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After a brief review of the origins of this work, a theory of the emotional/relational origins of male violence is outlined, and illustrated by episodes in Hitler’s life…
After a brief review of the origins of this work, a theory of the emotional/relational origins of male violence is outlined, and illustrated by episodes in Hitler’s life. Drawing on earlier work on aggression and violence, I propose that three conditions lead to rage and violence: (1) No affectional attachments. (2) A single overarching obsession. (3) Complete repression of shame. Key features of the theory are illustrated by details in Hitler biographies. This case suggests a way in which emotions unite leaders and led, leading to collective violence. Finally, a method that would provide a preliminary test of the theory is suggested.
Confidence, trust and loyalty are three social emotions necessary respectively for the social processes of agency, cooperation and organization. In addition to the centrality of emotion in social life, an examination of these emotions demonstrates the importance of future‐time in social structure. Temporality is seldom discussed in the sociological literature, but unavoidable in a consideration of confidence, trust and loyalty. An examination of confidence, trust and loyalty from the perspective of temporality clarifies issues of social rationality and indicates some of the limitations of rational choice theory.
Following Darwin, Plutchik's psychoevolutionary theory defines emotions as adaptive reactions to stimuli. While his ‘stimulus’ stands as an unanalyzed psychological…
Following Darwin, Plutchik's psychoevolutionary theory defines emotions as adaptive reactions to stimuli. While his ‘stimulus’ stands as an unanalyzed psychological construct, he does explicate four existential problems of life ‐ territoriality, hierarchy, temporality, and identity ‐ each of which can present itself as positive or negative, as an opportunity or a problem. Plutchik's four existential problems can be generalized into Fiske's (1991) four elementary relations of the social life ‐ market pricing, authority ranking, communal sharing, and equality matching, respectively. A set of propositions is presented, according to which the predicted values of particular emotions are proportional to power functions of the products of pairs of social relations variables. With the measurement of just eight social relations variables, the general, formal, socioevolutionary theory makes it possible to predict the level of each of the eight primary emotions and of the 28 secondary emotions that are mixed pairs of primary emotions. The possibility that jealousy is a mix of three primary emotions ‐ fear, sadness, and surprise ‐ is discussed.
Scheff (1990, p. 4) describes the maintenance of bonds as the most crucial human motive. He argues that while “money, power, sex, and other such externals may appear to be…
Scheff (1990, p. 4) describes the maintenance of bonds as the most crucial human motive. He argues that while “money, power, sex, and other such externals may appear to be motives in themselves,” the “fundamental” motive even in these cases is “maintenance or enhancement of one's standing in the eyes of others” (Scheff, 1990, p. 8). From this perspective, people who want money usually don’t want it to buy a hot tub or a car, but so that their friends and family members will be proud of them. People don’t want power to influence policy decisions, but so that they can attain the respect of their fellows. People don’t look for sexual release in their relationships with others, but want to be loved.
As institutional theory increasingly looks to the micro-level for explanations of macro-level institutional processes, institutional scholars need to pay closer attention…
As institutional theory increasingly looks to the micro-level for explanations of macro-level institutional processes, institutional scholars need to pay closer attention to the role of emotions in invigorating institutional processes. I argue that attending to emotions is most likely to enrich institutional analysis, if scholars take inspiration from theories that conceptualize emotions as relational and inter-subjective, rather than intra-personal, because the former would be more compatible with institutional theory’s relational roots. I review such promising theories that include symbolic interactionism, psychoanalytic and psychodynamic perspectives, moral psychology, and social movements. I conclude by outlining several possible research questions that might be inspired by attending to the role of emotions in institutional processes. I argue that such research can enrich the understanding of embedded agency, power, and the use of theorization by institutional change agents, as well as introduce a hereto neglected affective facet into the study of institutional logics.
The centrality of emotions to all significant social, indeed human activities is now broadly acknowledged. Nevertheless, discussion of emotions in core activities of science, as distinct from the motivation of scientists, is undeveloped. In reviewing the role of emotions in science the paper shows that emotions provide consciousness of objects of scientific relevance. It is also shown that emotions necessary to scientific activities are typically experienced nonconsciously. These two issues, of emotional consciousness and nonconscious experience of emotion, raise a number of questions for the study of both consciousness and emotions.
Erving Goffman has been variously interpreted as a symbolic interactionist, a structural functionalist, or an a-structural power-game theorist. However, when considering…
Erving Goffman has been variously interpreted as a symbolic interactionist, a structural functionalist, or an a-structural power-game theorist. However, when considering Goffman’s affiliation with the human ecology (HEC) of Robert Park and Everett Hughes, one is able to shed new light on Goffman’s relationship to the aforementioned sociological paradigms. This chapter will demonstrate that his Darwinist underpinnings and overall implicit evolutionary perspective allowed him to develop a dramaturgical theory that explicates how actors are able to understand, predict, anticipate, accommodate to, and influence others while pursuing one’s own or own group’s interests, through one or more of role “taking,” “playing,” and “making.” Furthermore, Goffman elaborates upon Park’s use of dramaturgy, following him in making more room for competition and inequalities in status and power, and offering new dimensions and categories for specifying when and why different adaptive strategies will be used, within different types and degrees of accommodation. Ecological dramaturgy is the term we give to these interdependent lines of social action within stratification contexts. Such structural concerns ultimately separate Goffman from the more subjective and less deductive elements of traditional symbolic interactionist thought. We argue that Goffman’s much neglected ecological and evolutionary-minded approach to role-taking and its inspired analysis of competitive interactive processes provide a missing link in better understanding his complicated intellectual heritage.