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The political landscape that has been unfolding since the attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001 has created an urgent imperative for a reappraisal of the place of individual force within philosophies of violence, particularly those that are directed to law. An extensive critique of the relation between law and violence has emerged around the works of philosophers, such as Walter Benjamin, Franz Fanon, Jacques Derrida and Giorgio Agamben (1998, In: D.H. Roazen (Trans.), Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life. California: Stanford University Press), but it is questionable whether any of these provide us with the conceptual tools with which to address what is being presented (correctly or otherwise) as a particular problematic of the 21st century. Indeed, I would argue that a certain intellectual malaise surrounds discussion around individual force and that this state of affairs is in large measure due to the way in which critical theory and philosophy has addressed questions concerning the relation between individual violence and the juridical order. Without exception such accounts declare that individual violence undermines the authority of law itself. The following seeks to interrogate this contention and in doing so to begin to construct a more nuanced way of conceiving how the law preserves its authority.

The purpose of the research is to determine the essence and notion of economic violation of law and their varieties, and to determine the reasons that lie in the basis of this negative social phenomenon. The authors use the philosophical law of integrity and struggle of contradictions and rather-legal, historical and legal, and formal and legal methods of scientific cognition. Such laws of dialectics and transition of quantitative changes into qualitative changes, negation of negation, and others are used. Signs and types of economic violations of law are analyzed and their predetermination by the conflict character of economic relations is noted. Comparison of economic violations of law that are peculiar for administrative and market models of economy is performed. The universal character of economic relations as objects of legal protection is shown. Classification of economic violations of law, based on the level of their public danger and spheres of distribution, is provided. Special attention is paid to civil and legal violations of law as a variety of economic violations of law, based on not anti-social settings of the subject but conflict with the borrowed system of values, which is alien to most members of society. The notion “economic violation of law” is of the collective character and includes illegal actions regarding economic relations, and the latter are of the conflict character due to different interests of subjects, the existing competition, and striving for obtaining profit. Economic violation of law is an illegal form of solving the existing conflict, which leads to application of measures of legal responsibility. The causes of economic violations of law could be overcome by implementation of the values and ideals of justice in the legal norms. They should be based on historical, cultural, spiritual, and legal traditions. All that is imposed artificially is destined for rejection and creation of new conflicts, including economic violations of law.

Charles K. Rowley's thin chapter is titled “An Intellectual History of Law and Economics: 1739–2003.” I say thin in the sense that, by my calculation, for the dates it purports to describe, it covers about one decade of history per page. Perhaps “accelerated” might better capture its essence. Overall it is an adequate outline of the history of Chicago law and economics (with some notable exceptions). To his credit (unlike most of the other chapters in this book), perhaps because, as its co-editor and probably responsible for the title of the book, he (like Posner) does actually include a nice discussion of those who were part of the “origins of law and economics.” The chapter does have two major flaws. First, for some odd reason, he chooses to challenge the well-accepted moniker—legal realist movement—and invokes the “legal realist mood” and then tries (awkwardly) to maintain the “mood-spin” within his descriptive analysis—it just sounds silly. One wonders, who (other than he) even thinks to raise the question as whether the legal realists were a “movement” or a “mood.” Surely not Edmund Kitch, one of the mainstays of Chicago law and economics and a contributor to his volume. Kitch does not buy into Rowley's spin; like all other scholars who write on legal realism (both in and out of the field of law and economics), in the forward to his chapter, Kitch follows the legal scholarship and uses the widely accepted—legal realist “movement” (p. 54).

Several power law relations are found to occur in bibliographic studies of scientific journals, articles, and citations. These can be interpreted in a self‐consistent manner in terms of growth parameters of articles, journals, and citations. Similar models have been proposed earlier in physical, biological, and behavioural sciences.

The law and guidance concerning the social care of adults are a mess. More than 30 statutes and guidance documents deal with this area, many of which overlap or contradict each other, some dating back five decades. Because of this, the Law Commission has been asked to review the law and propose changes, which is, as the Law Society Gazette has put it, ‘the most radical shake‐up of adult social care in 60 years’ (Rayner, 2010). It is estimated that such legislation would affect 1.8 million people and six million carers (Brindle, 2010). The consultation document was published in February 2010 following a scoping exercise, and the closure date for responses was the 1st July 2010. The hope is that the consultation exercise will result in a response next year and a Bill drafted by the summer of 2012. In this article, we review the background to the consultation, and explore the Law Commission's proposals for reform. We examine the issues with particular reference to the readership of this journal, and make suggestions for change. We have also submited this article to the Law Commission as a response to the consultation document.

The purpose of this paper is to outline the challenges and potential solutions of initiating a Sharia law module within a UK law school.

The approach is practical with focus placed on the local and international dimensions.

Sharia law is a popular module which adds to a law graduate's portfolio of international legal experience alongside the supplementary benefits provided to students attending from other disciplines. The advantages of interactions with local communities are also discussed.

Only a relatively small number of UK law schools run a module concerning Sharia or Islamic law, thus the paper facilitates other schools furthering the international aspects involved in the teaching and practice of law.

It is well known that the laws of Leimkuhler, Mandelbrot, Lotka and the verbal formulation of Bradford's law are equivalent. In this note we prove an analogous framework of laws in which now the law of Zipf occurs instead of Mandelbrot's law. Laws in this group are Brookes' law and the graphical formulation of Bradford's law. We show that both groups of laws are very different in the sense that they are not even equal asymptotically for high rankings.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the merits and disadvantages of the law of the People's Republic of China on anti‐money laundering.

The paper describes the main contents contained in the newly adopted law of the People's Republic of China on anti‐money laundering, celebrates the enactment of the law and points out the gap still remaining between Chinese legislation and international standards.

The enactment of the law of the People's Republic of China on anti‐money laundering is of vital significance. Based on the international experience in the fight against money laundering, Chinese anti‐money‐laundering legislation has made considerable progress. Its shortcomings, however, are also evident.

This paper presents a comprehensive description of, and comments on, the law of the People's Republic of China, which would be beneficial to the legislature.

Within each political subdivision of the state of Florida, there is an ordinance which applies to the procurement of goods and services for agencies under its jurisdiction. One common requirement in all these ordinances is the use of the Request for Proposal when purchasing goods or services above a given threshold. In contrast to an Invitation to Bid, the RFP is structured in such a way as to allow other criteria to be evaluated, along with the bottom line price submitted by vendors. The issue in this analysis is whether each meeting of the evaluation committee set up to review these criteria is subject to Florida’s Sunshine Law. Several court decisions and opinions of Attorneys General have held that meetings of ad-hoc committees, advisory committees, and other panels of staff or non-staff members are subject to the Sunshine Law. It appears clear, after a discussion of a few cases relating to the Sunshine Law, that any agency procurement officer must be very careful to avoid even the suggestion of making any recommendation outside of the public view. Public notice should be posted at least seventy-two hours prior to any meeting of the committee. Only by closely adhering to both the letter and the intent of the law will procurement officers avoid having their agency brought into court for a violation of the Sunshine Law.

To explain the Hague Securities Convention in the context of secured financing transactions in the US and to discuss the implications of the Convention on new and existing transactions, as well as on market practice going forward.

This article provides a broad overview of the Hague Securities Convention and the impact of the Convention’s choice of law rules on secured financing transactions in the US involving intermediated securities, including how this deviates from previously applicable laws (such as the Uniform Commercial Code), and provides practical considerations with respect to secured financing transactions.

While in most circumstances the Convention provides for the same choice of law as previously applicable laws, there are certain scenarios where the Convention will produce a different result. Market practice with respect to perfecting security interests will likely change to take account of the Convention and to provide the parties with certainty regarding the law applicable to secured transactions.

The Convention calls for increased diligence with respect to the law governing the account agreement between the debtor and the securities intermediary and whether the securities intermediary has a qualifying office in that jurisdiction.

Practical guidance from experienced finance lawyers.