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This case study examines how incentive pay programs are designed and changed over time in a financial organization that has typically relied on fixed salary compensation. Once incentive programs are introduced, pay plans change frequently, and this process allows the study of assumptions embedded in various incentive theories. Economic theories tend to explain incentives from an agency perspective, which suggests that incentives satisfy elaborate contractual requirements and vary with the risk preferences and costs of managers versus employees. Power theories, by contrast, argue that the interests and resources of various firm groups determine incentive structures. For this case study, qualitative data describing a firm’s process of changing compensation were gathered from documents, personnel manuals, and interviews with company managers. The findings suggest that instead of following from complicated cost‐benefit analyses, pay plans are often implemented within short time frames and with scant performance/effectiveness information. This evidence highlights the influence of power in efforts to change compensation structures and the importance of a multidisciplinary understanding of rewards.

The choice of proper incentives is a critical step in designing strategic planning systems. Incentives should integrate the behavior and action of managers with the objectives and strategies of their firms. The problem of inappropriate incentives in various types of organizations has been described by Kerr. While the literature on incentives is voluminous, the linkage between incentives and strategic planning has not been carefully explored. We propose a model that connects a firm's incentive systems with its strategic context, using incentives theory in the economics literature as basic building blocks.

In this chapter we use data from industrial plants to find out whether seniority-based pay is used as a motivational device for production workers. Alternatively, seniority-based pay could simply be a wage-setting rule independent of incentives. Unlike previous papers, we use a direct measure of seniority-based pay as well as measures of monitoring devices and explicit incentives. We find that those firms that base their wages partly on seniority are less likely to offer explicit incentives. They are also less likely to invest in monitoring devices. We also discover that these companies are more likely to engage in other human resource management policies, which result in long employment relationships. Overall these results suggest that seniority-based pay is indeed used as a motivational device.

Incentives are effective at enhancing productivity, but research also suggests that performance incentives can have “unintended negative consequences” including increases in hazard/injuries, increases in errors, and reduction in cooperation, prosocial behaviors, and creativity. Relatively overlooked is whether, when, and how incentives can be designed to prevent such negative consequences. The authors review literature in several disciplines (construction, healthcare delivery, economics, psychology, and [some] management) on this issue. This chapter, in toto, sheds a generally positive light and suggests that, beyond productivity, incentives can be used to improve other outcomes such as safety, quality, prosocial behaviors, and creativity, particularly when the incentives are thoughtfully designed. The review concludes with several potential fruitful areas for future research such as investigations of incentive-effect duration.

The purpose of this paper is to map corporate disclosure theories as a step towards filling a gap in the theoretical background for corporate disclosure research. The purpose of the map is to encompass a range of particular theories relating to corporate disclosure and to demonstrate the complex relationships between different notions of the financial disclosure phenomenon. This will help new researchers to understand how particular corporate disclosure theories are related, as well as help with teaching accounting theories at undergraduate and postgraduate level.

A deductive and inductive approach to theory building was applied. The deductive approach suggests identifying the gap in the literature, the inductive approach then prescribes theory building in three stages: phenomenon observation, categorisation and relationship building. This approach serves to develop a theoretical map integrating the corporate disclosure theories.

The paper discusses theories that recognise actual features of financial markets – market failure, information asymmetry and adverse selection – to provide an explanation for the existence of corporate reporting regulations and managerial incentives, which control and determine the maximum level of corporate information under these conditions. It then integrates these theories in a map seeking to explain corporate disclosure levels, mandatory and voluntary, financial and narrative. A combination of theoretical supplements – codification theory, Dye's theory of mandatory and voluntary disclosure, and disclosure transformation theory – are proposed in this framework as theories to explain processes of change in mandatory and voluntary corporate disclosure in practice.

Another benefit mapping these theories is to provide useful insights into existing disclosure theories, which may help to explain why some empirical results have been inconsistent with the predictions of these theories. No similar attempts have been published in the accounting literature.

Local public officials rely on tax and non-tax incentive packages to develop their economies. No conclusive evidence supports the economic improvement incentives afford. We investigate, with an experimental approach, the political reasons public officials use tax incentives. The experiment uses simulation gaming to model local economic development as an auction, in that way permitting us to compare the impact that motives, goals, and contexts have on outcomes. Our findings suggest that the majority of economic development competitors fall victim to the “winner’s curse”-overestimating and overbidding the potential payoff for business development.

The purpose of this paper is to address two research questions: which are the key factors that stimulate entrepreneurs to invest in ecopreneurship, and how ecopreneurhsip contributes to environmental sustainability.

To answer these questions, a framework has been developed to identify the incentives that lead entrepreneurs to invest in firms in the ecopreneurship through institutional and resource-based thinking.

From a survey of 91 Greek firms from the green service sector, it is shown that some specific institutional and resource-based view factors play a critical role in green entrepreneurs’ decisions, as well as some certain environmental practices that are frequently used by entrepreneurs to address environmental issues.

First, the answer of the second research question through data collected by a questionnaire survey may be faced with skepticism by some authors, as it could be seen that entrepreneurs and managers of firms could have overstated their company's environmental activities. Second, although the sample selection of 91 firms is a representative sample (response rate 12.35 percent) of the total population of Greek green firms (761) and equal to other relative studies, a higher number of firms and a wider variety of green entrepreneurship ventures is necessary in future research.

The findings are useful for scholars, practitioners and policy makers since it provide information regarding the behavior of green entrepreneurs.

The paper analyze the types of green entrepreneurs in relation to the different features and strategies which are emerged from two theories, such as institutional and resource-based theory.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the adverse incentives at the front end of government-funded projects with concentrated benefits and no liabilities for the privileged groups. In particular, the author discusses the risk of perverse incentives of the types typically found in the development aid sector that results in counterproductive outcomes.

The paper uses a simple conceptual framework based on agency theory. A qualitative, case-based approach with purposive sampling was chosen for the empirical part of the study. Eight Norwegian projects were selected because incentive problems were to be expected, and one development aid project served as a reference case.

The paper finds that low strategic project success corresponded well with the terms of financing. There were clear indications of agency problems, in three cases to the extent that the incentives turned perverse. The paper concludes with a discussion of relevant measures to prevent the emergence of perverse incentives.

The paper contributes to an improved understanding of the incentives related to public project initiation and selection, which is an under-researched topic and generally not included in formal project governance schemes. The research should therefore be useful to scholars as well as practitioners within the field of project governance.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationships between market mavenism, tourists’ cocreation experience, loyalty and the mediating role of travel incentives in the post-COVID-19 tourism environment in the context of vaxication intentions in Turkey.

This study used covariance-based structural equation modeling to empirically test the proposed hypotheses. A total of 348 respondents participated in the survey.

The findings of this study support the assumption that market mavenism (MM) engage in cocreating and sharing travel experiences (CCTE). Furthermore, the study reveals that market mavens tend to demonstrate loyalty (LTY) toward service providers when engaging in cocreation with travel industry professionals. In addition, the study establishes the significant mediating effect of travel incentives (TI) between MM and vaxication intention (VI).

The study uses the theory of planned behavior to examine tourists’ intentions for vaxication and the psychological factors influencing their decisions, while also using the macro–micro theory to explore industry-level factors like market mavens and customer engagement, leading to a comprehensive understanding of COVID-19 vaccination and tourism behavior. Further research is needed to address limitations such as country diversity, multiple locations and service providers, online behavior analysis, authenticity perception and identification of market mavens’ personality traits and travel preferences.

This study contributes to the scholarly literature in several ways. First, it explores the influence of market mavens on tourism experience cocreation and customer loyalty during the postpandemic era. Second, it empirically examines the mediating role of travel incentives, adding to the understanding of market mavens and vaccination intentions. Lastly, the study addresses the implications during and after the COVID-19 for managers and service providers in the tourism industry.

The purpose of this research paper is to study attitudinal responses to the tone of a voluntary disclosure. It is known that tone can affect market response. Existing literature assumes that investors' attitudes mediate these effects, but these attitudinal mediators have not been directly measured. The authors are especially interested in cases where a firm is reporting poor financial results. The purpose is to trace the mechanism and conditions under which tone affects the credibility of a voluntary disclosure.

The authors conducted a 2 × 2 between-subjects study that manipulates financial performance (good/bad) and tone (positive/negative). The attitudinal dependent variable is the credibility of the management discussion, with persuasive intent as a mediator of the effects of tone on credibility.

In the case of bad financial results, a positive tone has a negative effect on credibility as the authors predict. This effect is fully mediated by perceived “persuasive intent”. In the case of good financial performance, credibility is higher when management adopts a positive tone, even though there, too, subjects perceive the persuasive intent.

The research paper establishes a bridge between the communications and finance literature on the effect of tone in voluntary disclosures. The empirical findings provide initial evidence and new detail regarding an attitudinal response (credibility) that the finance literature often assumes is responsible for mediating market responses to voluntary disclosures. One unexpected finding with interesting implications is that positive tone increases credibility in the case of good news. The implication is that a firm may indulge in taking a victory lap to celebrate good news, without harming the credibility of their corporate communications. Additional research is warranted that combines theory and methods from communications and finance, to further elaborate the attitudinal mechanisms behind the market effects of tone in voluntary disclosures.

At the most general level, the original contribution is the creation of a theoretical and methodological bridge between the communications and finance literature, regarding the effect of tone in voluntary disclosures. This research proposes an integrated theoretical framework, in which the concept of incentives shapes the relationships between the firm's financial situation, a disclosure's tone and its credibility. Methodologically, the authors employ an experimental method, which is more typical in the communications literature, to illuminate the attitudinal effects of tone that are frequently mentioned and assumed in the finance literature.