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For more than nine decades, the Jewish–Palestinian conflict has dominated all aspects of life in the Arab world. The Arabs have disregarded and neglected their political, economic, and social development since 1916 because of their obsession with defeating the Jews or driving them into the sea. When the Arab armies collectively failed to destroy the newly established Jewish state in 1948, the dynamics of the conflict changed. On the one hand, Arab rationalists such as King Abdullah ibn al-Husyan (King Abdullah-I) (d 1951) of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (HKJ) suggested accepting the United Nations Partition Plan as proposed by the UN General Assembly on November 29, 1947. On the other hand, most Arab countries followed the lead of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nassir, who advocated the destruction of Israel. The latter view was also adopted by the PLO during Ahmad Shukeiri's reign (1964–1967) and later by Yasir Arafat (1969–2004) and most Palestinian armed factions.

Border environments differ as foci for conflict discourse. While classic realist theories are used to account for mechanisms of securitized borders, socially oriented theories are often invoked to characterize relaxed borders. This distinguishing pattern regarding securitization reflects a deeply rooted focus on idealized borders, based on implicit expectations that relaxed borders are a viable option and goal for all. This orientation is prone to mistaken assumptions regarding local, national and regional interests and ultimately threatens delicately balanced states of stability. This paper aims to question this somewhat simplified categorization and posit that securitized borders are longstanding realities which warrant more complex theoretical conceptualization.

The analysis is based on documentary study and qualitative field research, mapping and evaluating Israel–Jordan cross-border interactions conducted during 2006-2014. Local civilian interactions were studied using three tools: interviews, non-participant observations and a sector-based analysis of original and secondary sources. In the course of research, many tours and observations of the border region were conducted, and key actors in Israel and Jordan were interviewed: entrepreneurs, local residents, local and national government officials, security personnel and representatives of non-governmental organizations involved in the administration and funding of normalization-promoting initiatives.

In light of internal and external security threats which challenge states and border regions in conflict environments and in normalized settings, there is increasing value in recognizing multi-level power relations (“bringing the state back in”) that design, inhibit and ultimately control the inevitability, circumstance and social–political effectivity of any cross-border interaction. Cross-border cooperation (CBC), which evolves gradually, monitored by the border regime and reflecting actual levels of inter-state political dialogue, is a slower yet safer option and a more realistic expectation for CBC, especially in regions of minimal communication between cross-border neighbors. In the backdrop of the Middle East turmoil, Israel and Jordan mark 20 years of peaceful relations, enjoying stability based on shared political and security interests, yet displaying no apparent tendency toward increased cross-border interaction. Given the stark differences in regimes and ongoing regional unrest, this securitized border fulfills local and regional needs and is far from a temporary “second-best” reality.

The analysis is based on original fieldwork and documentary study, mapping and evaluating Israel–Jordan cross-border interactions conducted during 2006-2014.

The focus of this article is on non‐coercive means (i.e. reward and persuasion) for pursuing international conflicts. The article uses case studies of six Middle East peace efforts to analyse the conditions which affect the utilisation and contribution of non‐coercive means. It looks at the factors that account for the limited use of non‐coercive means by adversaries in trying to induce the enemy to yield what was desired and at factors affecting the success of those efforts that are made.

UNI Global Union’s General Secretary, Philip Jennings, delivered the Movement for the Abolition of War Remembrance Day Lecture at the Imperial War Museum on November 12th 2017. On a day when we remember the millions who died in the First World War and subsequent wars, Jennings called for renewed collective action to tackle the threats to peace. During the lecture, Jennings explored the ties that have bound the trade union movement to the peace movement over the last century or more and its relevance today to the struggle for social justice.

The article seeks to address the lack of serious, normative scenarios exploring peace in the Middle East.

Three normative, backcasted scenarios were written. These were derived from literature searches, interviews with experts in the field, and input from a three‐round Delphi. Actions were identified and rated by the Delphi panel in Rounds 1 and 2. Draft text with areas for comment throughout the scenarios was collected in Round 3 and used to improve the draft scenarios.

The scenarios address seven preconditions for peace in the Middle East: secure borders for Israel; establishment of a viable and independent Palestinian state; resolution of the Jerusalem question; ending violence by both sides and building confidence; social and economic development; education; and resolution of Palestinian refugee status.

The scenarios are intended for use in a variety of settings to help further the Middle East peace process.

The examination and analysis which will take place in this monograph is based on the necessary characteristics which pertain to the collective agreement concluded as a result of collective bargaining between the employer(s) and the trade union(s) and which have evolved through either case law, through the intrinsic nature of the collective agreement itself, or through legislation.

Purpose: National business groups in conflict countries may mitigate the civil war or do the converse. When the economy is mainly point-sourced, which means it mainly exports mineral-based products and/or narcotics, the business community (apart from small-businesses associated with services) is likely to be more pro-war, particularly, if the other side may gain control of the lootable commodities, as in secessionist wars. This tendency will be reinforced the closer are business and political ties, shorter the time horizons are and more difficult it is to make credible commitments to peace. If the economy exports mainly agricultural products excluding those mentioned above or manufactures (diffuse or manufacturing) the commercial case for peace is stronger because of the diffused nature of the core business activity. Even so, there will be some groups who profit from war contracts and arms deals. The peace lobby is likely to dominate in societies where business and political actors are more sharply separated, as well as in countries that have longer time horizons and better institutions of commitment. The pro-peace business lobby may have a stronger case in secessionist wars compared to rebellions, as the former are more likely to be longer and more intractable to purely military solutions.