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Article
Publication date: 19 June 2017

Jiaming Liu, Chong Wu and Tianyi Su

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the role of reference effect on newsvendor’s decision behavior in a market with strategic customers and work out the newsvendor’s…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the role of reference effect on newsvendor’s decision behavior in a market with strategic customers and work out the newsvendor’s optimal pricing policy and ordering quantity.

Design/methodology/approach

This study utilizes the prospect theory and strategic customer framework to analyze the decision-making behavior on the newsvendor’s optimal pricing policy and ordering quantity. The paper further presents an extension of newsvendor model and provides the model’s properties. The paper finally analyzes the results with various parameters on the model and reports on the insights generated by the model.

Findings

The paper indicates that the ordering quantity is not altered with the changing proportion of strategic customers and myopic customers, but the ordering quantity and the pricing strategy are influenced in terms of newsvendor’s reference effect, loss aversion, product cost, and salvage price.

Practical implications

The research findings have important implications for decision makers. Previous researches have studied the incomplete rationality newsvendor’s decision-making behavior mainly by analyzing the vendor’s risk preferences or loss aversion, but the effect of reference point also plays an important role in analyzing the decision-maker’s behavior. The paper provides the optimal pricing policy and ordering quantity with the reference effect considering the strategic customers behavior. This model is also a valid complementarity to behavioral operations management research area.

Originality/value

The paper examines the role of reference effect in newsvendor problem with the strategic customers and analyzes the impact of parameters such as loss aversion on the newsvendor’s decision behavior.

Details

Management Decision, vol. 55 no. 5
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0025-1747

Keywords

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Article
Publication date: 28 May 2021

Zhengtuo Wang, Yuetong Xu, Guanhua Xu, Jianzhong Fu, Jiongyan Yu and Tianyi Gu

In this work, the authors aim to provide a set of convenient methods for generating training data, and then develop a deep learning method based on point clouds to…

Abstract

Purpose

In this work, the authors aim to provide a set of convenient methods for generating training data, and then develop a deep learning method based on point clouds to estimate the pose of target for robot grasping.

Design/methodology/approach

This work presents a deep learning method PointSimGrasp on point clouds for robot grasping. In PointSimGrasp, a point cloud emulator is introduced to generate training data and a pose estimation algorithm, which, based on deep learning, is designed. After trained with the emulation data set, the pose estimation algorithm could estimate the pose of target.

Findings

In experiment part, an experimental platform is built, which contains a six-axis industrial robot, a binocular structured-light sensor and a base platform with adjustable inclination. A data set that contains three subsets is set up on the experimental platform. After trained with the emulation data set, the PointSimGrasp is tested on the experimental data set, and an average translation error of about 2–3 mm and an average rotation error of about 2–5 degrees are obtained.

Originality/value

The contributions are as follows: first, a deep learning method on point clouds is proposed to estimate 6D pose of target; second, a convenient training method for pose estimation algorithm is presented and a point cloud emulator is introduced to generate training data; finally, an experimental platform is built, and the PointSimGrasp is tested on the platform.

Details

Assembly Automation, vol. 41 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0144-5154

Keywords

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Article
Publication date: 31 October 2018

Tingting Zhou

The partial privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a dynamic process. The main feature of this process lies in not only gradual and sequential privatizations…

Abstract

Purpose

The partial privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a dynamic process. The main feature of this process lies in not only gradual and sequential privatizations but also privatized shares transfer. For partially privatized SOEs, the introduction of private sector ownership is not the end of the story because the previously introduced private owners may choose to leave the SOEs by transferring the privatized shares after privatization, a process that is called “privatized shares transfer”. This paper aims to investigate the determinants of privatized shares transfer (PST) from the perspective of large shareholders’ control rights.

Design/methodology/approach

Considering the pyramidal structure of Chinese listed companies, this paper extends existing analyses to study the impact of the ultimate controller’s control rights on privatized shares transfer. This paper also investigates the relationship between excessive control rights of the largest controlling shareholder and PST in view of the principle of equity of rights and obligations. In addition to a perspective on the holding of key positions by large shareholders, this paper further explores the impacts of the ownership of the largest controlling shareholder on privatized shares transfer.

Findings

The results capture the fact that the higher control rights of large shareholders lead to more privatized shares transfer. After exploring the impacts of excessive control rights, the results provide evidence supporting the idea that firms with excessive numbers of directors, senior managers or supervisors who also have positions in the largest controlling shareholder’s entity are more likely to transfer privatized shares owned by private owners. In addition, the largest shareholders’ ownership also plays a role in privatized shares transfer.

Originality/value

This evidence suggests that the large shareholders’ control rights should be limited to an appropriate range during the process of privatization, thereby giving private shareholders more opportunity to participate in the operation of firms, strengthen the state and enhance the competitiveness of state capital.

Details

Nankai Business Review International, vol. 9 no. 4
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 2040-8749

Keywords

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