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In this chapter, we examine several attributes of lone wolf terrorists and how their activities are temporally and geospatially patterned. In particular, we demonstrate how precursor behaviors and attack characteristics of lone wolves are similar and different compared to those of group-based terrorists.

Based on data drawn from the American Terrorism Study (ATS), we examine 268 federal terrorism “indictees” linked to 264 incidents. Three types of loners are identified based on group affiliations and levels of assistance in preparing for and executing terrorist attacks. A series of analyses comparatively examine loners who had no assistance and those actors that did.

The results of this study suggest that lone wolf terrorists are more educated and socially isolated than group-based actors. Lone wolves also engage in less precursor activities than group actors, but are willing to travel greater distances to prepare for and execute attacks. Explanations for why lone wolves are able to “survive” longer than terrorist groups by avoiding arrest may in part stem from their ability to temporally and geospatially position their planning and preparatory activities.

Studies on lone wolf terrorism remain few and many are plagued by methodological and conceptual limitations. The current study adds to this growing literature by relying on lone wolf terrorism data recently made available by the American Terrorism Study (ATS). Our findings are valuable for members of the law enforcement and intelligence communities responsible for the early detection and prevention of lone wolf terrorism in the United States.

This paper aims to examine the shift away from the traditional distinction between organised crime and terrorist groups towards their conceptual convergence under the crime-terror nexus narrative in the context of international security and development policy in post-Soviet Central Asia. It assesses the empirical basis for the crime-terror and state-crime nexus in three Central Asian countries – Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – and argues that the exclusion of the state from the analytical framework undermines the relevance of the crime-terror paradigm for policy-making.

This paper draws on a literature review of academic research, recent case studies highlighting new empirical evidence in Central Asia and international policy publications.

There is a weak empirical connection between organised crime and Islamic extremists, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizbut Tahrir, in Central Asia. The state-crime paradigm, including concepts of criminal capture, criminal sovereignty and criminal penetration, hold more explanatory power for international policy in Central Asia. The crime-terror paradigm has resulted in a narrow and ineffective security-oriented law enforcement approach to counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism but does not address the underlying weak state governance structures and political grievances that motivate organised crime and terrorist groups respectively.

International policy and scholarship is currently focussed on the areas of convergence between organised crime and terrorist groups. This paper highlights the continued relevance of the traditional conceptual separation of terrorist and organised crime groups based on their different motives, methods and relationship with the state, for security and democratic governance initiatives in the under-researched Central Asian region.

The purpose of this study is twofold; first, it aims to understand the underlying dynamics of the organizations behind the terrorist attacks, and second, to investigate the dynamics of terrorist organizations in relation to one another to detect whether there exist shared patterns of terror between different organizations.

To achieve this purpose, the researcher proposes a computational algorithm that extracts data from global terrorism database (GTD); calculates similarity indices between different terrorist groups; generates a network data file from the calculated indices; and apply network analysis techniques to the extracted data. The proposed algorithm includes applying SQL database codes for data extraction, building a tailored C# computer software to calculate similarity indices and generate similarity networks and using GEPHI software to visualize the generated network and calculate network metrics and measures.

Applying the proposed algorithm to Egypt, the results reveal different shared patterns of terror among different terrorist groups. This helps us in creating a terror landscape for terrorist groups playing in Egypt.

The importance of the study lies in that it proposes a new algorithm that combines network analysis with other data-manipulation techniques to generate a network of similar terror groups.

Looks at the self‐reported perceptions of police chiefs in a majority of US cities with a population exceeding 100,000. Identifies, regionally and nationally, those internal domestic groups that have the greatest potential for terrorism within the next two years. Finds that anti‐abortionists were predicted to be the most likely group to attack at national level, but that when predictions were sought for geographical areas, each respondent believed that there was a greater likelihood of terrorism in Washington DC or New York City than in their own area. Finds that there had been no significant increase in planning against terrorism.

An investigation of parallels between homegrown, international, and domestic terrorism.

A comparative method is used to analyze data from two main sources, ITERATE data on international and the TWEED data on domestic terrorism. The similarities are tested in various dimensions – target types, severity, and the method of the attacks.

Homegrown terrorism is inherently motivated by domestic issues. Moreover, variables of ethnic heterogeneity, political inclusiveness of fringe groups, and problems in the democratization process are good predictors of the occurrence of other forms of domestic and homegrown terrorism alike.

Number of observable cases of homegrown terrorism are low. The two main datasets have potentially overlapping incidents.

Provides and operational definition of homegrown terrorism and test empirically the similarity between homegrown and other types of terrorisms.

This paper aims to examine whether from a factual standpoint, it is sufficiently reasonable to address the suppression of terrorist financing by analogy with money laundering.

The process of terrorist financing will be examined in regard to the funding requirements of terrorists and the methods and tools that terrorists use to raise, move and store their funds. The process of money laundering will be compared with terrorist financing. The role of money laundering in terrorist financing will be discussed. In the core part of this paper, the assumptions justifying the inclusion of anti-money laundering measures to terrorist financing will be challenged.

What terrorist financing and money laundering share in common is money. However, there are fundamental differences between them with regard to the sources of funds and the direction of financial flows. None of the elements –“accumulation” and “legitimization”– involved in money laundering are necessarily engaged in the process of terrorist financing. This questions the authenticity of the assumptions which underlie the adopted approach. It also requires further investigation on the effectiveness of the integrated counter-terrorist regime, which will not be covered by this paper.

This paper provides a comprehensive introduction for those dealing with the greater question of whether the terrorist financing can and should be tackled by anti-money laundering measures.

This chapter explains how economic analysis can contribute to the delineation of the lone wolf’s opportunities and choices in a manner that allows operationally relevant advice to be contributed to the investigative process.

Using a risk-reward analytical framework we examine the lone wolf’s attack method opportunities and choices and identify those attack methods that would be chosen by lone wolves with different levels of risk aversion. We also use prospect theory as an alternative methodology for the determination of the lone wolf’s preference orderings over the available attack methods in a context where he references his actions against those of a predecessor whom he wishes to emulate.

We find that lone wolf terrorists with different levels of risk aversion can be expected to choose different attack methods or combinations of attack methods. More risk averse lone wolf terrorists will choose attack methods such as assassination. Less risk averse lone wolf terrorists will choose attack methods such as bombing, hostage-taking and unconventional attacks. Also, we find that lone wolf terrorists who reference their actions against ‘predecessor’ lone wolf terrorists will choose differently from among the available attack methods depending on which predecessor lone wolf is being referenced.

The analysis provides two different perspectives on terrorist choice but by no means exhausts the analytical alternatives. The analysis focuses on the fatalities and injuries inflicted whereas other perspectives might include different ‘payoffs’ series, including news or media coverage.

The chapter contributes an analysis of the order in which lone wolf terrorists with particular characteristics will choose from a set of available attack methods. During the course of our discussion we point out the consistency between the ‘rise’ of the lone wolf terrorist and the diseconomies to scale that are evident within the terrorism context. This presents the opportunity for new debates.

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate on the relationship between terrorism, criminal organisations, and the so-called ‘new wars’.

Review of the existing literature on the ‘new wars’ and on the terrorism–crime nexus; estimate of the financial revenues gained by terrorist groups engaged in illicit activities.

Terrorist and criminal groups can develop several forms of collaboration. Whether terrorists convert to criminal activities or not depends on a variety of factors, both internal and external. In some cases these links are occasional and opportunistic, associated with the possibility of exploiting the availability of specialised competences in a stateless environment, in other cases the warring parties are directly involved and create stable relationships as a way to finance their war activities.

Lack of reliable data limits a comprehensive analysis. Nevertheless, the study has important consequences for designing and adopting more effective policies regarding terrorism, organised crime, as well as conflict resolution.

The study presents an overview of different strands of the literature on terrorism; a discussion is articulated on the interplay between ‘new wars’ and the terror–crime connection. Potentially fruitful avenues of investigation are suggested for future research.

The purpose of this paper is to recognize that organized crime and terrorism do not always operate independently from each other but, at times, rely on each other to create synergistic outcomes and use the same tactics and methods to advance their goals such as the use of fraud.

Sources of information consisted of scholarly articles and articles retrieved from the web.

Findings suggest that over time the crime‐terror nexus has increased its collaborative nature and terrorists have adopted the use of fraud schemes that were initially believed to be methods used only by organized crime to finance their organizations and goals.

This paper serves as a useful guide to alert and educate anti‐fraud professionals, law enforcement and policy makers of the nexus between organized crime, terrorism and fraud and that fraud should not be viewed as a peripheral issue in the crime‐terror nexus.