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International regulators are due to finalize the New Basel Capital Accord by the end of 2003, for implementation by banks at the end of 2006. Basel II is a response to the need for reform of the regulatory system governing the global banking industry. In this article, we review the New Basel Capital Accord and summarize some of the main implications that we expect it to have on the European banking industry. As was the case for the first Basel Accord (Basel I), we conclude that not only will the new accord have an impact on the amount of book capital that banks are required to hold, but also on the strategic landscape of the banking industry.

Examines the rapid advances in risk measurement capabilities of financial institutions with the Basle Accord standards firmly in mind. Gives firm guidelines from the Basle Committee and recommendations and examples. States many financial institutions have developed methods for relating risk to capital, similar to the framework outlined in the recommendations. Looks at applications of economic capital and explores how these can be used to improve management decision making. Sums up that the need for financial institutions to design and implement what is required is pressing indeed.

This paper aims to investigates the argument that the financial case for continued internationalisation by telecommunication companies is unclear with respect to Deutsche Telekom, a leading international telecommunications company.

The international footprint of Deutsche Telekom is mapped over the period 1995-2013 (inclusive). Data are drawn from the annual reports of Deutsche Telekom as well as its principal subsidiaries. After mapping the international footprint, the financial dimension of this internationalisation is investigated to determine whether there are financial returns from continued international expansion.

The results demonstrate the extensive and complex nature of the international footprint of Deutsche Telekom. The company operates in 38 countries through a variety of lines of business, with its systems division being responsible for almost half of these countries. Although international markets now account for a majority of the company’s revenues, the lack of consistent data means that it is not clear whether the financial returns from internationalisation are positive.

The paper highlights the challenges of using annual reports as a source of data, as well as the difficulties of mapping the international operations of large multinationals like Deutsche Telekom.

The paper uniquely seeks to relate the international footprint of Deutsche Telekom to its financial performance.

The purpose of this research paper is to examine the implications of new banking regulations (Basel II) for the Irish SME sector. Training gaps are identified and recommendations to advance social capital networks are provided.

The Irish SME dependence on external (bank) finance and their susceptibility to legislative changes in that sector is explored through a survey of Irish SMEs. Additionally, banks' preparedness is investigated through semi‐structured interviews of five major banks, all serving the Irish SME sector.

The results show a high degree of Irish SME dependence on banks as a source of funding. Furthermore, there is evidence of increases in bank rates/charges over the past two years with limited switching between banks to avail of better rates. Moreover, the findings indicate that, while banks operating in the SME sector are on target for Basel II adoption, Irish SMEs remain unaware and unprepared for the possible implications of this change. The future competitive consequences for Irish banks that are slow to achieve sophisticated compliance with the new regulations are also discussed, in relation to their secondary effect on the SME sector.

The key contribution of this paper is that it highlights the need for Irish SMEs to proactively manage their potential funding sources. As part of the development of the necessary management skills, various training recommendations are made for Irish SMEs facing a more sophisticated global financial regulatory environment.

A representation in relation to a sale—written or in advertisements, films or labels or in the spoken word—may be (a) a mere expression of opinion or commendation by a seller of his wares; or (b) it may constitute part of the description of the thing sold; or (c) consist of a warranty. The law allows a certain latitude in the efforts to gain a purchaser; does not insist on the absolute truth of the commendatory expressions habitually used to induce people to buy. The flourishing expressions used by auctioneers and estate agents—“ this superlatively appointed residence ”—are commonplace examples of this recognised “puffing” of wares. “ Puffing ” in relation to sale is merely an extension of the everyday usage of accepting half‐truths, untruths or the conventional evasion of truth; even as part of the bedside manner, the splendide mendax, of the doctor! What constitutes the upper limit of permissible misrepresentations such as these is by no means clear, either in civil law or in the growing body of statutory law regulating trade descriptions and advertisements of recent years, for here, as with so much law relating to sale, there is that same cleavage between civil rights of action and prosecutions to inflict penalties for statutory offences.

A process improvement sampling methodology, known as process variation diagnostic tool (PROVADT), was proposed by Cox et al. (2013). The method was designed to support the objectivity of Six Sigma projects performing the measure-analyse phases of the define-measure-analyse-improve-control cycle. An issue in PROVADT is that it is unable to distinguish between measurement and product variation in the presence of a poor Gage repeatability and reproducibility (R&R) result. The purpose of this paper is to improve and address PROVADT’s sampling structure by enabling a true Gage R&R as part of its design.

This paper derives an enhanced PROVADT method by examining the theoretical sampling constraints required to perform a Gage R&R study. The original PROVADT method is then extended to fulfil these requirements. To test this enhanced approach, it was applied first to a simulated manufacturing process and then in two industry case studies.

The results in this paper demonstrates that enhanced PROVADT was able to achieve a full Gage R&R result. This required 20 additional measurements when compared to the original method, but saved up to ten additional products and 20 additional measurements being taken in future experiments if the original method failed to obtain a valid Gage R&R. These benefits were highlighted in simulation and industry case studies.

The work into the PROVADT method aims to improve the objectivity of early Six Sigma analyses of quality issues, which has documented issues.

This paper aims to demonstrate how consolidation within Europe’s mobile telecommunication markets requires willing buyers and sellers.

After highlighting the resurgence in merger and acquisition (M & A) activity in mobile telecommunications, the paper draws on a variety of secondary sources to analyse the strategies of three companies.

The paper highlights the interwoven nature of the strategies of three companies: BT, Hutchison Whampoa and Telefónica. BT has returned to the mobile telecommunications market in the UK, with the company it did not acquire being purchased by Hutchison. As Hutchison implements a “double or quits” strategy in Europe, it has acquired operations from Telefónica, which, in turn, has exited most of its non-Spanish European operations to focus on Latin America.

The paper relies on secondary data and thus highlights the challenges of doing so and the need for more information regarding M & As to be in the public domain.

There is a need to adopt a sector-wide or regional approach for analysing the strategies of telecommunication companies.

The paper uniquely provides an overview of three corporate strategies to show how they interact with one another.

By the beginning of the war, Germany's over‐all self‐sufficiency in food had reached a level of approximately 83 per cent., on the peace‐time basis of 2,200—2,400 calories per person per day. In respect to some types of food, however, the situation was not satisfactory. For example, before the war she produced approximately 73 per cent. of fish requirements, 12 per cent. of corn, 50 per cent. of legumes, and 60 per cent. of fat within her own boundaries. The country could be fed at a reduced level by the produce raised within its own boundaries if food were perfectly controlled and evenly distributed. However, in practice, individual provinces were much less favourably situated in this respect. Western Germany, an area of relatively small and diversified farms, was critically dependent on the eastern provinces for its flour, grain, and potato supplies. It is clear that all German civilians could be fed at a uniform level of adequacy during a war only by control of the country's food supply at the national level and by the continued operation of the new transportation network of the country. For this reason the bombing of rail and inland water transportation facilities became such a serious threat to national uniformity in food distribution. Of the many kinds of centralised food processing industries known in the United States, only a few played an important role in the food supply of German civilians. The principal examples of these were grain milling, sugar production and refining, and the large bakeries of urban areas. The damage or destruction of these facilities, incidental to air attack on other industrial targets, seriously decreased their production capacity. Bombing destroyed the mills for processing 9 per cent. of the German rye output and 35 per cent. of the wheat output. Of the sugar refineries four plants producing 300,000 tons annually, were destroyed. This represents a 38 per cent. decrease in production of sugar. Similarly bombing of chemical plants was largely responsible for the decrease in the supply for fertiliser nitrogen. In 1939, 718,000 tons of fertiliser nitrogen were available, but by 1945 this had decreased to 140,000 tons. The significance of this destruction of facilities vital to the feeding of a country already on a border‐line diet is ominous. Reliable estimates indicate that aerial bombings destroyed 35 per cent. of Germany's total (approximately 460,000 square metres) cold storage capacity. The increased use of cold storage intensified their dependence on transportation and on the continuity of the power supply. Aerial attack, as a result, not only decreased usable cold storage space, but also seriously interfered with the operation of the remaining space by impeding shipments and interrupting sources of power. It was the constantly reiterated opinion of all food officials that the bomb destruction of the transportation network was the largest single factor contributing to the disruption of the food supply. Bulk shipments which had been carried on inland waterways were seriously impeded by the bombing of canals. Aerial attack against railway lines, bridges and terminal facilities caused widespread interruptions in service and destroyed rolling stock, freight en route and handling facilities at terminals. It is not possible at this time to state exactly in what measure the curtailment of the national diet contributed to the ultimate defeat of Germany. The evidence available indicates, however, that it was an important factor. There is in any case no doubt that strategic bombing is the major element contributing to the present shortage of food in Germany. It was not apparent that the Germans considered the vitamin and mineral content of food in determining the ration allowances of the people. Immediately with the beginning of the war, all the principal foods were rationed, so that the lack of recognition of the importance of the vitamin and mineral content of this ration actually was an additional point of vulnerability for the German diet. With a food economy so vulnerable it is not surprising to have found that the basic food rationing programme was abandoned early in 1945 when the destruction of transport and communications by the strategic air offensive attained major proportions. This necessitated falling back on the inadequate system of regional self‐supply. The destruction of large food stocks, processing plants and cold storage plants by bombing also contributed to the general deterioration of the German food supply. There is ample evidence for the conclusion that as a result of the strategic air offensive the nutritional demands for the continued health of the German people could not be met.