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We examine a central tenet of real option theory – whether real options influence managerial thresholds for investment. In contrast to prior studies that have focused on whether real options influence discrete investment decisions, our focus is on empirically isolating real options’ effects on thresholds. In particular, we examine the real options inherent in acquisition decisions. Our model posits that there are good reasons why we might expect there to be information asymmetry around the value of real options. Accordingly, if managers have unique information about growth options we might expect to observe them lowering their thresholds, perhaps to the point where they are willing to accept negative market returns. We further expect that the degree of information asymmetry for firm-specific growth options should be higher than for industry-specific growth options. Finally, we believe that managerial thresholds will be more prone to influence from growth options than deferment options. While thresholds are unobservable, we are able to isolate the effects of real options on acquisition thresholds by borrowing a method used originally in labor economics to isolate the determinants of reservation wages. Using a sample of over 28,000 acquisitions in the U.S., we find strong support for the model. These findings suggest that firms with low thresholds may choose to acquire despite comparatively low expected performance.

Performance of firms in network industries depends much on the creation of standards around their technologies, products, or services. Establishing standards requires committing large, irreversible, upfront investment while demand remains uncertain. This paper focuses on the real options involved in this investment problem. The conventional real options literature recognizes the waiting-to-invest option where firms could avoid regret by waiting until at least some of the uncertainty is resolved. However, early commitment of network investment has vital strategic effects on shaping the expectations of potential users and inducing them to adopt the standard, thus creating a strategic growth option. We develop a simple model to explore the tradeoff between this strategic growth option and the waiting-to-invest option. We solve for the optimal investment rules and find that for high uncertainty, the strategic growth option often dominates the waiting-to-invest option and reduces the investment threshold. Furthermore, the intensity of network effect enhances the strategic growth option. Our results have important implications to the strategies of firms in technology industries.

I am interested in clarifying the discussion of how researchers might try to isolate real option effects to identify whether managerial decisions are guided by a real option heuristic. If we are to claim that the theory of real options illuminates managerial behavior, then as a field, we must converge on an understanding as to what constitutes a real option effect, and what does not. The discussion centers on hypothesis development, measurement issues, and research methodology.

Financial contagion refers to the propagation of shocks that can generate widespread failures. The authors apply a financial contagion model proposed by Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014) to a cross-shareholding network of firms in Ecuador. The authors use a novel dataset to study the potential channels for contagion. Although diversification is not high, results reveal enough conditions for a contagion event to occur. However, the low level of integration attenuates the effects of shocks. The authors run simulations affecting a particular firm at the time, and find that two firms coming from the finance and trade industry cause the highest contagion. In addition, when an entire industry receives a shock, trade and manufacturing industries contagion more companies than the rest. Finally, the model can assist policymakers to monitor the market and evaluate the fragility of the network in different scenarios.

This chapter provides a theoretical evaluation of entrepreneurial orientation (EO) to demonstrate some of its current shortcomings for being a construct to categorize entrepreneurial firms. To do this, we explore all the facets of how a firm can be entrepreneurial and the nuances of how firms can differ in their entrepreneurial approach, which EO currently does not capture. We argue that while EO’s rise in popularity stems from its simplicity, this simplicity has provided it with longevity challenges to keep up with evolving entrepreneurial behaviors within firms. We note these issues in hopes to extend the life of EO, and we provide future recommendations on how to put EO on that path.

This chapter addresses an unresolved theoretical issue in international business: the impact of existing, committed assets in a host location on parent and subsidiary decisions regarding the configuration of future value-adding activities for the location. We develop a measure of investment committedness, or the degree of flexibility versus specificity of existing assets in a host location, to explore this issue. The measure assesses whether assets, such as brands, human capital, process technologies, and supplier relations, retain only scrap value outside their current application or they can be redeployed to alternative value-adding activities in the host location or shifted offshore, either within the multinational enterprise (MNE) or to another user. The measure is a key step in developing a model of strategic choice for the future configuration of value-adding activities by MNEs in host locations. Drawing on firm-specific data from 237 MNE subsidiaries operating in Australia, we first present a traditional integration-responsiveness classification of subsidiary activities. This static snapshot of the subsidiaries’ current profiles is then compared with the measure's preliminary findings on the levels of investment committedness and strategic flexibility available to the sample MNEs and how this may shape strategic allocation decisions, including divestment and withdrawal.

Despite the importance of the processes by which legitimacy barriers to the emergence of new industries are overcome, direct study of them has been largely absent from the literature. We develop and test a model of how capacities for social action are created and deployed to overcome cultural barriers to new industries. Specifically, we argue that the experience that firms gain in field-relevant activity as well as the development and concentration of ties among those firms generate capacities to overcome the barriers of cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy. We support this argument empirically by linking measures of these factors with attention to and favorability assessments of the new industry.

This study examines the variety of cooperative strategies used to organize the international co-production of motion pictures. Motion picture production is a high-goal singularity, project-based industry in which the structure of relationships between companies involved in cooperative strategies is highly visible. Working from existing theories of co-production and drawing on the strategic joint ventures literature, I examine archival data, first for evidence of the strategies predicted by theory, and then for project participation strategies that theory does not account for. I identify four strategies on the basis of the ways that firms participate in international co-productions. A large number of relatively short-lived firms enact strategies of supplying resources and skills to the persistent firms dominate the industry. Two types of persistent firms cooperate with both direct competitors and complementors but pursue different markets, whereas a third type avoids cooperation with peers. The observed strategies constitute a hierarchy of strategic roles, and thus demonstrate the complexity of strategic behavior involved in project-based production.

In this chapter, we examine the impact of pay-for-performance incentives on learning-by-doing. We exploit personnel data on fruit pickers paid under two distinct compensation contracts: a standard piece rate plan and one with an extra one-time bonus tied to output. Under the latter, we observe bunching of performance just above the bonus threshold, suggesting workers distort their behavior in response to the discrete bonus. Such bunching behavior increases as workers gain experience. At the same time, the bonus contract induces considerable learning-by-doing for workers throughout the productivity distribution who presumably hope to one day hit the target, and these improvements significantly outweigh the losses to the firm from the bunching. In contrast, under the standard piece rate contract, we find minimal evidence of bunching and only small performance improvements at the bottom of the productivity distribution. Our results suggest that contract design can help foster learning on the job, underscoring the importance of dynamic considerations in principle-agent models.

Productivity growth in Italy has been persistently anemic and lagged that of the euro area over the period 1999–2015, while the indebtedness of its corporate sector increased. Using the ORBIS firm-level database, this chapter studies the long-term impact of persistent corporate-debt accumulation on the productivity growth of Italian firms, and investigates whether total factor productivity (TFP) growth varies with the level of corporate indebtedness. The authors employ a novel estimation technique proposed by Chudik, Mohaddes, Pesaran, & Raissi (2017) to account for dynamics, bi-directional feedback effects, cross-firm heterogeneity, and cross-sectional dependence arising from unobserved common factors (e.g., oil price shocks, labor and product market frictions, and the stance of the global financial cycle). Filtering out the effects of unobserved common factors and controlling for firm-specific characteristics, the authors find significant negative effects of persistent corporate-debt build-up on firms’ TFP growth on average, and weak evidence of a threshold level of corporate debt, beyond which productivity growth drops off significantly. The results have strong policy implications, for example the design of the tax system should discourage persistent corporate-debt accumulation, and effective and timely frameworks to reduce corporate-debt overhangs are essential.