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This paper introduces the volume on Resource Redeployment and Corporate Strategy, which is devoted to exploring a relatively new justification for how multi-business firms…
This paper introduces the volume on Resource Redeployment and Corporate Strategy, which is devoted to exploring a relatively new justification for how multi-business firms create value – having flexibility to internally redistribute non-financial resources across their businesses. We clarify how a theory around resource flexibility differs from other theories of how multi-business firms create value. We then synthesize the collection of papers in this volume and describe how they contribute to this line of inquiry. Finally, we offer our own views on opportunities for elaboration of this theory.
We examine a central tenet of real option theory – whether real options influence managerial thresholds for investment. In contrast to prior studies that have focused on…
We examine a central tenet of real option theory – whether real options influence managerial thresholds for investment. In contrast to prior studies that have focused on whether real options influence discrete investment decisions, our focus is on empirically isolating real options’ effects on thresholds. In particular, we examine the real options inherent in acquisition decisions. Our model posits that there are good reasons why we might expect there to be information asymmetry around the value of real options. Accordingly, if managers have unique information about growth options we might expect to observe them lowering their thresholds, perhaps to the point where they are willing to accept negative market returns. We further expect that the degree of information asymmetry for firm-specific growth options should be higher than for industry-specific growth options. Finally, we believe that managerial thresholds will be more prone to influence from growth options than deferment options. While thresholds are unobservable, we are able to isolate the effects of real options on acquisition thresholds by borrowing a method used originally in labor economics to isolate the determinants of reservation wages. Using a sample of over 28,000 acquisitions in the U.S., we find strong support for the model. These findings suggest that firms with low thresholds may choose to acquire despite comparatively low expected performance.
I am interested in clarifying the discussion of how researchers might try to isolate real option effects to identify whether managerial decisions are guided by a real option heuristic. If we are to claim that the theory of real options illuminates managerial behavior, then as a field, we must converge on an understanding as to what constitutes a real option effect, and what does not. The discussion centers on hypothesis development, measurement issues, and research methodology.
This study analyzes the trade‐off between strategic flexibility and commitment for cases of simultaneous and related strategic investments under high levels of…
This study analyzes the trade‐off between strategic flexibility and commitment for cases of simultaneous and related strategic investments under high levels of uncertainty. It develops a model that, using a Cournot game and real option theory, demonstrates that (1) a correlated strategic investment adds value to a portfolio of ongoing strategic investments in a decreasing marginal fashion, and (2) the new investment delays the development of the other investments. Managers who fail to recognize these properties may make strategic commitments that destroy value, even in the presence of options with individual positive values. An important feature of the model is that competitive advantages may flow from market power or from the capability of managing the portfolio.