Search results

One of the strongest connections in politics in developing countries is through military links. This study aims to examine the auditor choice preference of the militarily-connected firms in Indonesia, an emerging country where there is a strong influence from the military on political decision-making.

The analysis used 3,473 firms-year observations listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange spanning from 2003 to 2017 using regression and other statistical tests.

The results reveal that firms with a militarily-connected director are less likely to appoint one of the Big 4 auditors. Using the military reform as a natural experiment, the finding shows that militarily-connected firms did not change their auditor choice preference even after the military reform. Interestingly, I find that connected firms are associated with high earnings management. In addition, the different retirement position level and military affiliations of the connected directors generate different outcomes related to the auditor choice decision. Overall, the results indicate that militarily-connected firms were less likely to appoint one of the Big 4 auditors both before and after the military reforms. These results are robust, even after the author controlled for political connections, year fixed effects and industry fixed effects.

Because of the limitations of the prior literature on military connections, this study is developed based on the assumption that the militarily-connected directors have identical behavior whether they serve in either public or private companies. However, this assumption could be invalid which potentially affects the interpretation of some of the results in this study.

This paper provides direct evidence of the auditor choice preference of firms with a military connection. The evidence builds on the existing literature on the difference in auditor choice preference between politically and militarily-connected firms.

This paper argues that structural and institutional reforms imposed by the military regime and accepted by the Concertación impose substantial impediments to collective action among Chile's popular sectors. In particular, labor market and social welfare policies exacerbate social stratification, deprive the public of vital resources, reinforce workers’ vulnerability to market forces and undermine social trust. These dynamics and the state structures that perpetuate them indicate the state's role in either facilitating or impeding collective action among subordinate segments of the population. They further suggest the negative impact neoliberalism has on the quality of democracy by constraining popular participation.

After the Korean War, South Korean politics was dominated by national security concerns. Reversing Carl von Clausewitz's well-known dictum, in South Korea, “politics is the continuation of war by other means.” Until the late 1980s, politics in South Korea was far from democratic. South Korea had five direct presidential elections (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007) and six national assembly elections (1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008) after the democratic transition of 1987. In 1992, a civilian candidate, Young Sam Kim, was elected president. Young Sam Kim (1993–1998) prosecuted and punished former generals turned presidents Doo Hwan Chun (1980–1988) and Tae Woo Roh (1988–1993) for corruption, mutiny and treason in 1995. Dae Jung Kim (1998–2003) was elected president in 1997. For the first time in South Korean political history, regime change occurred between a ruling party and an opposition party.

In this chapter, the change and continuity of civil–military relations through the fluctuating dynamics of the democratic transition and consolidation in South Korea is examined. A positive consolidation of democratic reform is one that, while securing indisputable civilian supremacy, grants the military enough institutional autonomy for the efficient pursuit of its mission. Civilian supremacy should be institutionalized not only by preventing military intervention in civilian politics but also by ensuring civilian control over the formation and implementation of national defense policy.

In sum, despite three terms of civilian presidency, civilian supremacy has not yet fully institutionalized. Although significant changes in civil-military relations did occur after the democratic transition, they were not initiated by elected leaders with the intention of establishing a firm institutional footing for civilian supremacy. South Korea's political leaders have not crafted durable regulations and institutions that will sustain civilian control over the military.

More than six decades, Korea is still divided. The most highly militarized zone in the world lies along the demilitarized zone. How to draw the line prudently between seeking national security and promoting democracy shall be the most delicate task facing all the civilian regimes to come in South Korea. That mission will remain challenging not only for civilian politicians but also for military leaders.

This paper examines micro-practices of resistance to understand how they influence accounting.

A qualitative methodology based on interviews is used to explore an extreme case of disciplinary organization, that of the French Armed Forces whereby secrecy and discipline are the norm. The study draws on James Scott's concept of infrapolitics to illustrate how service members manage to appear obedient and disciplined, while simultaneously criticizing and resisting accounting practices “below the radar” of surveillance.

The study describes “resistance in obedience” to account for how service members resist while following discipline. Three main forms of resistance are identified. Containment consists in obstructing and delaying a process of change that depends on willing participation of active supporters. Subversion consists in weakening the sources of information and the communication channels. Sabotage consists in fragmenting accounting (here a balanced scorecard) by separating performance indicators from cost accounting. The study shows that these three tactics of hidden and informal resistances prevent the spread of accounting reforms, disrupt transparency and create a blockade around financial information.

The study of resistance to accounting in a setting where compliance and discipline are the norm shows how widespread it can be. In that respect, future research could provide a more systematic understanding of resistance in action and its conditions of possibility in various contexts and settings. This article further illustrates the allure of opacity against the threats of transparency and accountability. The use of accounting in opaque settings opens interesting avenues of research, since the appeal of accounting has often been related to the allure of transparency and to accounting's potential to create visibilities. Finally, this paper opens a perspective for future research on how micro-resistance meets micro-practices of power in the context of ostensibly liberated, participative and non-authoritarian management.

While previous literature argued that resistance to accounting arises when it is used to increase discipline, our findings challenge this assumed dichotomy, by showing that sometimes accounting is resisted in the name of discipline. This study further outlines the fact that the “allure” of transparency is not universal but can also prove disruptive and be contested. In addition, this study contributes to the literature on resistance to accounting that mainly focused on overt, dramatic and organized forms of resistances, by highlighting the existence of a more widespread, omnipresent yet hidden and mundane, day-to-day, form of opposition, which significantly influences accounting. Finally, the findings show that resistance is not only an outside force intersecting with accounting but also an intrinsic force that shapes accounting from the inside.

Many European countries suspended mandatory conscription after the Cold War, and especially between 2000 and 2010. However, with the changing security situation in Europe, more and more countries are considering the re-introduction of the draft. That is why, it is important to evaluate the impact of conscription on draftees, including its effect on fertility outcomes. Additionally, fertility is of particular interest because birth rates have been below replacement levels in most European countries at least in the last two decades. This, combined with the increase in life expectancy, has contributed to aging population and raises concerns about the future economic prospects and sustainability of the continent. Military service could be related to fertility in several ways. Compulsory service for men would affect the marriage market and subsequently child-bearing outcomes. For example, men who serve in the military would have to delay higher education at least by a year, given that they plan to continue their education after high school. One possibility is that this leads to older men meeting younger women if partners meet at college. Alternatively, in case the partners know each other prior to the draft, service could delay marriage by up to a year due to the conscription, postponing planning and having children, and potentially having fewer children as women might be less able or less willing to have a child after a certain age. Finally, some men who plan and would otherwise continue their education might choose to not do so or to further postpone it once they disattach from studying during their service. For some men, this might influence their marital and subsequent fertility outcomes. In either of these scenarios, a draft or its suspension is likely to be connected to fertility.

This study examines the effect of the suspension of the draft in Spain in December 2001 on three fertility outcomes of men that would have been drafted in the absence of the suspension. The author performs the analysis in a difference-in-differences framework. Potential concerns and policy implications are also discussed.

The findings suggest that after the suspension of the draft, individuals started to have their first child earlier given that they decide to have children. Consistent with the overall time trend, they became less likely to have a child and started to have fewer children. However, the age at birth of the first child decreased while the number of children and the likelihood of having a child increased for men relative to women, after compared to before the suspension of the mandatory draft.

The author extends prior literature by investigating the effect of the abolition of compulsory military service in Spain in December 2001 on fertility. This is novel is several ways. First, to the best of the author’s knowledge, previous literature has examined the effect of this Spanish reform only on labor market outcomes prior to men's conscription. Second, even for other countries that terminated the compulsory draft, fertility has been under-studied, providing an opportunity for further exploration. Third, this analysis is based on rich Census data, representative of the population in Spain. Finally, given the inconclusive findings of previous studies for other countries and the proposed re-introduction of the draft in some parts of Europe, additional evidence of the effect of the conscription has important policy implications necessary for the evaluation of future military service policy decisions.

This chapter has two major objectives. It discusses the political leadership in Thailand in terms of historical development and examines the role adaptation of Thai elites in order to respond to different demands from various sectors in the society. The chapter concludes that political leaders have to adjust their roles to cope and to survive. Apart from the old bureaucratic elites, both military and civil, there are also some other stakeholders who have become stronger over time, making more demands on political leaders (and, consequently, on the state apparatus). In reaction to these stakeholders, political leaders have used public administration reforms and initiated public policies to gain more capacity to lead.