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To introduce the concepts of interval funds and tender offer funds and compare them to other pooled investment vehicles.

This article provides an overview of the interval fund and tender offer fund structures, including the law, regulations and market practices regarding redemptions, liquidity, fees and expenses and other key terms.

Interval funds and tender offer funds should be considered by alternative investment managers seeking to expand into public markets or traditional fund managers that seek additional portfolio flexibility.

In addition to a plain English analysis of the rules and regulations applicable to interval funds and tender offer funds, the article analyzes market practices regarding redemption frequency and amount.

To analyze and identify the key findings from the April 8, 2020, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (the “SEC”) recently approved rule amendments (“Adopted Rules”) extended to business development companies (“BDCs”) and registered closed-end funds and an Exemptive Order providing regulatory flexibility to BDCs.

Discusses the key takeaways and implications from the Adopted Rules and Exemptive Order.

The Adopted Rules provide BDCs and registered closed-end funds some of the more efficient registration, reporting, offering, and communication requirements currently applicable to operating companies. The Exemptive Order provides BDCs additional flexibility with respect to (1) the issuance and sale of senior securities and (2) the participation in certain joint transactions.

Firms and their representatives should heed the trends in both the substantial restitution FINRA is ordering and the related enforcement issues in the cases FINRA has brought.

Expert analysis and guidance from experienced asset management lawyers.

To explain recent regulatory guidance for different types of stakeholders, including asset managers, fund complexes, and institutional investors.

Summary of recent regulatory guidance and explanation for different types of stakeholders, including asset managers, fund complexes, and institutional investors.

While the U.S. Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) letter does not open the door to direct access to Private Market Investments by 401(k) plan participants, it does provide a framework for the expanded use of private equity and, we believe, other types of Private Market Investments in managed asset allocation funds such as target date funds.

Practical guidance from experienced asset management and investment funds and ERISA lawyers.

Russia's size – both in terms of population and geography, spanning 11 time zones, 89 oblasts (states or regions) and autonomous republics and its privatization program, encompassing some 100,000 small-scale enterprises, 25,000 medium to large firms, and 300 or so of its largest firms, made its privatization program the largest sale/transfer of assets conducted among the transition economies, with the possible exception of China. Comparisons by many of the program's critics, and there are many, to Poland, Hungary, or the Czech republic are invidious, especially the latter two countries whose populations are similar to just that of greater Moscow.

After a series of recent Delaware Chancery Court and Delaware Supreme Court decisions and the standard of judicial review applied in challenges to “going‐private” transactions, controlling stockholders seeking to privatize their subsidiaries may be induced to do so by means of a two‐step acquisition (i.e., unilateral tender or exchange offer, followed by a short‐form merger) instead of a negotiated, single‐step merger. That said, there are a range of practical considerations for public M&A advisors in the wake of these decisions that may not necessarily make the two‐step method the “be all and end all” approach. In any case, there is an incongruity in Delaware’s common law, which is policy‐driven and, to some degree, formalistic, and which may no longer be as defensible today as it once may have been. Accordingly, a critical review of the applicable Delaware precedents and, ultimately, the reversal or modification thereof, seems appropriate at this time.

The British North American colonies were the first western economies to rely on legislature-issued paper monies as an important internal media of exchange. This system arose piecemeal. In the absence of banks and treasuries that exchanged paper monies at face value for specie monies on demand, colonial governments experimented with other ways to anchor their paper monies to real values in the economy. These mechanisms included tax-redemption, land-backed loans, sinking funds, interest-bearing notes, and legal tender laws. I assess and explain the structure and performance of these mechanisms. This was monetary experimentation on a grand scale.

This chapter focuses on policy intervention that has grown in popularity in the UK since the financial crisis of 2008. The focus is on inclusive growth and more specifically, community wealth building. The concept has been picked up by institutions and think tanks at multiple scales from the OECD to local government. We aim to address the tensions in community wealth building and in particular how local authorities in the UK are adjusting their procurements strategies to increase the tendering capabilities of SMEs in their political geography.

We introduce a UK-based study utilising an ESRC-funded case study, desktop research and semi-structured interviews to investigate how well the region of Greater Manchester (GM) ecosystem was equipped to prepare small firms to learn how to compete for public contracts with evidence applicable to other large-scale tenders.

Overall, at the time of writing business support across GM does not create the value proposition of enabling small firms to be capable at tendering and thus undermines community wealth building (CWB) efforts. The advice on offer is sparse; it offers partial or no advice about different capabilities and is often limited to simple guidance stating procurement rules and compliance demands. Information is often abstract and technical support is also fragmented, making it unlikely that small firms will find resources. Advice fails to engage with evidence on how small firms learn and to provide a learning process. In particular, support to raise absorptive capacity and strategic commitment to tendering, build basic tender readiness and develop and refresh tendering capability is not evident. Training, coaching and peer learning are largely absent.

UK appears to be an experimental ground for CWB with dedicated think tanks and several examples such as the ‘Preston Model’. GM is a suitably sized and comparable region to offer transferable knowledge and indicators to support regions to innovate. We offer a ‘Dashboard of Priorities’ to enhance business support to SMEs so they can win at tendering, thus strengthening CWB policy and impact. Furthermore, we are adding clarity to a fuzzy definition of CWB and define inclusive procurement. We assist global policymakers to answer the fundamental question; are we doing all that we can with these significant resources to create an economy which truly benefits the people? By examining the ideas of community wealth building and inclusive procurement from a local authority and SME perspective, we can extrapolate finings for international comparison and offer an in-depth look at how the execution of this policy can be strengthened to deliver maximum benefit to their communities. The implication is to focus attention on how institutions (public or private), by way of better execution, can enhance the economic resilience of their own local ecosystems/places.

This paper aims to extend the work by Vafeas and Lie and Lie by developing an empirical model of choice among four alternative mechanisms for distributing cash from corporations to shareholders: a fixed‐price self‐tender offer, a Dutch auction self‐tender offer, an open market share repurchase, and a special dividend.

A multinomial logit (MNL) model adapted for choice‐based sampling is used to examine the factors that influence a firm's choice among the four methods.

Firms with a high degree of heterogeneity in shareholder valuations tend to select an open market repurchase, while firms with low levels of heterogeneity choose a special dividend. Firms already paying high dividends are more likely to issue a special dividend than institute an open market repurchase. A firm with poor stock performance prior to the announcement is more likely to choose a fixed‐price self‐tender offer or open market share repurchase. On the other hand, firms are more likely to follow strong performance with a special dividend. Contrary to Persons' model, it is found that firms facing a takeover threat are more likely to choose a fixed‐price tender offer than a Dutch auction.

It is shown that the ownership structure, current payout level; the size of the distribution, and the degree of stock undervaluation are among the most important determinants of a firm's choice among alternative payout methods.

This study adds to the existing literature by developing the first empirical model of choice among all four one‐time (or infrequent) corporate cash disbursement methods. It is also the first to adjust the MNL estimates for the choice‐based sampling method used to collect the data.

This article addresses, in the third‐party acquisition context, how a series of U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals and District Court decisions have chilled the use of tender offers as an expedient, and often the optimum, method of business combination or sale of control. These decisions have disparately construed the applicability of the SEC’s “all holders‐best price” rule (contained in the federal tender offer regulations) to an increasing variety of compensatory and other management payment arrangements which, while often incidental and certainly related to the tender offer, may not necessarily have been intended as deal consideration paid to the recipients. Until there is resolution by the U.S. Supreme Court or definitive guidance from the SEC on the ambit of Rule 14d‐10, expedient and less costly tender offer structures are yielding to single‐step mergers. This is not always the best result for stockholders.

This paper aims to show how the proposed approach (two analytic hierarchy process [AHP] models) may allow dealing with the best tender selection process in an organic and simple way and ensure the consistency check of the judgements, the necessary step for having reliable results. At first, this paper highlights some critical issues regarding the weighted sum model (WSM) and the algorithms frequently used to evaluate the most economic advantageous tender. Then, it proposes to extend the AHP approach to the evaluation of both the qualitative and quantitative components of a public procurement award. Finally, the WSM and the AHP are applied to the same case study to show, step by step, some criticisms of the former and some advantages of the latter.

This paper proposes to apply two AHP models to evaluate both qualitative and quantitative components of a public tender. The quality and cost models allow to identify and select the tender associated with the highest quality/cost ratio.

The assessment of the WSM and the AHP models, and some differences between them, build upon their application as an example of public procurement. A case study is used as a teaching device (Yin, 2003) to highlight why the AHP may provide different results. In particular, an important issue concerning the evaluation of qualitative requirements is explored: the consistency of judgements expressed by the committee members.

This approach provides analytical tools for public management that allow appropriate implementation of their management function and allow a realisation of the strategic objectives of European Union law and Italian legislation on public procurement. It would help managers to prioritise their goals and criteria and evaluate them in a scientific way. The model integrates multiple qualitative and quantitative criteria, simplifies the selection process, achieves optimal use of funds and leads to cost savings. It allows to reduce the discretional power of both the contracting issuer, in the choice of the formula to adopt for calculating the coefficients, and the committee members, allowing tender evaluation to have more trust and ensure the fairness of public procurement matters and quality of the object purchased.

This paper proposes the use of two hierarchical models to evaluate qualitative and quantitative requirements and provide the ranking among several tenders.