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This paper aims to inform the readers about the existing financial intelligence tools that are being used by financial intelligence units. It tries to demonstrate, with the help of a literature review, what the limitations of these tools are and how these limitations hinder the potential of the financial intelligence tools for early detection of terrorist financing activities.

The literature review method was adopted to discuss the financial intelligence tools, their limitations and the implications of the limitations for early detection of terrorist financing activities.

It was found that although the financial intelligence tools were introduced with a view to detect terrorist financing activities early, there are some inherent limitations of the tools relating to technical design features and operational procedures that hinder early detection of terrorist financing activities.

The existing financial intelligence tools need to be repaired by removing the inherent limitations of the tools.

The financial intelligence units should take into cognizance the importance of early detection of terrorist financing activities for preventing terrorist attacks and need to redesign the existing tools in such a way that make these tools effective for early detection of terrorist financing activities.

Peace will be established in society by preventing terrorist attacks through early detection of terrorist financing activities.

The originality of the paper lies in identifying the limitations of the existing financial intelligence tools for the early detection of terrorist financing activities.

The aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between terrorist activities in Pakistan and the stock market development.

Using Terrorism Impact Factor (TIF), a unique score developed for this paper, an insight is provided into the causal relationship that exists between terrorism and Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) index. Quantitative significance of the impact of terrorist activities on stock index is also discussed in the paper.

Through the empirics of the study, it is analyzed that terrorism negatively impacts stock market returns in the long run; whereas no significant relationship between stock market returns and terrorism is estimated in the short run.

A potential limitation of the study was the constraint related to the available yearly economic growth and other economic variables' data. The TIF created for the study was based on the terrorist activities from 2001 to mid‐2011 on an incident‐to‐incident basis. A yearly measure would have provided 11 data points for the study, which are considered insufficient for econometric analysis.

It is recommended that governments pay particular attention to economic recovery in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. Policies aimed at combating terrorism must be the priority of the government, so that its harm can be reduced, if not exterminated.

Terrorism, with its all kinds of impacts, affects the society and its activities and therefore must be eliminated if an economy needs to prosper.

This study envisions the overall impact of terrorist activities, not just a single activity, on the health of the economy. For studying this impact, a Terrorism Impact Factor (TIF) scale has been developed for this study, based on the impact of each terrorist activity in the country.

This paper aims to examine whether the money laundering/terrorist financing (ML/TF) model excludes important aspects of terrorist resourcing and whether the terrorist resourcing model (TRM) provides a more comprehensive framework for analysis.

Research consisted of case studies of resourcing activities of four listed terrorist organizations between 2001 and 2015: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hamas, a grouping of Al Qaeda-inspired individuals and entities under the heading “Al Qaeda inspired” and Hezbollah.

The most prevalent resourcing actors observed were non-profit organizations/associations, and the most prevalent form of resourcing was fundraising that targeted individual cash donations of small amounts. Funds were pooled, often passed through layers of charitable organizations and transmitted through chartered banks. The TRM is indeed found to provide a more comprehensive framework for identifying sources of resourcing and points of intervention. However, it does not in itself recommend effective means of response but it has implications for counter-resourcing strategies because it identifies resourcing actors and nodes where counter-resourcing could occur.

This paper advances the state of knowledge of terrorist resourcing activities in Canada and about the value of doing so through the analytical lens of the TRM as opposed to the predominant ML/TF model.

This paper aims to examine whether from a factual standpoint, it is sufficiently reasonable to address the suppression of terrorist financing by analogy with money laundering.

The process of terrorist financing will be examined in regard to the funding requirements of terrorists and the methods and tools that terrorists use to raise, move and store their funds. The process of money laundering will be compared with terrorist financing. The role of money laundering in terrorist financing will be discussed. In the core part of this paper, the assumptions justifying the inclusion of anti-money laundering measures to terrorist financing will be challenged.

What terrorist financing and money laundering share in common is money. However, there are fundamental differences between them with regard to the sources of funds and the direction of financial flows. None of the elements –“accumulation” and “legitimization”– involved in money laundering are necessarily engaged in the process of terrorist financing. This questions the authenticity of the assumptions which underlie the adopted approach. It also requires further investigation on the effectiveness of the integrated counter-terrorist regime, which will not be covered by this paper.

This paper provides a comprehensive introduction for those dealing with the greater question of whether the terrorist financing can and should be tackled by anti-money laundering measures.

The purpose of this paper is to give a better insight to the legal society, practitioners and legislators of the working mechanisms of money laundering activities, as well as the functionalities of the Anti‐Money Laundering and Anti‐terrorism Financing Act 2003 (AMLATFA) in Malaysia, in curbing money laundering and terrorism funding activities. At the same time, the paper provides an overview on the applicability and practicability of the enforcement mechanisms in Malaysia by exploring legislations from different jurisdictions that are more developed.

The paper achieves this by having a cross‐sectional analysis onto the legislation in Malaysia such as AMLATFA and also similar legislations found in countries such as the UK. A complete insight is further gained by having interviews with experts in the judiciary, Bank Negara, as well as the experts from the Attorney General's Chamber in Malaysia regarding their insight into the subject matter. Last but not least, the authors also surveyed into the different points of view from journal articles in Malaysia and globally.

Malaysia has a legal framework for curbing money laundering but the current AMLATFA provisions are considered to have failed to be effectively enforced. A more comprehensive, specific and well elaborated legal framework will have to be laid down in order to create a better platform for the prosecutors to bring a good case against these money launderers.

This paper will give a deeper insight to the legal society of the capability of AMLATFA and the lack of it, in curbing money laundering in Malaysia and, at the same time, creating awareness among policy makers of the difficulties faced by the enforcement bureaus in prosecuting these money launderers due to the lacunas in the current law.

This paper could be useful source of information for practitioners, academics, policymakers and students and a guide for any possible future amendments to the current insufficiency.

This paper aims to inform the readers about the preferred type of financial intelligence for early detection of terrorist financing activities.

Literature review methodology was adopted to find the existing approaches of financial intelligence and logical reasoning was applied to sort out what type of financial intelligence is more preferable for early detection of terrorist financing activities.

It was found that proactive financial intelligence executed through financial intelligence tools is the most preferred type of financial intelligence for early detection of terrorist financing activities.

The research will pave the way for further research on how to design financial intelligence tools for the early detection of terrorist financing activities.

The financial intelligence units will use the preferred type of financial intelligence for the early detection of terrorist financing activities.

It will help to establish peace in the society by thwarting terrorist conspiracies because early detection of terrorist financing through financial intelligence tools will stop the flow of funds to and from terrorists.

The originality of the paper lies in distinguishing proactive financial intelligence from reactive financial intelligence.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the anti‐terrorist finance provisions in the Penal Law as well as the vulnerabilities in place that hamper more effective regime.

The paper identifies the pre‐September 11 legal structure in Jordan regarding terrorist finance. Since, then the amended Penal Law, promulgated on October 8, 2001, has emerged as the principal tool in addressing terrorist finance activities. The paper is divided into five sections covering pre‐existing statutory provisions on terrorist finance, Jordan's counterterrorist financing regime including money laundering law and directives, the anti‐terrorist finance provisions in the Penal with its constituent elements, Jordan's accession to the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and finally the paper provides a set of conclusions.

There are still many loopholes to close in Jordan's anti‐terrorist finance initiatives. There is a need for greater enforcement of existing provisions with an eye to expanding the scope of article 147(2) of the Penal Law to include Islamic banks, hawala, charities, and zakat. A clear definition of the term “terrorist activity” should be supplied in article 147(2) and penalties for terrorist finance offense should be tightened.

Lack of publications or research on the subject of terrorist finance in Jordan in Arabic.

This paper will be very helpful for any individual interested in the legal regime of anti‐terrorist financing as it exists in Jordan.

This paper meets a need for an understanding of the Jordanian legal regime as applied to anti‐terrorist financing and offers insights to lawyers and academics.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a metric for validating the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative’s (NSI) sixteen-category instrument, which is designed to guide law enforcement in the collection and analysis of suspicious behaviors preceding serious crimes, including terrorist attacks.

Data on suspicious preoperational activities and terrorism incident outcomes in the USA between 1972 and 2013 come from the American Terrorism Study (ATS). Using a mixed-method approach, the authors conduct descriptive and multivariate analyses to examine the frequencies of the least and most prevalent suspicious activities (or SAR indicators) and how they predict the likelihood of terrorism prevention. In addition, the authors contextualize how configurations of SAR indicators are associated with the successful thwarting of terrorism incidents by law enforcement using an analytical method known as conjunctive analysis of case configurations (CACC).

The study reveals several key findings. First, certain behaviors categorized as suspicious, such as making threats, occur more frequently than others. Second, making threats, conducting surveillance and terrorist recruitment/financing predict law enforcement interdiction in terrorism plots, while misrepresentation (or the manufacturing and use of false documents) is more associated with terrorist success. Third, prevalent SAR indicators operate differently in the context of various combinations of suspicious activities to shape the likelihood for law enforcement interdiction.

The current study’s findings may not be generalizable to other forms of violent extremism and terrorism outside of the USA.

This study illuminates opportunities for the NSI to provide law enforcement with the necessary tools to reduce terrorism risk and prevent future attacks.

To our knowledge, no scholarly work to date has assessed how observable behavioral indicators of suspicious preoperational activities affect the outcomes of terrorist plots.

The terrorism of “Islamic State” (IS) is increasingly coming to be seen as a complicated and complex phenomenon permeated with various political goals and personal interests. The effectiveness of terrorist recruiters determines the need to identify the reasons for the appeal of the IS image and for the effectiveness of IS propaganda in different population layers and social groups. From this perspective, it is crucial to identify the significant social factors that are most affecting the perception of the terrorist activities of “IS” and their role in creating and shaping IS images. The purpose of this paper is to determine the role of social capital in the perception of the IS image.

The study is based on the findings of a sociological survey of a sample comprising 881 Russian students. In this research, six scales were used to identify the attitude of Russian students toward IS: informational awareness of IS; the image of IS fighters; the image of IS as an organization; attitude to an anti-terrorist policy; the role of the mass media; the level of social capital. Factorial analysis of the main components was conducted for each of the scales.

Subsequently, the correlation analysis of the relationship of social capital to the perception of the image of “IS” was conducted. Six main IS images were identified in the minds of the students. The research results show that survey participants with high levels of social capital are significantly more negative in their perception of the activities of the terrorist organization in question.

From this perspective, it is crucial to identify the significant social factors that are most affecting the perception of the terrorist activities of “IS” and their role in creating and shaping IS images. This study focuses on determining the role of social capital in the perception of the IS image.

The purpose of this paper is to examine – using crime script analysis – the practical effectiveness of internationally endorsed and universally recognised counter-terrorism financing (CTF) standards in preventing the movement of money for the purposes of terrorism. The paper does not seek to examine the originating circumstances of terrorist finances or how laundered value is assigned.

Preliminary evaluation focuses on the discrepancies between the practices of money laundering and terrorist financing. Following an introduction to crime scripts, internationally endorsed anti money laundering (AML)/CTF practices are discussed to identify the process used to trace, prevent and limit money laundering and terrorist financing. Several terrorist financing case studies are then aligned to the process of crime script analysis to determine whether existing AML/CTF practices are effective in preventing terrorist financing.

The AML model “Placement, layering, integration” is only relevant to CTF in the comparatively rare cases when the origin of the money is crime. This creates a false sense of security through over reliance on AML/CTF for CTF purposes. A crime script approach can be applied to terrorist finance, but it is currently hindered by insufficient reporting of low level financing of terrorists, their addresses and associates. Law enforcement make insufficient use of financial intelligence – as a routine practice – in their crime and terrorist investigations; they have not adopted parallel investigation as a routine approach and consequently remain largely unconnected with the AML/CTF regime.

Utilising terrorist financing case studies, this paper identifies that existing AML/CTF international standards and practices are not adequate for controlling the movement of funds for financing terrorism because of the lack of focus on a specific script that aligns to known terrorist finance methodologies. While the paper identifies that existing AML/CTF international standards are thorough, the process underpinning the financing of terrorism is too dissimilar to the process of money laundering, namely, placement, layering, and integration, to support practices associated with terrorism prevention and detection.

This paper provides an examination of the practicalities behind the countering of terrorist financing from a compliance and investigative perspective. The paper is of interest to those involved in policy, compliance and investigations associated with terrorist financing.