extrinsic motivators.

To thrive, any individual, organization, or society needs to separate true from false expertise. This chapter provides a selective review of research examining self and social judgments of human capital – that is, expertise, knowledge, and skill. In particular, it focuses on the problem of the “flawed evaluator”: most people judging expertise often have flawed expertise themselves, and thus their assessments of self and others are imperfect in profound and systematic ways.

The review focuses mostly on empirical work specifically building on the “Dunning–Kruger effect” in self-perceptions of expertise (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). This selective review, thus, focuses on patterns of error in such judgments.

Because judges of expertise have flawed expertise themselves, they fail to recognize incompetence in themselves. Because of their flaws, most people also fail to recognize genius in other people and superior ideas.

The review suggests that organizations have trouble recognizing those exhibiting the highest levels of expertise in their midst. People in organizations also fail to identify the best advice and correct flawed ideas. Organizations may also rely on the “wisdom of crowds” strategy in situations in which that strategy actually misleads because too few people identify the best idea available.

Chance models – mechanisms that explain empirical regularities through unsystematic variance – have a long tradition in the sciences but have been historically marginalized in management scholarship, relative to an agentic worldview about the role of managers and organizations. An exception is the work of James G. March and his coauthors, who proposed a variety of chance models that explain important management phenomena, including the careers of top executives, managerial risk taking, and organizational anarchy, learning, and adaptation. This paper serves as a tribute to the beauty of these “little ideas” and demonstrates how they can be recombined to generate novel implications. In particular, we focus on the example of an inverted V-shaped performance association centering around the year when executives were featured in a prominent listing, Barron’s annual list of Top 30 chief executive officers. Our recombination of several chance models developed by March and his coauthors provides a novel explanation for why many of the executives’ exceptional performances did not persist. In contrast to the common accounts of complacency, hubris, and statistical regression, the results show that declines from high performance may result from the way luck interacts with these executives’ slow adaptation, incompetence, and self-reinforced risk taking. We conclude by elaborating on the normative implications of chance models, which address many current management and societal challenges. We further encourage the continued development of chance models to help explain performance differences, shifting from accounts that favor heroic stories of corporate leaders toward accounts that favor their changing fortunes.

The Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) measured 15-year-olds’ performance in mathematics, reading, and science. The purpose of this paper is to use the assessment results of PISA 2006, 2009, and 2012 to benchmark the compulsory education performance of 65 countries and economies with emphasis on two benchmarking steps: identifying benchmarks and determining performance gaps.

The authors use a multi-criterion and multi-period performance categorization method to identify a group of best performers as benchmarks. Then, the authors use two-sample t-tests to detect against benchmarks whether each country or economy has significant performance gaps on individual performance measures.

Based on the mean scores of three assessment subjects in PISA 2006, 2009, and 2012, six best performers (Top-6) are identified from 65 participating countries and economies. In comparison with Top-6’s weighted averages, performance gaps are found for most countries and economies on the mean score of each subject, the percentage of top-performing students in all three subjects, and the percentage of lowest-performing students in each subject.

For compulsory education systems around the world, this paper provides an original categorization of performance based on the results of three PISA cycles, and provides new insights for countries and economies to prioritize improvement efforts to increase average performance, pursue excellence, and tackle low performance. For benchmarking applications involving multi-criterion and multi-period data, this paper presents a novel method of using statistical control charts to identify benchmarks and then using two-sample t-tests to determine performance gaps on individual performance measures.

To derive and apply a new composite performance metric to top performing US companies in order to identify consistently excellent performers and explain their success over the last half‐century. The ten firms topping the list for this new composite performance metric represent the “best of the best” of American corporations during the fifty‐one years of Fortune magazine listings.

Data for this analysis were gleaned from the annual lists of the top 500 companies reported by Fortune from 1954 to 2005. Using Fortune's annual rankings of companies according to the four performance criteria of return on investment/equity, net profits, total assets, and revenues dimensions, the authors firstly computed, for each of these four performance dimensions, an average ranking based on a company's particular rank each year and its total number of appearances during the 51‐year period; and then, secondly, by assigning each of the four performance criteria a weight reflecting its importance, derived a composite (total) score based on a company's average ranking on all four criteria.

For a modern US based company to be successful year after year it must consistently achieve two of four performance criteria included in the composite metric. The results of the longitudinal analysis illustrate the significance of using a variety of metrics, or a composite metric, to gauge corporate performance.

The limitations of the findings are that assigning different weights to the four performance criteria would yield a somewhat different composite ranking.

This paper is the first to derive and present a composite performance metric, compiled from Fortune's annual rankings of four critical performance variables and representing an aggregated weighted ranking of American companies over a half‐century.

Scanning both the academic and popular business literature of the last 40 years puzzles the alert reader. The variety of prescriptions of how to be successful (effective, performing, etc.) 1 Organizational performance, organizational success and organizational effectiveness will be used interchangeably throughout this paper.1 in business is hardly comprehensible: “Being close to the customer,” Total Quality Management, corporate social responsibility, shareholder value maximization, efficient consumer response, management reward systems or employee involvement programs are but a few of the slogans introduced as means to increase organizational effectiveness. Management scholars have made little effort to integrate the various performance-enhancing strategies or to assess them in an orderly manner.

This study classifies organizational strategies by the importance each strategy attaches to different constituencies in the firm’s environment. A number of researchers divide an organization’s environment into various constituency groups and argue that these groups constitute – as providers and recipients of resources – the basis for organizational survival and well-being. Some theoretical schools argue for the foremost importance of responsiveness to certain constituencies while stakeholder theory calls for a – situation-contingent – balance in these responsiveness levels. Given that maximum responsiveness levels to different groups may be limited by an organization’s resource endowment or even counterbalanced, the need exists for a concurrent assessment of these competing claims by jointly evaluating the effect of the respective behaviors towards constituencies on performance. Thus, this study investigates the competing merits of implementing alternative business philosophies (e.g. balanced versus focused responsiveness to constituencies). Such a concurrent assessment provides a “critical test” of multiple, opposing theories rather than testing the merits of one theory (Carlsmith, Ellsworth & Aronson, 1976).

In the high tolerance level applied for this study (be among the top 80% of the industry) only a handful of organizations managed to sustain such a balanced strategy over the whole observation period. Continuously monitoring stakeholder demands and crafting suitable responsiveness strategies must therefore be a focus of successful business strategies. While such behavior may not be a sufficient explanation for organizational success, it certainly is a necessary one.

This paper provides an overview of the empirical findings on how relative performance information (RPI) affects employee behavior. Additionally, the review identifies future research opportunities based on a systematic analysis of the literature that incorporates findings across several disciplines and provides replicable, extensive coverage.

This paper addresses a research gap via synthesis, drawing on the empirical literature identified and analyzed systematically. A conceptual framework is developed to integrate the studies.

The effect of RPI on performance through enhanced effort is positive; moreover, publicity and performance-dependent compensation strengthen the effect. However, RPI has also been found to increase sabotage among employees, and it can lead to less honest reporting. Future research could examine critical mediators and moderators of the RPI-performance relationship and thus complement the findings. Additionally, the effects of group-based RPI remain underrepresented. Future work could help to assess in greater detail how RPI interacts with culture and norms and whether RPI is due to personal expectations. There is also room for further research regarding the effects of RPI on cooperation, its consequences for learning, how it affects budgeting decisions and its implications for risk taking.

This paper presents the first literature review in the field of RPI. It provides synthesized knowledge about whether RPI is beneficial or detrimental to organizational performance.