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This study aims to take advantage of the unprecedented anti-corruption campaign launched in China in December 2012 and examine the effect of improved public governance on tunneling.

This study uses a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies from 2010 to 2014 and conduct regression analyses to investigate the effect of improved public governance attributed to the anti-corruption campaign on tunneling.

This study finds that the level of tunneling decreased significantly after the anti-corruption campaign, suggesting that increased public governance effectively curbs tunneling. Cross-sectional results show that this mitigating effect is more pronounced for non-SOE firms, especially non-SOE firms with political connections, firms audited by non-Big 8 auditors, firms with a large divergence between control rights and cash flow rights and firms located in areas with lower marketization.

This study highlights the importance of anti-corruption initiatives in improving public governance and in turn reducing tunneling. This study provides important implications for many other emerging economies to improve public governance.

This study contributes to the literature on the role of public governance in constraining corporate agency problems and advances the understanding of the economic consequences of China's anti-corruption campaign in the context of tunneling.

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the deleveraging impact of the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on private firms with political connections, relative to those without political connections.

In this paper, taking the anti-corruption campaign employed from the end of 2012 as an exogenous shock, the authors design a quasi-experiment difference-in-difference approach to examine how the loss and failure of political connections impacts private firms’ debt financing.

The authors find that the loss and failure of political connections following the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress causes the yearly new debt ratios of treatment firms with political connections to decrease, relative to those of control firms without political connections. This outcome is more pronounced for provinces with more cadres excluded in the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress, which rendered politically connected firms susceptible to lose connections with central or provincial cadres. To explore the mechanism, the authors find that following the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress, politically connected firms limit rent-seeking activities, whereas resource acquisition is weakened. The authors also find that the impact of the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress on the debt financing of politically connected firms, relative to their counterparts, is more pronounced for groups with high levels of information asymmetry and for less explicit guarantee groups. Finally, politically connected firms are more likely to be dominated by internal funds in dealing with a loss of advantages in debt financing, compared with their counterparts without political connections.

The findings in this study suggest that the loss or failure of previous political connections following Xi’s anti-corruption campaign make politically connected firms lose the advantages in debt financing through the rent-seeking, resource acquisition, information asymmetry, implicit guarantee channels, which provide new evidence for research on the impact of the anti-corruption campaign since the 18th CPC National Congress on private firms’ financing behaviors via the loss or failure of existing political connections.

The findings in the study will have some inspiration for policy makers and entrepreneur.

This study provides new evidence on the different impacts of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign on private firm’s debt financing between politically connected and unconnected firms.

Employing the anti-corruption campaign as an exogenous political shock, this paper examines how political intervention shapes the impact of financial expert CEOs on firm investment decisions.

This paper uses a sample of 2,808 Chinese firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2003 to 2016. Panel data is used for conducting the analysis controlling for firm, industry, and year fixed effects.

The authors found that CEOs with financial expertise are sensitive to political intervention when making investment decisions. First, financial expert CEOs spend more on R&D expenditure in private-owned companies and they are associated with less R&D expenditure in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Second, financial expert CEOs are associated with higher investment expenditure in general, but they become less likely to invest more in the post-anti-corruption period. The reduction in investment expenditure due to the anti-corruption campaign is more pronounced in SOEs than in private-owned companies. Third, the anti-corruption campaign promotes R&D investment in general, but in SOEs, expert CEOs tend to be less likely to invest more on R&D after the anti-corruption shock.

This paper enriches the growing literature on the impact of political intervention and the role of the anti-corruption campaign on corporate behaviour.

This paper aims to answer the following two research questions: Do corruption cases present different features before and since the new administration in China? How are criminal penalties affected by these corruption features?

The investigation is based on the online disclosure of 269 state corruption audits and their consequences, which have been made public by China’s National Audit Office since 2011. By manual coding, these official reports were analyzed, and an appropriate-sized sample of corruption cases was chosen. The authors then adopted Welch’s t-test and regression model methods to test the research hypotheses relevant to the two research questions.

The authors find that larger embezzlement or bribery amounts and more organizational corruption cases have been detected and punished since the anti-corruption campaign was launched by the new administration. They also conclude that significantly tougher criminal penalties were given to corruption cases involving large monetary amounts, that bribery cases were more harshly punished compared to other occupational crimes and that individual perpetrators received tougher criminal penalties than organizational criminals. In addition, the authors observe a trend that criminal penalties for corruption have been increasingly harsher in recent years.

The limitations of this study are quite clear as the Chinese corruption cases in this sample only include state corruption audit cases and does not refer to high-profile corruption cases investigated by the Central Commission of Discipline Inspection. However, this study suggests that state corruption audit results are a good research sample, which can be used to extend empirical tests to archival data acquired from state audit practices and can encourage more studies on public sector auditing and occupational financial crime.

State corruption audits can be an effective approach to successful anti-corruption campaigns, and the conclusions can be useful to policy makers and legislators in China and other developing countries.

This paper bridges some gaps in the existing financial crime literature. First, this study on corruption features is located within the context of a political administrative change; second, the state audit is highlighted as a supervising agency in the anti-corruption campaign; and third, the authors’ contribution adds to the empirical testing of data sets of state corruption audits within the existing financial crime literature.

The authors study the effectiveness of the anti-corruption campaign in all of mainland China's provinces in terms of risk and volatility spillovers.

A nonlinear model describes interdependencies and determines how shocks and uncertainty spillovers from the first suspects to the rest of the country are dynamically transmitted.

The authors find that both idiosyncratic and systematic risk increase after the first investigation, suggesting that investors do react to the political shocks induced by the new policy. However, even if the scope of the inquiry expands, as the current policy is almost certain to be maintained, investors do not need to update their beliefs, stock news about their political costs does not matter and shocks cease to spread.

In this paper, the authors contribute to the literature by examining the financial effects of China's anti-corruption campaign and determining whether such a large-scale campaign affects risk. Qian and Wen (2015) and Ke et al. (2016) show that the anticorruption campaign has a negative impact on the consumption of luxury goods. Agarwal et al. (2020) provide evidence that government officials' access to credit decreases following the anti-corruption campaign. According to Zhang (2018), firms are less prone to commit fraud after the anti-corruption campaign. However, Griffin et al. (2018) find little evidence that the anti-corruption campaign reduces corporate corruption. Kim et al. (2018) assess market reaction during the investigation and discover that the anti-corruption examination has a significant positive influence on Chinese financial markets. The authors intend to fill the gap in the literature concerning the campaign's impact on risk and volatility spillovers across the country during the first stage of the campaign.

Despite an intensified anti-corruption campaign, China's economic growth and social transition continue to breed loopholes and opportunities for big corruption, leading to a money-oriented mentality and the collapse of ethical standards, and exposing the communist regime to greater risk of losing moral credibility and political trust. In Hong Kong, the setting up of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 1974 marked the advent of a new comprehensive strategy to eradicate corruption and to rebuild trust in government. The ICAC was not just an anti-corruption enforcement agency per se, but an institution spearheading and representing integrity and governance transformation. This chapter considers how mainland China can learn from Hong Kong's experience and use the fight against corruption as a major political strategy to win the hearts and minds of the population and reform governance in the absence of more fundamental constitutional reforms, in a situation similar to Hong Kong's colonial administration of the 1970s–1980s deploying administrative means to minimize a political crisis.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the anti-corruption campaign, “Hunting the Tigers,” incurs a significant short-term loss of shareholders’ returns.

A sophisticated event study approach is employed.

The results show that the “Hunting the Tigers” has incurred a significant short-term loss of investment returns for shareholders in China’s main stock market board. In addition, the beginning of a new assault on China’s official mogul corruption in another round of political anti-corruption cycle after the 18th National Congress of the CPC has reduced this price significantly.

This finding should be perceived as the price of the corruption of official-business collusion within capital markets in contemporary China.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a historical review of China’s anti-corruption efforts, from the ancient period of Chinese slavery societies to the late 1970s before China launched its profound economic reform, under the current status of the harsh crusade against corruption that the Chinese new leadership initiated.

This paper is mainly based on a great deal of historical literature and empirical findings, with relevant comparative analysis on policies and regulations between various periods of China.

The phenomenon of corruption has existed in Chinese history for thousands of years, throughout Chinese slavery societies, feudal societies, republic period and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Anti-corruption laws formed an important part of ancient Chinese legal system, and each dynasty has made continuous and commendable progress on fighting such misconduct. Innumerable initiatives have also been taken by the ruling party Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the founding of the PRC. The PRC government created various specially designed government organizations and a series of updated regulations for preventing economic crimes. They have realized that periodic movements against corruption would no longer be helpful, and the paramount issue nowadays is indeed how bold the leaders are in striking out those unhealthy tendencies.

This paper fills in the blanks in the Western world with a comprehensive description of, and comments on, the historical efforts on China’s corruption and economic crime prevention. It also, in various ways, provides meaningful information that links to China’s current furious war against corruption.

As a consequence of the proposal of the Carbon Neutral and Carbon Peak policy in 2020, the Chinese Government is paying more attention to developing sustainability performance. This study aims to assess the direct influence of country-level and corporate anti-corruption measures on environmental, social and governance (ESG) and its three dimensions, besides ascertaining the moderating role of firm size.

This study used the system generalized method of moments on a sample of 820 Chinese listed firms from 2012 to 2021.

The findings show that country-level and corporate corruption negatively affect ESG performance. Corporate anti-corruption measures have a more pronounced positive influence on the sustainability performance of small firms than large firms due to the limited resources, lower political position and weaker refusal power of small firms.

The study has great implications for governments, corporate boards and ESG rating agencies. Government and corporate boards should mitigate the risks of country-level and corporate corruption to attain sustainable development goals. Rating agencies should add country-level and corporate corruption into the ESG evaluation system.

Some empirical results have proven that anti-corruption measures help reduce the emission of carbon dioxide, but few evidence shows how country-level and corporate corruption affect ESG and its three dimensions.