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Although the threat of terrorist attacks is not a new phenomenon for hotels, limited literature exists on measures that hotels can take to prevent them or limit their damage. The purpose of this paper is to propose a baseline strategy to address this threat.

Using the terrorist attack cycle and the security function models introduced in this paper, 19 hotel security experts, members of an international working group on terrorism, were tasked to reach consensus on a baseline anti‐terrorist strategy for a hotel. To reach this consensus, the study employed the Nominal Group Technique.

The study presents a six‐step baseline anti‐terrorism strategy and a series of measures and actions under each step. In the centre of this strategy lies the disruption of the terrorist attack cycle.

There are limitations inherent to the Nominal Group Technique which may not allow the generalizability of the findings. However, every effort was made to ensure the reliability and validity of the study.

The study suggests a shift from physical protection alone to a more intelligence‐led approach. Counter‐surveillance, terrorist behavioral analysis, higher visibility of security measures, stronger relationships with local community leaders, collaborative relationships with emergency response agencies and strategic use of risk intelligence providers will have to take a higher place in the agendas of hotel security departments.

The paper presents, for the first time, two models that industry practitioners will find useful when designing security policies: the terrorist attack cycle and the security function model. Each component of the proposed strategy provides a starting point for the design of security strategies tailored on the security needs and budget of any hotel property.

This chapter examines the ‘new lateral surveillance’, spearheaded by government anti-terrorism campaigns urging citizens to report any suspicious people and objects they encounter. Drawing a comparison between this and the community crime prevention (CCP) programmes of past decades, the chapter discusses the likely effectiveness of such campaigns in controlling crime and increasing security, suggests an alternative interpretation and discusses the consequences of the culture of suspicion generated by this form of surveillance. It concludes that the new lateral surveillance is a form of ‘high policing’ that is both political and dangerous in its vulnerability to errors.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a metric for validating the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative’s (NSI) sixteen-category instrument, which is designed to guide law enforcement in the collection and analysis of suspicious behaviors preceding serious crimes, including terrorist attacks.

Data on suspicious preoperational activities and terrorism incident outcomes in the USA between 1972 and 2013 come from the American Terrorism Study (ATS). Using a mixed-method approach, the authors conduct descriptive and multivariate analyses to examine the frequencies of the least and most prevalent suspicious activities (or SAR indicators) and how they predict the likelihood of terrorism prevention. In addition, the authors contextualize how configurations of SAR indicators are associated with the successful thwarting of terrorism incidents by law enforcement using an analytical method known as conjunctive analysis of case configurations (CACC).

The study reveals several key findings. First, certain behaviors categorized as suspicious, such as making threats, occur more frequently than others. Second, making threats, conducting surveillance and terrorist recruitment/financing predict law enforcement interdiction in terrorism plots, while misrepresentation (or the manufacturing and use of false documents) is more associated with terrorist success. Third, prevalent SAR indicators operate differently in the context of various combinations of suspicious activities to shape the likelihood for law enforcement interdiction.

The current study’s findings may not be generalizable to other forms of violent extremism and terrorism outside of the USA.

This study illuminates opportunities for the NSI to provide law enforcement with the necessary tools to reduce terrorism risk and prevent future attacks.

To our knowledge, no scholarly work to date has assessed how observable behavioral indicators of suspicious preoperational activities affect the outcomes of terrorist plots.

The purpose of this paper is to challenge the “myth” that terrorism is cheap and that terrorists are extremely efficient in how they use their money.

This paper makes a critical assessment of the “costs” involved in terrorist attacks and addresses the debate about how this affects the overall strategy against terrorist financing.

This paper argues that costs of terrorism are many and not limited to what is spent on an actual attack. Owing to military and financial counter‐measures, terrorists appear to have lost overall operational efficiency; they are no longer capable of carrying out large‐scale and complex operations like the September 2001 attacks.

Small amounts involved in carrying out a terrorist attack have led to the perception that terrorism is cheap and terrorist attacks can be inexpensively implemented. This has undermined the global and national efforts to counter the financing of terrorism (CFT). This paper is an attempt to persuade the stakeholders in the CFT community that targeting terrorist financing has been and must remain one of the most important fronts in the war against terrorism.

Whenever America has fought wars, civil liberties are compromised. Led by Hoover, whose career began in the Library of Congress, the FBI has historically conducted questionable surveillance, often spying illegally on American citizens. There is a history of FBI surveillance in the Academy, including surveillance in libraries. Researchers, students, and librarians have been the subjects of FBI surveillance efforts. Today, the Patriot Act has reignited concerns about FBI surveillance in academic institutions. Librarians have often led the fight against limits imposed on accessing information. This is a short history of the conflict between the Academia and FBI surveillance.

In 2019, FIU-the Netherlands celebrated its 25th anniversary. This study takes the occasion to reflect on the role of the FIU in financial surveillance and to describe its core practices of collecting, analysing and disseminating financial intelligence.

Because FIU practices are often secret and its transaction data classified as state secrets, the FIU’s daily operational activities remain obscure. Drawing on interviews, public reports and an online training course, this study encircles secrecy and offers a fine-grained analysis of the FIU's core activities.

The article finds that the FIU plays a pivotal role in financial surveillance because it can operate at various intersections. An FIU operates at the intersection of finance and security, in between the public and private sector and at the national and international domain. This pivotal role makes the FIU indispensable in the surveillance of payment systems and spending behavior.

The article poses that the desirability and effectiveness of financial surveillance has to date not received sufficient consideration, while it affects (the privacy of) anyone with a bank account. The article asks: is it ethically justifiable that transaction information is declared suspect, investigated, and shared nationally and internationally, without the individual or entity concerned officially being notified and legally named a suspect?

This case-study is not only relevant for the study of finance/security, AML/CFT and financial surveillance, but also to policy makers and the broader public who merit an understanding of how their financial behaviour is being surveilled.

The purpose of this paper is to examine privacy rights and the relationship between those rights and business and government interests in data collected from individuals.

This paper approaches legal issues from the perspective of the consumer or citizen.

While conducting research for this paper, it was found that the issues facing the citizenry on privacy protection have been addressed extensively in the not too distant past. The distinguishing characteristic is the speed with which data can be collected and disseminated and the infinitely more vast amount of personal data being collected not only by the government and businesses with whom consumers conduct transactions, but also by independent data brokers.

Privacy rights are ephemeral and difficult to measure. Businesses, therefore, appear to have difficulty determining the value of protecting consumers' privacy. Additionally, governments from which citizens derive many social services accumulate substantial personal information given in exchange for those services. Businesses and governments are increasingly negligent in protecting the data collected on individuals, which has been revealed by a series of reported data breaches, disclosures, thefts, and surveillance activities. This paper addresses the inherent value in protecting the privacy interests of individuals and proposes that more robust privacy laws, derived from established tort law, be developed and used by concerned persons.

This paper will provide an overview of the contemporary surveillance environment in the age of Big Data and an insight into the complexities and overlap between security, bodily and informational surveillance as well as the subsequent impacts on privacy and democracy. These impacts include the ethical dilemmas facing librarians and information scientists as they endeavour to uphold principles of equality of access to information, and the support of intellectual freedom in private in an increasingly politicised informational environment. If we accept that privacy is integral to the notion of learning, free thought and intellectual exploration and a crucial element in the separation of the state and the individual in democratic society, then the emergence of the data age and the all-encompassing surveillance and exposure of once private acts will undoubtedly lead to the reimagining of the social and political elements of society.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how intelligent terrorist financiers avoid detection when acquiring and subsequently transferring financial assets to finance terrorism. Particular emphasis is placed on cryptocurrency.

A qualitative content analysis of 30 semi-standardised expert interviews with both criminals and prevention experts led to the identification of means for the circumvention of current combat the financing of terrorism (CFT) measures with a focus on cryptocurrency.

The findings illustrate, for the benefit of law enforcement agencies, investigators, regulating authorities and legislators, the specific low-risk methods that terrorist financiers use to generate and transfer assets. These findings help to develop more effective prevention methods.

Qualitative findings from the analysis of semi-standardised interviews are limited to the 30 interviewees’ perspectives.

Identification of gaps in existing CFT mechanisms provides compliance officers, law enforcement agencies and legislators with valuable insights into how criminals operate.

The existing literature focuses on organisations that combat terrorist financing and the improvement of CFT measures. This article outlines how terrorist financiers avoid detection. Both preventative and criminal perspectives are considered.