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The purpose of this paper is to explore the extent to which formal logic can be applied to conflict analysis and resolution. It is motivated by the idea that conflicts can be understood as inconsistent sets of interests.

A simple propositional model, based on propositional logic, which can be used to analyze conflicts, has been introduced and four algorithms have been presented to generate possible solutions to a conflict. The model is illustrated by applying it to the conflict between the Obama administration and the Syrian Government in September 2013 over the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons programme.

The author shows how different solutions, such as compromises, minimally invasive solutions or solutions compatible with certain pre-defined norms, can be generated by the model. It is shown how the model can operate in situations where the game-theoretic model fails due to a lack of information about the parties’ utility values.

The model can be used as a theoretical framework for future experimental research and/or to trace the course of particular conflict scenarios.

The model can be used as the basis for building software applications for conflict resolution practitioners, such as negotiators or mediators.

While the idea of using logic to analyse the structure of conflicts and generate possible solutions is not new to the field of conflict studies, the model presented in this paper provides a novel way of understanding conflicts for both researchers and practitioners.

This chapter presents first a theoretical model of conflict between two agents characterised by a two-sector economy. In a contested sector, two agents struggle to appropriate the maximum possible fraction of a contestable output. In an uncontested sector, they hold secure property rights over the production of some goods. Agents split their resource endowment between ‘butter’, ‘guns’ and ‘ice-cream’. Eventually, tradable goods made of both butter and ice-cream produced by conflicting parties are sold to the rest of the world. Therefore, the opportunity cost of conflict depends also on the relative profitability of contested and uncontested production. In particular, productivity of uncontested production and profitability of contested sectors are countervailing forces. The empirical section focused on a panel of Sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1995–2006. Results are not fully conclusive. However, there is robust evidence that prices of manufactures (interpreted as the uncontested ice-cream) are negatively associated with the likelihood of a civil war. Eventually, international price of manufactures is also associated with a higher GDP per capita growth rate. The concluding remark seems to be that an increase in world prices of manufactures would make civil wars less likely.

In spite of the large body of literature on success factors of enterprise resource planning (ERP) implementation, there is a need to explore its multinational dimension. The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of the conflict between parent and subsidiary on the process of ERP implementation in a multinational enterprise (MNE).

Using an interpretive case study methodology, this paper analyses the theoretical frameworks of parent-subsidiary conflict and applies them to interpret an in-depth case study and generate a set of managerial prescriptions.

Theoretical analysis and case evidence suggest that managing parent-subsidiary conflict is a critical success factor of ERP implementation in MNEs.

This case relates to a diversified multinational group producing a variety of materials through subsidiaries. The data collection includes multiple sources in the company, and strong theoretical development provides a high level of generalizability. The paper shows that managers should consider the impact of conflict from the planning stages of any multinational ERP implementation.

A detailed set of practical managerial prescriptions is derived from case and theoretical analysis. These prescriptions provide guidance to multinational managers planning a successful global ERP rollout.

Although parent-subsidiary conflict is clearly a major factor in multinational ERP implementations, this topic has never been analysed in detail in the literature. This paper breaks new ground applying grounded theoretical frameworks of parent-subsidiary conflict to an implementation case, and providing managerial guidance for implementation decisions.

This paper aims to examine the role of outside peacekeepers in a bilateral conflict.

The authors build upon a trade theoretic framework by incorporating disruptions due to war, which could affect directly the return to investment, both domestic and foreign, and by introducing explicitly peacekeeping forces into the model. Two countries are engaged in a war, with the purpose of capturing capital. A third country plays a dual role: it is the source of investments in the warring countries, and it deploys soldiers on ground for peacekeeping purposes. The authors consider the cases where the levels of foreign investments are exogenous and when they are endogenously determined by free mobility conditions. In the worst case, they find that foreign investment reduces conflict. In the case of endogenous foreign investments, they examine the effect of multilateral agreements where the two warring countries reduce their number of soldiers and the third increases the number of peacekeepers.

The authors find that the reform benefits all three countries and increases the level of foreign investments. They consider the cases of exogenous and endogenous foreign direct investment (FDI). In the first case, the authors examine the effect of an exogenous increase in FDI on the war equilibrium and find that it reduces the employment of soldiers in the warring countries and increases the size of the peacekeeping force. They also find that the first-best level of peacekeeping is larger than the equilibrium level. When FDI is endogenous, starting from the initial war equilibrium, they also examine the effect of a multilateral agreement in which the size of the peacekeeping force is increased by the third country and the two warring countries agree to reduce their war efforts. The authors find that the reform makes all three countries better off and increases the level of FDI.

The paper uses a theoretical model with third-party interventions in a bilateral war. It intends to shed light on some of the missing economic implications of peacekeeping. The paper introduces explicitly peacekeeping forces into the analysis and introduces a factor that represents a disruption to return on investment in both warring countries. The third country has a dual role; it provides investments in the warring countries and deploys soldiers for peacekeeping. Peacekeeping reduces the disruption mentioned above and affects the employment of soldiers by the warring countries. The authors find that a multilateral agreement in which the two warring countries reduce their war efforts and the third party increases its peacekeeping force can increase welfare in all three countries.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of four policy options for the international community to help resolve conflicts involving black diamonds: foreign aid, a tax arms exports, a tax on blood diamond and a tax on diamond exports in general from the war zones.

A trade‐theoretic model of two open economies which are in conflict with each other was constructed. War efforts, which involve the use of soldiers and arms, are determined endogenously. The purpose of war is the capture of land containing a natural resource like diamond, but the costs are that lives are lost and production sacrificed. The capture of mining land helps to reinforce the war by using profits from the sale of the natural resource to purchase arms.

The paper identifies the role of the “protective” nature of arms, and of income effects of the policy instruments, on the results. For example, foreign aid is found, unambiguously, to increase war when the entire profit from the sale of blood diamond is used to buy arms. But, when the proportion of profits from blood diamond used to buy arms is chosen optimally, foreign aid increases war efforts when arms are significantly protective of soldiers' lives.

This paper helps to understand conflicts, the resolutions of which have serious social implications for the conflict‐torn areas of the world.

This paper provides the international community with an analysis of policy options for dealing with blood diamond. It shows, for example, that controlling supply of arms can be as effective as discouraging the consumption of blood diamond.

The purpose of the chapter is to describe the concept of conflicts of socio-economic systems on the basis of the theory and methodology of the systemic approach.

The authors use the provisions of the systemic approach.

It is determined that dynamic socio-economic system is susceptible to conflicts, which, according to the Systemic approach, are bifurcation points. The features of conflict that allow defining it as a bifurcation point are its short duration, violation of sustainability of socio-economic system, uncertainty of consequences, influence on the system on the whole (cascade effect), and multiplicity of scenarios of development of socio-economic system after the conflict.

Studying conflict with the help of the theory and methodology of the systemic approach allowed determining the fact that conflict is a violation of order in a socio-economic system (which specifies definition of conflict and its essence) and could be evaluated through the measure of the system’s order (which specifies methodology of conflict evaluation). Moreover, conflict in a socio-economic system emerges not at once – it is accumulated under joint negative influences of internal and external factors. Further, the performed research allows specifying the classification of conflicts, which is offered in previous chapters – according to scenarios of development of socio-economic system after the conflict, normal (leading to normal change of system), abrupt (leading to abrupt change of the system), and attraction (all following states of the system are sustainable) conflicts are possible.

The purpose of this paper is to build theory and present a model of the development of conflicts in teams.

The paper develops a conceptual model based on past theory and research.

The model brings a multi-level perspective to the process of intragroup conflict by showing the mechanisms by which an interpersonal, dyadic conflict can spread to other team members over time through a process of conflict contagion.

This study provides a new model for conflict escalation and it sheds light on factors which can either ameliorate or exacerbate the speed and extent of conflict contagion. The repercussions of different degrees of conflict involvement within a team are discussed.

The study of war and peace is nowadays becoming a complex topic drawing from different disciplines and applying different methodologies. This book collects 10 studies on conflict and its pernicious consequences. The appropriate scientific field for this set of studies is the peace economics as defined in Isard (1994), Arrow (1995) and Caruso (2010). In particular, Peace Economics is a sub-field of Peace Science and it is generally concerned with (1) the economic determinants of actual and potential conflicts; (2) the impact of conflict on welfare and on the economic behaviour of societies; (3) the use of economic measures to cope with and control conflicts whether economic or not. Central to this field are analyses of conflicts amongst nations, regions and other communities of the world; measures to control (deescalate) arms races and achieve reduction in military expenditures; programmes and policies to utilize resources thus released for more constructive purposes. Put briefly, the main object of peace economics is the study of conflict and conflict resolution in different forms. In particular, the contents of this book are mainly on the positive ‘side’ of Peace Economics, which emphasizes the study of conflict and its consequences. In particular, in the recent years, a growing economic literature has uncovered both the economic determinants and consequences of actual intra-state conflicts. This book is intended to be a contribution to this literature. It gathers both theoretical and empirical contributions.

Most studies of conflict handling styles in organizations analyze these styles separately. These studies assume that individuals are oriented towards the use of one of the styles of conflict management. As a result, different styles are compared one by one as if they were independent. In contrast, from a more all‐embracing perspective people are seen as adopting configurations of styles. The interest in this alternative perspective lies in exploring the relations between these styles, how they combine and form patterns of conflict styles. This article presents an exploratory study that seeks to identify empirically the specific combinations of conflict handling styles that result in differentiated patterns within groups of managers. By using hierarchical and non‐hierarchical cluster analyses of a sample of managers, different patterns of conflict management were identified. The effectiveness of each of the resulting patterns was analyzed in terms of its influence on the parties' joint substantive outcomes and their mutual relationship. Results show that patterns using multiple conflict handling styles were more effective than patterns based on a single style.