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This paper aims to investigate the financial aspects of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), its sources of financing and the management of funds in a State-like apparatus.

It is argued that ISIS constitutes a phenomenon not only due to the extreme violence, instrumentalized via “marketing” methods but also on grounds of its declared aspiration to occupy and control land and population with ever expanding borders. After analyzing the group’s sources of funding which are closely interlinked to the areas it controls and its coordinated efforts to establish a proto-terror state framework, a strategy for addressing this threat based on international practices and decisions is being highlighted.

ISIS represents a “sui generis”, primarily self-funded State Scale Entity, a case study for Defense and Security Geo-economics. Its “economic model”, an amalgam of terrorist and criminal practices, could not be used for a viable proto-state it aspires to be.

No official data of any kind are available by international recognized organizations or bodies. The sources for this paper are primarily Western media, journalists, indirect habitants’ testimonies and very few official reports.

Caution must be exercised, when using even trivial platforms of social media and mobile applications, linked even remotely with ISIS or its affiliates.

This paper is a comprehensive presentation of the economic facets of this first modern endeavor for a terror-state.

The existing literature on Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has thus far focused on the group’s contemporary or previous financing activities. However, there has not been an analysis of the ways in which ISIS’ funding is likely to change moving forward now that it has come under international scrutiny. The purpose of this paper is to assess the ways in which ISIS’ funding is likely to evolve in the future and to also suggest methods for combating its financing activities.

The paper is theoretical in nature. By assessing the existing literature on terrorist financing, it is apparent that terrorist organizations alter their funding sources and methods after coming under intense international scrutiny. Therefore, two hypotheses are put forth for the future of ISIS’ funding activities: the group will become more effective at building social support among its local population, thereby consolidating is funding sources and methods within Syria and Iraq; and the group will increasingly branch out, searching for sources from a transnational network, as its base in Syria and Iraq begins to deteriorate.

Community support is essential for sustaining a terrorist network. As a result, it is likely that ISIS will increasingly seek funding from a transnational network as its base of support in Iraq and Syria begins to deteriorate. There is also a distinct third possibility that the group will be able to consolidate its base while also moving abroad for financial support. This third option presents the most complicated outcome for the international community in its fight against ISIS.

This study fills a gap in the literature on terrorist financing, particularly with regards to ISIS, to assist the international community in its fight against the group both now and moving into the future.

This paper aims to show the viability of consociational power-sharing as a conflict-resolution tool in Syria. It further argues that a subsequent movement from consociational to centripetal power-sharing is vital to ensure sustainable peace.

A theoretical overview of power-sharing as a conflict-resolution tool provides the basis for this paper, supported by empirical evidence and qualitative research analysis for its proposed application in Syria. Perceived obstacles to a negotiated settlement are outlined, with suggestions made as to how these issues can be transformed into incentives for invested parties. Such obstacles include Bashar al-Assad remaining in power, and calls for the implementation of Shari’a law by some opposition groups.

While previously the conditions of the conflict were not conducive to peace talks, this paper finds that regional developments, including the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, have re-opened the possibility of, and indeed the necessity for, political negotiations. Detailing the complexity of a conflict that goes far beyond a mere sectarian divide, the findings of this paper dispel the notion that a sectarian partition is a viable model for Syria. The paper highlights the multiple cleavages occurring simultaneously, and shows how a power-sharing model is best suited to deal with them.

The paper analyses the ongoing inertia of political negotiations to peacefully resolve the conflict. It offers an approach to conflict-resolution in Syria that has, thus far, not been adequately considered in academic – or political – spheres.

The purpose of this paper is to use nearly a century’s worth of gang research to inform us about modern terrorist groups, specifically the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

A case study approach is employed, comparing and contrasting the competing theoretical frameworks of gangs and terrorist organisations to understand group structure, demographics, patterns of behaviour (e.g. territoriality, strategic, and instrumental violence), goals, and membership patterns of ISIS.

The qualitative differences of ISIS make them more comparable to street gangs than other terrorist groups.

ISIS, while being qualitatively different from other terrorist groups, actually has many similarities with street gangs allowing for the adaptation of effective gang prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies. This paper highlights how the expansive literature on street gangs is able to inform practical interventions to directly target ISIS and deradicalise potential recruits. By introducing a gang-terror nexus on the crime-terror continuum, this paper provides a useful perspective on the decentralised but dynamic nature of modern era insurgencies. This paper urges similar case studies of terrorist organisations to determine the extent to which they conform to street gang characteristics.

Terrorist groups are often compared to street gangs, yet it has not been until the last few years that gang researchers (Curry, 2011; Decker and Pyrooz, 2011, 2015a, b) have begun to compare and contrast these two deviant group archetypes. The goal of this paper is to use nearly a hundred years of gang research to better equip scholars and practitioners with a broader understanding of terrorism and insurgency in the era of globalisation by presenting a case study of ISIS using a street gang perspective.

Purpose – Research on terrorism has demonstrated the importance of state violence as a factor in the adoption of terrorism. This chapter seeks to clarify this previous research by examining the process through which state violence contributes to violence through groups’ narratives and appeals for action.

Methodology – To study how state violence contributes to terrorism this chapter uses qualitative methods that are ideal for clarifying social processes across cases. This chapter uses a mixed-methods approach, first using a comparative-historical analysis of groups involved in the anarchist, anti-colonial, and New Left waves of terrorism. Examining this diverse set of groups highlights the common role and process through which state violence contributes to terrorism. This study is combined with an in-depth analysis of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s online propaganda, which provides a detailed picture of how state violence is featured in terrorist texts.

Findings – This chapter reaffirms the previous research on the role of state violence as a grievance and indication that alternative methods are unavailable. In addition to this, this chapter demonstrates the symbolic importance of state violence, which provides a moral justification for terrorism and martyrs to aspire to and avenge.

Value – This chapter clarifies the role of state violence in the development of terrorism by describing how it is integrated in the narratives of terrorist groups to justify and inspire violence.

This chapter attempts to uncover the decision code of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, based on 12 decisions he made concerning the Middle East during his third term as president, from 2012 until October 2015.

The study was carried out to understand Putin’s line of thought and decision-making, in light of Putin’s increasing importance throughout the last decade, globally and in the Middle East, in particular. After understanding the decision calculus of Putin, it might also be possible to predict his future decisions concerning the region.

Decision rules can be inferred by analyzing a set of decisions. Analysis of such decisions is made in this chapter using the Applied Decision Analysis (ADA) method that uncovers historic decisions, and aims to peer into the mind of the decision-maker.

The results show the main decision rule for each of Putin’s decisions. The work proves that when it comes to foreign issues, the decision code which leads Putin in his decisions is rational. The results also reveal Putin’s strong desire to promote Russia and himself, while using holistic, maximizing, and compensatory processing, as long as his political survival is not compromised.

The purpose of this paper is to study and specify to what extent Iran will succeed in being a regional hegemon. The paper is devoted to clarification of the constitutive elements for regional hegemony. These elements will be related to an actor’s perception of its role and regional perception, and how these hegemons exert power, do these work for the public good in the region (provision) and how this regional power projects power and exerts power to influence others’ preferences and values without reference to violence (projection). For the Middle East, Iran emerged as a key player in most regional conflicts and it tried to increase its sphere of influence as a regional hegemon. Therefore the question here would be: To what extend could Iran succeed in being a regional hegemon and what are the circumstances that could enhance or constrain this Iranian ambition? So the aim of the paper is to look at three dimensions in general and see whether Iran makes a plausible candidate for regional hegemony. The paper outlines the essential traits of a regional hegemon, and the main elements that constitute a regional hegemony such as perception, provision and projection, and then analyze how Iran follows those elements by analyzing internal perceptions of the Iranian elite about Iranian regional role, regional acceptance, provision of public good, projection and finally impact of the relation with external great powers. Through analyzing its regional strategy in Syria and Iraq since 2003, the year of invasion of Iraq, since ever a political vacuum was created, that enabled Iran to extend its regional influence, after the fall of its historical regional rival, Saddam Hussein baathi regime.

The study adopts an analytical framework of analyzing a regional hegemony strategy which is approached by Miriam Prys in her study “Hegemony, domination, detachment: differences in regional powerhood” to study and analyze Iran’s regional behavior as one of regional power that is seeking regional hegemony. This analytical framework is one of the most significant analytical tools that interests in the study of the behavior of regional power and identify the constitutive dimensions for regional hegemony such as self-perception, regional perception, provision and power projection.

The study concludes that there are obstacles completely in front of achieving the Iranian quest to regional hegemony over the Middle East. These are the continuing US involvement in the Middle East and the consequent tense relationship between Iran and the USA. It is most unlikely that Iran will be hegemonic state over the Middle East as long as there are refusal and resistance from other regional states for Iranian regional role; as each of regional powers has tools to contain the influence of the other. The Iranian regional behavior that is sectarianism-based, whether to protect Shiite shrines and holy places or to protect Shiites in the region, such policies deepen the ideological and sectarian conflicts. It also has not provided an attractive cultural model for the peoples of the region.

This paper enhances the deep analysis of the Middle East dynamics through the prospective of regional power. Also, the paper focuses on the analysis of the relation between great power and aspiring regional power and the impact on its strategies.

This study enhances the understanding of how Iranian decision-makers perceive their regional Iranian and the threats. Moreover, the tools that Iran uses its hard power and ideational one to create regional followers and change its allies’ normative and value systems to come in line with its national interests. Moreover, the study tries to measure the actual Iranian influence, its weakness and strength so that the Arab states and the West could behave in a fruitful way.

In the final analysis, the paper offers an insight into the regional behavior and the importance of external power in regional dynamics and to what extent the regional hegemon is applicable to Iran.

This study investigates the association between managerial ability and earnings quality in firms listed on the Iraq Stock Exchange and how the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) influences the association.

This study uses a sample of firms listed on the Iraq Stock Exchange over the period 2012–2018. Managerial ability is quantified using data envelopment analysis, and earnings quality is measured by earnings restatement, earnings persistence, accruals quality and earnings response coefficient. Panel regression analysis is used to examine the research hypotheses.

The findings indicate that managerial ability positively affects earnings quality of Iraqi firms and that ISIS weakens the relationship between managerial ability and earnings quality. These findings are robust to the alternative measures of managerial ability, as well as to various approaches used to address endogeneity including propensity-score matching and a difference-in-differences analysis.

This study provides insight into the impact of managerial ability on earnings quality in an under-studied emerging market. Furthermore, this study broadens the existing literature about the financial consequences of a modern terrorist group, ISIS.

The wave of popular unrest in the Arab world reached Syria in March 2011, and what started as peaceful demonstrations with simple demands of justice and freedom turned into a brutal armed conflict and a full-scale civil war. Over seven years of conflict resulted in the deaths of over half a million Syrians, the forced displacement of millions more, and a huge loss of the country's social and physical structures. What began as another Arab Spring movement against a dictatorial regime has turned into a proxy war that has attracted the interests of the world and regional powers. The paper discusses Syria's political history and investigates the motives for the Syrian uprising and argues that it is related to socio-economic deprivations rather than sectarianism. The work underlines the interests of the countries involved in the Syrian conflict focusing on Russia, USA, Iran, and Turkey, as well as their contribution to the future reconstruction of the country.

Over the past few years, the Syrian regime and its allies targeted many cities and destroyed opposition-held neighborhoods. The work considers if this destruction was part of an overall strategy adopted by the al-Assad regime to terrorize those who opposed it and change Syria demographically, examining the new laws issued by the government to transfer public properties into the hands of its loyal businessmen factions, as in the case of the reconstruction project in the city of Homs.

Seven years of war exhausted Syria's financial stocks, and the country (and in turn the regime) is suffering the consequences of military spending. But like any other war, destruction is also a great opportunity to generate money through reconstruction and growth. It is a “win-win situation”; the regime will use the fund designated for reviving the country to its own benefit, gaining future profits. Already invested in the conflict, involved countries will be part of the reconstruction process to secure their presence and control in Syria.

United Nations agencies like UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) and UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) are working closely with the Syrian regime and its governmental representatives. This research examines their involvement and how their ‘humanitarian mission' is being exploited to prop up the al-Assad regime.

The cost of equity (COE) and corporate governance structure are the most critical factors affecting competition among publicly held companies. Accordingly, the present paper aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance and the COE in the wake of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq.

Our statistical sample includes 34 companies listed on the Iraq Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2017. Board structure (i.e. board size, board independence, CEO tenure, board meetings frequency and CEO duality) and ownership structure (managerial ownership, institutional ownership and state ownership) are considered proxies for corporate governance structure. Besides, the authors employ the Capital Asset Pricing Model to measure the COE as our dependent variable. Multiple regression analysis and Exploratory Factor Analysis are also used to estimate the research models.

Our results suggest that corporate governance structure plays a significant role in reducing COE during the ISIS era. Furthermore, the authors find that corporate governance can be an alternative to COE reduction in Iraq’s absence of national security. Our findings also indicate that board size, board meeting frequency, managerial ownership and institutional ownership are negatively associated with COE.

Although this study has been thoroughly considered and cautiously planned, the specific period chosen to conduct the research (i.e. the ISIS era) could be a significant limitation since financial disclosure of listed companies may have been of lower quality during this period. However, to relatively alleviate this limitation and maintain the authenticity of the findings, the authors exclude low-quality financial statements, particularly non-audited financial reports, from the statistical sample. Furthermore, practitioners of emerging markets that are suffering from a weak external corporate governance combination can use the findings of this paper as a guideline to compensate the existing market deficiencies by improving internal corporate governance for observing further cash sources with lower cost. The findings also propose to international agencies that the business environment in Iraq is heavily affected by the ISIS phenomenon and needs financial aid to recover from its side effects. Furthermore, macroeconomists may use this paper to make more decisive macroeconomic indicators predictions.

This paper is among the pioneer investigations and elaborates on how the agency conflict is resolved effectively. The board and managerial characteristics and different forms of ownership might be applicable to provide cheaper funds for companies listed in emerging markets suffering from weak external corporate governance combinations.