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Based on the traditional buyback model, this paper aims to propose a new buyback method – the variable buyback contract – to solve the serious inventory backlog in the current economic situation.

In this paper, the authors further study the buyback problem in a two-level supply chain with uncertain demand. Such a problem can be found in many research papers, which also use the Stackelberg game model. They put forward many factors that affect the buyback price, including risk preference, random arrival of consumers, etc. Different from the existing research, the authors propose another factor that may affect supply chain buyback – the retailer's remaining inventory to study the buyback contract.

First, the authors found that under the variable buyback contract, there is an optimal retail price, wholesale price and an optimal range of parameter settings for the buyback price. Second, the proposed Pareto-optimal solution for system improvement can achieve supply chain coordination. Third, under some conditions, the variable buyback contract is better than the wholesale price contract and fixed-price buyback contract.

First, this is the first paper to discuss to measure the buyback price with the retailer's remaining inventory. Second, the proposed buyback contract can help decision-makers to choose the optimal improvement strategies. Third, this contract has a certain practical significance, which can effectively alleviate the current inventory backlog problem.

Organizational equilibrium theory is a theory of an inducements‐contributions balance within organizations; i.e. it ultimately aims to find conditions for organizational survival. Based on the Simon‐Smithburg‐Thompson postulates for the organizational equilibrium theory, an organizational equilibrium model under uncertainty is constructed. Using a multiple objective satisficing problem formulation, the survival conditions (i.e. existence conditions of viable solutions) are studied. The existence of uniformly better solutions than a given viable solution is also shown. Then, a unique solution (i.e. viable Pareto solution) is defined, and a problem whose solutions are viable Pareto solutions is specified. Finally, several organizational factors involved with the organizational equilibrium concept are discussed.

Looks at Arrow’s early background in New York and his subsequent development in the field of econometrics and mathematical economics. Covers his work in depth and his achievements in the school of thought of economics, adding that the modern school of thought is complementary to the classical school.

This paper seeks to describe an approach to multi‐objective optimization problems (MOOPs) based on game theory (GT) and to provide a comparison with the more standard Pareto approach on a real design problem.

The GT is first briefly presented, then a possible recasting of MOOPs in terms of GT is described, where players from GT are associated with single objectives and strategies to the choice of degrees of freedom. A comparison with the Pareto approach is performed on the optimized design of a superconducting synchronous generator.

It was shown that the GT can be applied to the optimized design of real world devices, with results that present a different viewpoint on the problem, yet with device performance comparable with those obtained by standard approaches.

Only the Nash approach to non‐cooperative games has been applied; the conditions for the solution found using GT to belong to the Pareto front have not been fully explored.

Designers and engineers interested in optimal design are presented with a new design technique able to get a balance among conflicting partial objectives, that can also be used to select among different possible designs obtained in other ways (e.g. using the Pareto front approach).

The paper demonstrates the possibility of using GT in the design of real world electromagnetic devices, with reference to the optimal shape design of a high temperature superconducting single‐phase synchronous generator.

To analyse the implications of signs of reform modification, stoppage or reversal, such as price controls, that have emerged in many developing economies, it is necessary to understand their efficiency consequences. This paper aims to study the effect of price interventions in imperfectly competitive product markets, to investigate whether reforms reversals are necessarily harmful.

The model assumes firm set prices and face sunk costs of entry.

The paper shows that a minimum price can induce a Pareto improvement, by preventing price wars and encouraging entry. The result is supported by empirical evidence from some developed economies, holds when sunk cost vanishes, and is robust to some extensions. A fixed price may be optimal in the environment investigated.

The results may be of interest to theorists and policy-makers interested in imperfectly competitive markets.

This chapter tells the story of how the concept of Pareto efficiency was shipped from Lausanne to the modern US theory of competitive general equilibrium, focusing on the specific role of Maurice Allais. It identifies similarities in both epistemological approach and theoretical achievements realized first by Pareto, then by Allais, and finally by Debreu and Arrow and Hahn. It also shows that these similarities are not casual, since historical circumstances account for the influence of Pareto on Allais and later of Allais on Arrow and Debreu.

Purpose – For the purpose of forming a nation from the independent regions, the desirability is examined whether first we must seek economic integration of the regions or first military integration of the regions. The comparison of the “all-volunteer army system” and the “draft system” is also attempted.

Design/methodology/approach – Assuming the two regions facing the assault by an intruder, the Walrasian general equilibrium theory in economics is utilized for the comparison. For the construction of armed forces, Lindahl mechanism is introduced. The desirability is evaluated by the comparison of final utilities for the two integration processes achieved from the computation of equilibrium prices and burden shares for military expenses.

Findings – It is found that the all-volunteer army system is more desirable than the draft system in any of the two integrations. Furthermore, “first, the economic integration of the two regions, then the military integration” is more desirable than “first, the military integration of the two regions, then the economic integration.”

Research limitations/implications – Parameters in production and utility functions as well as the population sizes are specified numerically, although the specification is made randomly. The present simulation provides a starting point for further research with general (unspecified) production and utility functions.

Originality/value – This simulation provides a theoretical support for the actual design of the European integration. The originality consists in the derivation of the conclusion from the formulation of a purely theoretical model, which assumes individuals' maximizing behavior.

This paper aims to analyse the phenomenon of race to the bottom in a federation and provides answer to the question why developing countries are more prone to race to the bottom competition than developed countries.

The paper considers a two-stage game where, in the first stage, two regional governments in a federation choose tax rate on mobile capital employed in its own region by maximising its regional per capita income, and in the second stage, a representative firm chooses capital and labour employment in the two regions by maximising total profit. As capital is mobile across regions, tax policy chosen by any region affects other region. From strategic interaction between the regional governments, the authors derive Nash equilibrium tax rates. Comparing Nash equilibrium with Pareto optimum outcome, race to the bottom is characterised.

The paper finds that federations with poorer endowment of capital are more prone to the race to the bottom outcome. The result is robust to the introduction of different types of asymmetries between the regions and a centrally executed revenue equalisation scheme. Whilst it hints at the fact that capital accumulation can naturally solve the race to the bottom problem, it identifies the presence of an equalisation scheme and equity concern at the regions to weaken the impact of capital accumulation in achieving such an outcome.

The role of capital endowment in the race to the bottom literature in fiscal federalism has previously been ignored. This has serious implications for developing countries like China and India where states compete with each other for attracting private capital in their own jurisdictions.