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Boards of directors often attempt to foster corporate entrepreneurship by replacing a firmʼs chief executive officer (CEO). Compelling theoretical arguments and anecdotal evidence suggest that when firm performance has suffered, a new CEO is best suited to lead the firmʼs creative endeavors. On the other hand, among firms that retain their existing CEO after a decline in performance, manipulating the CEOʼs compensation package is a common governance practice used by boards to encourage innovation. In these cases, some have argued that increasing the CEOʼs pay will encourage corporate entrepreneurship, because the CEO has been compensated for assuming additional risk. Counter to these propositions, this study develops theoretical arguments that a firmʼs existing CEO is better equipped to foster corporate entrepreneurship and that this probability increases when the CEOʼs cash compensation is decreased. Results from a sample of 100 single-product manufacturing firms suggest firms that retain their current CEO and decrease the CEOʼs cash compensation are most likely to engage in corporate entrepreneurship. Implications that this research has for corporate entrepreneurship, corporate governance, and firm performance are discussed.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how game theoretic solution concepts inform what classes of problems will be amenable to artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML), and how to evolve the interaction between human and artificial intelligence.

The approach addresses the development of operational gaming to support planning and decision making. It then provides a succinct summary of game theory for those designing and using games, with an emphasis on information conditions and solution concepts. It addresses how experimentation demonstrates where human decisions differ from game theoretic solution concepts and how games have been used to develop AI/ML. It concludes by suggesting what classes of problems will be amenable to AI/ML, and which will not. It goes on to propose a method for evolving human/artificial intelligence.

Game theoretic solution concepts inform classes of problems where AI/ML 'solutions' will be suspect. The complexity of the subject requires a campaign of learning.

Though games have been essential to the development of AI/ML, practitioners have yet to employ game theory to understand its limitations.

The paper discusses the rationale for a widespread reliance on Codes of Conduct (CoC) in European crowdfunding through the lenses of economic theories of self-regulation. By analysing the institutional design of CoCs in crowdfunding, the paper illustrates the differences in their regulatory context, inclusiveness, monitoring and enforcement. It offers the first systematic overview of substantial rules of CoCs in crowdfunding.

A comparative case study of nine CoCs in Europe is used to illustrate differences in their institutional design and discern the economic purpose of the CoC.

The institutional design of different CoCs in Europe mainly supports voluntary theories of self-regulation. In particular, the theory of reputation commons has the most explanatory power. The substantial rules of CoC in different markets show the potential sources of market failure through the perspectives of platforms.

CoCs appear in various regulatory, cultural, and industry contexts of different countries. Some of the institutional design features of CoC might be a result of these characteristics.

Crowdfunding associations wishing to develop their own CoC may learn from a comparative overview of key provisions.

For governments in Europe, contemplating creating or revising bespoke crowdfunding regimes, the paper identifies areas where crowdfunding platforms perceive market failure.

This paper is the first systematic study of self-regulatory institutions in European crowdfunding. The paper employs a theoretical framework for the analysis of self-regulation in crowdfunding and provides a comparison of a regulatory context, inclusiveness, monitoring and enforcement of different CoCs in Europe.

Stakeholder capitalism (SC) advocates that organisations should focus on creating long-term value for all key stakeholders rather than maximising short-term profits for shareholders. This paper aims to explore whether and how business organisations have applied stakeholder capitalism principles (SCPs) during the COVID-19 pandemic and how these efforts were communicated in integrated reports.

This study is based on the content analysis of the text extracted from the integrated reports of 22 companies categorised as excellent in the 2020 EY Excellence in Integrated Reporting Award 2020. The research material consisted of paragraphs that reflected how the company observed the SCPs in practice.

The stakeholder responsibility principle was the most represented by the examined companies, followed by the principles of continuous creation, stakeholder engagement and stakeholder cooperation. The COVID-19 pandemic has propelled the necessity of implementing innovative solutions to counteract the virus's spread. It has also spurred the need for two-way digitalised communication between the executives and stakeholders. The new situation also required collaborative approaches in the forms of partnerships, joint initiatives and programmes to ensure employee safety and help communities recover from the social and economic impacts of the pandemic.

This study links SC with integrated reporting (IR) and contributes to the literature by providing new insights into how SCPs have been applied during the COVID-19 pandemic. This discussion suggests that whereas these principles determine how the companies must act to satisfy stakeholders expectations, integrating reporting may help develop a report that is stakeholder-oriented and which responds to their information needs.