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This paper explores the possibilities of intercultural dialogue as a means of peace building on the people‐to‐people level. With its focus on the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict the work assesses a number of efforts, which have utilized cultural dialogue rooted in religion to facilitate dialogue, relationship building, and perception change during the period subsequent to the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993 and prior to the outbreak of Israeli‐Palestinian violence in September 2000. Utilizing an interdisciplinary theoretical framework and questionnaire‐based quantitative data collected from Israeli and Palestinian students, the work suggests that the religiously based dialogue has the potential to move mutual perceptions to more favorable positions based on the similarities between Islam and Judaism. Such dialogue can also clarify to both sides the identification which each side has with the same land. We believe that our exploratory data might encourage the further use and study of religious cultural elements to facilitate peace building in both the Israeli‐Palestinian context and in other acute interethnic conflict venues.

The current work aims to introduce the concept of conflict perception and construct a scale that measures individual differences in perceptions about conflicts along religious, national and material dimensions. The concept and the measure are developed in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

The research design combines three methodological elements: 14 focus groups in Israel and the West Bank, which represent diversity in place of residence, religion, age and political background; an expert panel review; and a survey of 411 student respondents that was conducted between September 29 and October 9, 2013, among university students in Israel and Palestine.

The findings show that conflict perception is an individual’s subjective view regarding the essence of the conflict and its central issues, the identities of the parties involved and their motivations, which may include material, ideological or symbolic motives, or any combination thereof. A novel scale consisting of five statements that can measure conflict perception that was developed, validated and implemented via a survey sample showed that Palestinians in the West Bank and in Israel have a religious perception of the conflict, whereas Jews have a national perception of the conflict.

First, the paper introduces a new concept that sheds additional light on the micro foundations of peoples’ attitudes in conflict situations. Second, it develops and validates a measurement tool for conflict perception that may be usable, with necessary adjustments, in other conflicts. Third, it demonstrates that parties to the conflict do not necessarily share similar perceptions about the conflict, a finding with far-reaching consequences for conflict resolution at both the scholarly and policy levels.

The present research study aims to explore the impact of the most recent Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which unfolded in October 2023, on global equity markets, including a wide range of both emerging and developed markets (as per the Morgan Stanley Capital Investment country classification).

The market model of event study methodology, with an estimation window of 200 days and 28-day event window (including event day, i.e. October 7, 2023), has been employed to investigate the event’s impact on the stock markets of different countries, with 24 emerging countries and 23 developed countries. The daily closing prices of the prominent indices of all 47 countries have been analyzed to examine the impact of the conflict on emerging markets, developed markets and overall global equity markets. Additionally, cross-sectional regression analysis has been performed to investigate the possible explanations for abnormal returns.

The findings of the study suggest the heterogeneous impact of the selected event on different markets. Notably, emerging markets and the overall global equity landscape exhibited substantial negative responses on the event day, as reflected in average abnormal returns of −0.47% and −0.397%, respectively. In contrast, developed markets displayed resilience, with no significant negative impact observed on the day of the event. A closer examination of individual countries revealed diverse reactions, with Poland, Egypt, Greece, Denmark and Portugal standing out for their positive or resilient market responses. Poland, in particular, demonstrated significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of 7.16% in the short-term and 8.59% in the long-term event windows (−7, +7 and −7, +20, respectively), emphasizing its robust performance amid the geopolitical turmoil. The study also found that, during various event windows, specific variables had a significant impact on the CARs.

The study suggests diversification and monitoring of geopolitical risks are key strategies for investors to enhance portfolio resilience during the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This study identifies countries such as Poland, Egypt, Greece, Denmark and Portugal with positive or resilient market reactions, providing practical insights for strategic investment decisions. Key takeaways include identifying resilient markets, leveraging opportunistic strategies and navigating market dynamics during geopolitical uncertainties.

As per the authors’ thorough investigation and review of the literature, the present study is the earliest attempt to explore the short-term and long-term impact of the 2023 Israeli–Palestinian conflict on equity markets worldwide using the event study approach and cross-sectional regression analysis.

This article presents the results of a 15-year longitudinal study of the major educational peacebuilding initiatives in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, during times of relative peace and of acute violence (1993–2008). Using longitudinal field research data and surveys, it examines how peace initiatives, that work across conflict lines, adapt to hostile and unfavorable environments. Additionally, it investigates the criteria that allows some peacebuilding initiatives to survive and persist, when the large majority do not. Building on the organizational and social movement studies literature, I contend that organizations need to successfully attend to a variety of challenges such as maintaining resources, maintaining legitimacy, managing internal conflict, and maintaining commitment to have a significant chance for survival. Moreover, I argue that for organizations committed to working across difference and inequality in unfavorable and hostile conflict environments, it is critical for organizational effectiveness and survival to pay heed to the quality of the cross-conflict relationships, as well as, to matters of equality.

On 1 April 1978, the Israeli peace movement burst into world consciousness when an estimated 25,000 Israelis demonstrated in Tel Aviv to urge the administration of Prime Minister Menachem Begin to continue peace negotiations with Egypt. A grassroots group called Peace Now is credited with organizing and leading that demonstration. Today, the “peace camp” refers to left‐wing political parties and organizations that hold dovish positions on the Arab‐Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue. While some figures in the Labor Party view themselves as the peace movement's natural leader, political parties further to the left like the Citizens Rights Movement (CRM) and Mapam are more dovish. In the last 10 years, many grassroots peace organizations have, like Peace Now, formed outside the political party system, with the goal of influencing public opinion and eventually having an impact on policy makers. Peace Now is still the largest, most visible and influential of those organizations.

Scholarship on the contact hypothesis and peacebuilding suggests that contact with marginalized ethnic and racial groups may reduce prejudice and improve opportunities for conflict resolution. Through a study of dual-narrative tours to Israel/Palestine, the purpose of this paper is to address two areas of the debate surrounding this approach to social change. First, past research on the effectiveness of contact-based tourism as a method to change attitudes is inconclusive. Travel to a foreign country has been shown to both improve and worsen tourists’ perceptions of a host population. Second, few scholars have attempted to link contact-based changes in attitudes to activism.

Through an analysis of 218 post-tour surveys, this study examines the role of dual-narrative tours in sparking attitude change that may facilitate involvement in peace and justice activism. Surveys were collected from the leading “dual-narrative” tour company in the region, MEJDI. Dual-narrative tours uniquely expose mainstream tourists in Israel/Palestine to Palestinian perspectives that are typically absent from the majority of tours to the region. This case study of dual-narrative tours therefore provides a unique opportunity to address the self-selecting bias, as identified by contact hypothesis and tourism scholars, in order to understand the potential impacts of exposure to marginalized narratives.

The findings of this study suggest that while these tours tend to engender increased support for Palestinians over Israelis, their most salient function appears to be the cultivation of empathy for “both sides” of the conflict. Similarly, dual-narrative tours often prompt visitors to understand the conflict to be more complex than they previously thought. In terms of activism, tourists tend to prioritize education-based initiatives in their plans for post-tour political engagement. In addition, a large number of participants articulated commitments to support joint Israeli–Palestinian non-governmental organizations and to try to influence US foreign policy to be more equitable.

These findings complicate debates within the scholarship on peacebuilding as well as within movements for social justice in Israel/Palestine. While programs that equate Israeli and Palestinian perspectives are often criticized for reinforcing the status quo, dual-narrative tours appear to facilitate nuance and universalism while also shifting tourists toward greater identification with an oppressed population. Together, these findings shed light on the ability of tourism to facilitate positive attitude change about a previously stigmatized racial/ethnic group, as well as the power of contact and exposure to marginalized narratives to inspire peace and justice activism.

This paper describes a communication and cultural code approach to ethnonational conflicts. More specifically, it describes theory and research emerging from transformative communication events aimed at building constructive relationships betwetact necessitated by conflict. These are dialogue groups organized according to principles established by Allport's (1954) contact hypothesis including sustained contact, cooperative interdependence, and norms of equality. Secondly, we state the assumptions of an interactional approach to conflict, which assumes that conflict is, by definition, interactive making communication impossible to avoid. These assumptions also include an emphasis on the relational aspects of communication, and the fact that interaction sequences become patterned over time and become constitutive of the defining characteristics of the conflict. Moreover, the participants are influenced by communication codes, which are culturally based orientations to producing and interpreting interactions. These codes are grounded in the work of Katriel (1986), Carbaugh (1990), Ellis (1994, 1999) and Philipsen (1997) and have implications for the meaning potential of individuals in conflict situations. Finally, we explicate these issues by describing research that is representative of this communication approach to conflict. This research conceptualizes reconciliation‐aimed contacts and demonstrates how communication codes are modified by situational constraints.

This article aims to analyse the Israeli negotiation strategy in reference to the theoretical frameworks of reconciliation and settlement. It focuses on the Israeli‐Palestinian negotiation experience over the past three years, or since Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister of the Israeli Government in 2009.

Theoretical literature provides two hypothetical frameworks for resolution of conflicts: a political settlement; and reconciliation between parties to the conflict. This article argues that Israel's vision of conflict resolution effectively attempts to integrate both hypothetical frameworks by proposing a political settlement for Palestinians in return for obtaining reconciliation from them. To analyse this strategy, this article explores the Israeli political discourse over the past three years, as well as Israel's vision of the conflict resolution as is manifest in this discourse.

The article argument is based on the indication that willingness of a party to reach a settlement is met with reconciliation from the other party to the conflict. A party's insistence on offering a settlement and attaining reconciliation is associated with power relations between both parties. To maintain its powerful position, the stronger party usually demands reconciliation from the weaker party, at the same time presenting a settlement that implies a political, not moral, recognition of the weaker party with a view to dispossess it from its moral logic in the conflict.

An assessment of the Israeli political discourse over the past three years indicates that Israel is implementing a compound negotiation strategy to resolve the conflict. The strategy entails settlement and reconciliation components. Israel wishes to deal with Palestinians through a political settlement. On the other hand, Israel wants the Palestinians to deal with it through the reconciliation process.

The study aimed to investigate how Israelis and Palestinians, Jews and others from around the world present their views on boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) and the Palestinian Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI). The quality of discourse was examined along with the implications of the rhetoric for social-justice and conflict resolution frameworks.

This qualitative study analyzed 257 texts (newspaper articles, opinion pieces, YouTube videos, emails. Facebook posts, Twitter tweets, campaigns and websites) for content and quality of discourse and for their implications for social-justice and conflict resolution work.

Most texts divided into those in favor of the boycott and those opposed. The content was also polarized − most pro-BDS texts saw Israel as a settler-colonial enterprise, and emphasized issues of social-justice, whereas opponents perceived Israel as a legitimate nation and were skeptical of the human rights angle. The main types of discourse discerned included: ethnocentric talk, attack and intellectual discussion, regardless of national/ethnic origin of the writer or stance toward the boycott.

Different types of texts were analyzed, which did not always fit easily into the discourse categories. Because this was the first study of its kind and looked at limited years, results should be approached with this in mind.

The rhetoric leaves little place for dialogue between those in favor and those opposed. Specific suggestions for combining social-justice work and conflict resolution work are offered.

BDS discourse in its present form hampers finding a solution to the conflict and abuse of Palestinian rights. A new approach is needed to try to resolve these issues.

Because there are few systematic studies on BDS, this article provides insight into how people discuss the strategy and how it connects to frameworks for resolving conflicts.